


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IBRAHIM OF EGYPT



IBRAHIM PASHA

IBRAHIM OF EGYPT

BY

PIERRE CRABITÈS

*Author of Gordon, the Sudan and Slavery ; The Winning of
the Sudan ; Ismail, the Maligned Khedive ; Beneš,
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WITH TWO PORTRAITS



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PREFACE

THE name and fame of Muhammad Ali, the Founder of Modern Egypt, are well known. His vivid personality has appealed to many writers, who have concentrated the limelight on him. Some of them have allowed Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim, to appear on the stage, but they have assigned him a more or less obscure rôle. They refer to him as the sword wielded by his astute father, and have usually treated him as if he knew nothing of statesmanship, and were merely a bluff soldier whose military talents happened to be superior to those of the generals opposed to him.

This book seeks to redress this error and bring the truth into its proper perspective. It does not belittle the glory of Muhammad Ali, but it stresses the part played by Ibrahim in public affairs.

My theme is Egypt, but it draws me into the vortex of higher European politics in the years between 1820 and 1841.

These pages are a tribute to the broadness of vision of King Fuad, the present sovereign of Egypt. It was he who collected the documents which now constitute what are known as the Abdine Palace archives of the reign of Muhammad Ali. It was there that I found the abundant source material which I cite. My respectful thanks are due to his Majesty for having given me unfettered access to these records.

My book makes repeated reference to the recent publication of official reports contained in the French Foreign Office and in the Greek, Russian and French Consulates, not to speak of those of the states which

now consitute the Kingdom of Italy. His Majesty's privy purse bore the heavy expense of collecting and publishing all this hitherto widely scattered and in some cases almost inaccessible source material. It is thus obvious that King Fuad's initiative dominates this work. My debt to him is indeed very great.

PIERRE CRABITÈS

CHAPTER I

BIRTH

WHEN, on 9 July, 1805, Constantinople conferred upon Muhammad Ali the pashalik of Cairo, that astute soldier felt secure enough in his position to send for his sons, Ibrahim and Toussun. They were not yet out of their teens, the elder being barely seventeen years of age. During those crucial years when their father was tempting fate and scheming and fighting for power, the boys had remained with their mother at their birthplace, Kavala, a small seaport on the frontier of Thrace and Macedonia. The day after their arrival in Cairo the Pasha took them to the citadel and there installed his elder son as Governor of that stronghold.¹

In asserting that Ibrahim was made Governor of the Cairo Citadel we are entering upon controversial ground. Sheikh Abdel Rahman El Djabarti is our authority for the statement that Muhammad Ali conferred this honour upon the elder of the two brothers. Djabarti lived in Egypt during the period he describes, and published a diary of the events of which he was an eye-witness. His truthfulness is generally recognized by students of the reign of Muhammad Ali. But later writers such as Mouriez² and Bankes,³ for example, who were not in Egypt

¹ *Merveilles biographiques et historiques, ou chroniques du Cheikh Abdel Rahman El Djabarti*, Traduites de l'Arabe, Le Caire, Imprimerie Nationale, 1892, vol. VII, p. 348.

² *Histoire de Méhémet Ali, Viceroy d'Egypte*, par Paul Mouriez, Paris, Louis Chappe, 1858, vol. I, p. 241.

³ *Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Giovanni Finati*, edited by William John Bankes, London, John Murray, 1830, vol. I, p. 85.

in 1805, record that the father gave this post to Toussun. This detail would seem to be of no importance, but it is emphasized for reasons that will subsequently be made clear.

Shortly after Muhammad Ali had summoned his sons from Kavala, his adversaries renewed their pressure on him. Fortune still favoured him, but in order to maintain his supremacy he had to exercise much diplomacy. He considered it expedient to promise to send to Constantinople a present of four thousand purses. But he did not possess the ready cash. The Sultan's capitan-pasha was obdurate. He wanted gold, and threatened to use his influence on behalf of one of the other camps if it were not forthcoming. It was finally agreed that Ibrahim, Muhammad Ali's son, should be sent as a hostage, with rich presents, and that he should remain in Constantinople until the entire sum was paid. The boy sailed for the Bosphorus in October 1806.¹

An unpublished report submitted to his Foreign Office by the Austrian Ambassador accredited to the Sublime Porte and dated 25 November 1806, brings out the fact that the Turkish fleet, which had just returned from Egyptian waters, had on board Muhammad Ali's eldest son, whom his father had sent as a species of hostage to guarantee his good faith.²

Ibrahim was returned to his father on 26 September, 1807. It is by no means certain that Muhammad Ali had yet paid the four thousand purses, but he had rendered the Sublime Porte such splendid services that it was considered wise to surrender the young man. The disastrous British expedition of that year had so enhanced the prestige

¹ *Histoire de l'Égypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammed Ali*, par Felix Mengin, Paris, Bertrand, 1823, vol. I, p. 247; Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 259; Djabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, p. 36.

² Austrian Haus, Hof und Staatsarchiv. Turkish Section 1806, file 66 A.

of the boy's father and internal troubles at Constantinople had so lessened that of the Sultan that every effort was made by Constantinople to conciliate its resourceful and triumphant vassal.¹

But while the Sublime Porte thus recognized the growing power of Muhammad Ali, tongues wagged in Egypt and gossip sought to undermine the influence of the leader who had recently conquered an English army and had boldly exhibited in his capital an avenue of stakes decorated with the heads of slain British. Notwithstanding this success, the Mamelukes whom the Pasha had defeated, the enemies whom he had outwitted, the leaders whom he had supplanted, still looked upon the Sultan as being more powerful than the Viceroy. From the very day when Ibrahim had sailed from Alexandria as a hostage to guarantee the payment of the four thousand purses, all the cunning of those whom the Pasha had defeated, outwitted and outbid was centred upon attempting to prove that he would never pay the tribute which he had promised to transmit. Spleen carried the disgruntled group so far that they declared that Muhammad Ali did not care what happened to his diplomatic pawn so long as he could save his sceptre. Malicious tongues added that the hostage was not the son, but merely the adopted child of the sturdy Albanian.

There is not a scintilla of evidence to justify this wanton falsehood. Djabarti did not like either Muhammad Ali or Ibrahim and would certainly have reported any such rumour, had he heard of it. Von Stürmer, the Austrian Internuncio, was in a position to get to the bottom of matters because his representative in Egypt, Rossetti, by name, probably knew that country better than any other foreigner. We have already seen that in 1806 he officially referred to Ibrahim as being Muhammad Ali's eldest son

¹ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 297.

and obviously based his report upon information given him by Rossetti.

The lie which was launched by political intriguers was made circumstantial. The tale was told—and we do not question its accuracy—that Muhammad Ali had wedded a divorced woman and that her former husband was still living when Ibrahim was born. But two facts were suppressed—that his wife had been validly divorced before the Pasha had married her and that Ibrahim, like Toussun, and a daughter who was elder than either of them, had been born of the new union. The story, nevertheless, was constantly repeated by ill-disposed tongues.

Giovanni Finati, a native of Ferrara who, under the name of Muhammad, enlisted in the Egyptian forces, Joseph Planat, a Frenchman who served in the same army, and an anonymous French author writing under the initials C.D. and believed to be Charles Deval, heard these stories and put them into print.¹ Their books were published more than twenty years after the Austrian Ambassador had submitted his official report to his Foreign Office. Other writers, such as Sadlier, a British officer attached to Ibrahim's army², William Gifford Palgrave, an English traveller who visited Arabia in 1861-1862,³ and Scipion Marin, a Frenchman who issued in 1840 a work entitled "*Événements et Aventures en Egypte en 1839*"⁴

¹ Finati, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 85. *Histoire de la Régénération de l'Égypte*, par Jules Planat, Paris, J. Barbezat, 1830, p. 34. *Deux Années à Constantinople et en Morée 1825-1826*, par Monsieur C.D.: London, R. G. Jones, 1st January, 1828, p. 199.

² *Relation de la Campagne d'Ibrahim Pacha contre les Wahabites*, traduit de l'Anglais par N. Perrin, Paris, Imprimerie de Rignour, 1833, p. 7.

³ *A Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, by William Gifford Palgrave, London, Macmillan & Co., 1866.

⁴ *Événements et Aventures en Egypte en 1839*, par Scipion Marin, Paris, 1840, vol. I, p. 23. Baedeker's *Egypt*, Vth English edition, 1902, on page xcix refers to Ibrahim as Muhammad Ali's adopted son. We have not consulted the VI and VII editions of this work, but the VIII issued in 1929 under the title of *Egypt and the Sudan* mitigates the finality of this statement and speaks of "Muhammad (Ali's) son (or adopted son) Ibrahim Pasha (born 1789)."

gave further publicity to the yarn. Not one of them, however, appears to have been interested in source material. The latter, who was obviously bent upon collecting all the salacious morsels he could gather together in the slums of Cairo, prefers to say that Ibrahim was Muhammad Ali's son but that the boy was begotten while his mother's first marriage was still undissolved.

We dismiss Scipion Marin's slander, which is beneath contempt. This Frenchman with a jaundiced mind obviously had no way of knowing what went on behind the walls of a Muslim *harim* in Kavala in 1789.

Bankes bases his deduction on the theory that Muhammad Ali showed marked preference for Toussun over Ibrahim. "He was", he writes, "(on the first arrival of both in 1805) made Governor of the Citadel and afterwards a Pasha of two Tails and General-in-Chief of the Mecca expedition, long before any such honours fell to Ibrahim's share."

Djabarti's diary has already been cited to prove that Ibrahim, not Toussun, was made the Governor of the Citadel in 1805. It was only when the elder brother was sent, in 1806, as a hostage to Constantinople that the post was given to the younger son. When Finati reached Cairo, some months after Ibrahim's return, Toussun was permitted to remain in office, but a new mandate of greater dignity was given to the returned hostage. He became his father's Defterdar or Inspector-General of Accounts. Captain Sadlier records that this trust was discharged with remarkable ability.¹

Bankes is likewise mistaken when he affirms that Toussun was made a Pasha and appointed General-in-Chief of the Mecca expedition "long before any such honours fell to Ibrahim's share". A fire, which broke

¹ Perrin, *op cit*, p 7.

out in the Cairo Citadel in 1820, has destroyed practically all the Egyptian records covering the years which precede 1817. We are therefore unable to say with certainty just when Ibrahim and Toussun received their "two tails". But where Bankes obviously falls into error is in assuming that the command of the Mecca expedition was a more important assignment than that already held by Ibrahim. Perhaps it was because the Englishman was attached to that army that he looked upon Toussun's command as being of such transcendent importance.

The question should, however, be considered from the point of view not of Bankes but of Muhammad Ali. In 1811, and the years immediately before and after that date, the security of Egypt and the husbanding of her finances meant far more to the Pasha than did the conquest of Arabia. The only register which escaped the Citadel fire of 1820 contains copies of certain official reports sent by Muhammad Ali to the Sultan. They demonstrate abundantly that the Sublime Porte insisted upon the importance of putting down the Wahabi revolt which then held Arabia in its grip, but that the vassal preferred to delay entering upon the campaign until he could first assure the maintenance of law and order in Egypt. Muhammad Ali was a prudent statesman and a competent soldier. He saw that unless he had peace at home an expedition in foreign parts was a risk that he could not safely undertake.

Ibrahim not only played a prominent part in collecting the revenues needed for this attack on Mecca, but he was also one of Muhammad Ali's main lieutenants in his father's war against the internal foe. Several authorities may be cited in support of this statement. Attention will, however, be rivetted upon Captain Sadlier's report. It tells that :

"after having filled for some time the post of

‘ collector of taxes for Upper Egypt, Ibrahim was
‘ assigned to the command of an army which had
‘ been ordered to march against the Mamelukes.
‘ He attacked them and drove them into Nubia. . . .
‘ In 1809 Ibrahim was appointed Governor of Upper
‘ Egypt, while maintaining his post of Defterdar.
‘ His administration of the revenues of the country
‘ assumed wide ramifications and, carrying out his
‘ father’s orders, he devoted large sums to the
‘ improvement of agriculture ”.¹

While Ibrahim was thus hard at work raising revenue and chasing contingents of Mamelukes out of Egypt, his father, when not in the field leading the battle, was sending despatches advising the Sultan of his inability to launch the Mecca expedition until the complete extermination of the Mamelukes. Unpublished reports submitted by the Pasha to the Sultan and dated 11 Rabi el Awal 1225, 7 Jemazi el Akbar 1225 and 9 Safar 1226², Many an historian has described how Muhammad Ali invited all the Mamelukes in the neighbourhood of Cairo to attend the ceremony incident to the departure of Toussun for Arabia and how all these men met their death. The Pasha’s account of this incident is now available. It is the last of the three documents just cited. It reads in part :

“ Having been occupied during the last four or five years in an attempt to prepare the ground for the Hedjaz campaign, I did everything conceivable to make that expedition possible. The rebellious Mamelukes were, however, for several years an insurmountable difficulty which thwarted my plans. . . . I kept them near me in order that I might be able to shower all kinds of courtesies upon them.

¹ Perrin, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

² Royal Egyptian Archives (Turkish Section), File 1, Document No. 81.

"I spared nothing in the hope of making them my devoted adherents. But they are traitors. Several hundreds of them recently ran away from their camp and fled to the South. I had them followed and annihilated. When this defeat was known, those who had not escaped from Cairo came to me and besought me to keep them in my service. I did so, but they proved recreant to the trust put in them. . . . I therefore took the departure of my son, Toussun Ahmed Pasha, as a pretext to summon to Cairo the 24 accursed Amirs, who were nominally in my service but really scheming against me. I made them come with their auxiliaries and their partisans, known as Itch-oglans, and their satellites and clients. When all of them were in the Citadel I had the gates of that fortress securely closed. All these brigands were exterminated to the very last."

This is not the place to comment upon the ethics of this holocaust. The only deduction that will be drawn from it is that it demonstrates the supreme importance attached by Muhammad Ali to the task of exterminating the Mamelukes. This massacre accounted for twenty-four of their number and for the blood of many of their followers. The report refers to other Amirs who had already been killed in the south. The power of the Mamelukes was undoubtedly tottering when Toussun left for the Hedjaz, but it was still potentially dangerous enough to require vigilance. In view of the fact that Toussun was chosen for the command of the more spectacular but less important Mecca expedition, Bankes was mistaken in assuming that the younger brother was given precedence over the elder.

We have been informed that there are no records at Kavala which can throw the slightest light upon the date of the marriage of Muhammad and of the birth of Ibrahim. There are official documents in the Turkish section of the Royal Egyptian archives in

which Muhammad Ali refers to Ibrahim as his son. A letter written by the Pasha to the Sublime Porte is, however, far more convincing than could be any such matter-of-fact evidence. The Sultan had reproached his vassal with having been somewhat remiss in discharging certain obligations. The Pasha, in defending himself, used this language :

" I shall give, Master and Benefactor, a short insight into my devotion. God has vouchsafed to me three children who are dearer to me than my life or my sight. . . . And yet I appointed my eldest son my Defterdar and I have sent him to the Sudan. I have not seen him for six months. I assigned him to the Sudan because the Mamelukes were ruining that province. The redemption of that province is essential. It is to that task that I have assigned my son who is the light of my eyes. My second son, Toussun Ahmed Pasha, has been designated for the Hedjaz mission. Although separation from these two children tears my heart, I say : ' I sacrifice my children for my Master. The only question which I consider is whether he is satisfied with his servant ' ' .¹

The whole tone of the letter written 16 January 1812 excludes the idea that Ibrahim could have been an adopted child. It states that Toussun was the second son. And it shows that the elder brother was pursuing the Mamelukes in the South when Toussun was still in Cairo preparing to depart for the simpler and less important task of defeating the Wahabis.

Another letter, in these archives, reveals the same truth. It is dated 4 Rabi al Awal, 1237, corresponding to 29 November 1821. Toussun was then dead. Ibrahim was a national hero. He had completed the task of subduing the Wahabis in which the younger son had failed. He was then in the Sudan on an

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives (Turkish Section), File 1, Document Nos. 81.

important mission entrusted to him by Muhammad Ali. The letter is addressed to "my son Ibrahim". It deals with official business. To it is added a post-scriptum which emphasizes the fatherly touch. It reads :

"My son, I love you and I love your brother, Ismail, even as I do my eyes and my soul. If I thus expose you to such great fatigue and thus send you out of your country, it is in order that I may be able to procure for us such advantages as will add to our prestige. It is for you, not for me to decide".¹

A footnote in *The Founder of Modern Egypt* by Henry Dodwell reads as follows :

"The story was put about that he (Ibrahim) was the son of Muhammad Ali's first wife by a former husband. But this was untrue. Campbell, July 30, 1839, (F.O. 78-375)".

This reference gave us a clue which settles the question.

We wrote Roy Atherton, the efficient and obliging Counsellor of the American Embassy at London and requested that he procure for us a copy of the complete text of the report thus cited. He did so. We reproduce it in full. It reads as follows :

"No.63

" Alexandria,

31st July, 1839.

" My Lord :

" Having seen it asserted in the speeches of some French deputies that Ibrahim Pasha was only the adoptive Son of Mehemet Ali, I mentioned it to him and asked him if Ibrahim Pasha was his own Son or if he was the Son of his wife by a former husband.

" The Pasha replied that his wife had never any

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives (Turkish Section) File unnumbered. Document No. 98.

“ other husband but himself, and that she bore to him
“ five children, all born at Cavalla in Romelia, the
“ native town of himself and of his wife. That the
“ eldest child, a female, who has been dead for some
“ years, was the wife of Moharem Bey (now here).
“ Ibrahim Pasha was the second and the others were
“ Toussun Pasha and Ismail Pasha (both dead) and
“ Nazli Hanım the widow of the late Defterdar.

“ The Pasha added that Ibrahim Pasha was the only
“ one of his children who was nursed by his own
“ Mother, the reason of which was, that as the plague
“ existed at Kavalla at the time of his birth, his Mother
“ was afraid etc. to get a nurse for him.

“ The Pasha added that all his other children were
“ the offspring of separate and different Mothers.

“ I have the honour to be with the highest respect,

“ My Lord,

“ Your Lordship's

“ Most Obedient

“ Very Humble Servant

“ (signed) Pat. Campbell.”

“ The Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B., etc., etc., etc.”

This official document eliminates all possibility of doubt in regard to the paternity of Ibrahim. It may be objected, however, that we have said that Muhammad Ali married a divorced woman and that this report quotes him as saying “ that his wife had never any
“ other husband but himself”. Our reply is that as recent a work as *Mon Pays, La Rénovation de l’Egypte, Mohammad Aly*, by Princess Chivékiar of Egypt, a lineal descendant of Muhammad Ali, after setting forth how grateful was the Governor of Pravousta for certain services rendered by Muhammad Ali, adds :

“ *Il lui donna le grade de capitaine et lui offrit comme*
“ *épouse une riche parente divorcée qu’il protégeait.*
“ *Muhammad Ali eut de sa femme cinq enfants, trois*

"garçons et deux filles, Ibrahim, Toussun, Ismail, Nazli, "Téfideh." (He made him a Captain and offered him as wife a rich divorced relative whom he protected. Muhammad Ali had by his wife five children, three boys and two girls, Ibrahim, Toussun, Ismail, Nazli Téfideh).¹

We offer two explanations of this apparent contradiction. The first is that Muhammad Ali answered the Consul-General's question about the birth of Ibrahim because it was a pertinent inquiry and tended to set at rest rumours affecting Ibrahim's paternity—rumours which might easily affect adversely the dynasty which the Pasha had then determined to found. The detail of whether Ibrahim's mother was or was not a divorced woman when Muhammad Ali married her, had no dynastic significance. The reply registered by the British Consul-General may well have been an attempt on the part of Muhammad Ali to abstain from unnecessarily taking the public into his confidence.

The other explanation is equally plausible. It is this. Under Muhammadan law, marriage is a civil contract. The payment of a dower by the husband to the wife is an essential pre-requisite. The woman becomes legally the man's wife from the instant the contract is signed and the dower paid. Months almost invariably elapse between the date of this formality and the departure of the bride from the paternal roof. It is during this period that the trousseau is prepared. The ceremony which may be compared to the Occidental wedding usually takes place the evening the bride leaves her father's home. It is then that the husband receives her in his arms and takes her to his couch, but she has legally been his wife since the moment of the signing of the contract.

¹ *Mon Pays, La Rénovation de l'Egypte, Mohammad Aly, par la Princesse Chivékiar d'Egypte, Paris, Le Roux, 1933, p. 9.*

It is quite possible that this rich relative was married to somebody else, but that she had remained with her parents pending the completion of her trousseau. She may, perhaps, have been married when in her cradle. Muhammad Ali's sudden rise to fame made him a good catch, and the girl's mother decided that she wanted her daughter to wed him. This necessitated a divorce, because the girl was legally the wife of a husband whom she may never have seen. She was not his betrothed. She was his spouse.

The dissolution of this marriage made her, technically speaking, a divorced woman, although she had never had a husband in the practical sense of the word. Muhammad Ali did not affirm that he had not married a divorced woman. The idea which he meant to convey was that he had married a virgin whose first marriage had never been consummated, or, as he expressed it, that the mother of Ibrahim "had never" any other husband but himself".

Ibrahim bore a striking resemblance to his father. John Barker, who was British Consul at Alexandria in 1830, brought out this fact in a letter addressed to John Calvert and dated 1 April, 1830. He wrote :

"An erroneous impression has existed that Ibrahim Pasha was not the own son of the Viceroy but only an adopted son or Mameluke ; but anyone who has seen them must have remarked the striking resemblance to each other, particularly the remarkable fact of their both having very short arms."¹

The Sublime Porte knew so well that Ibrahim was Muhammad Ali's son that when the latter's mind broke in September 1848, the former was, without delay, appointed Viceroy of Egypt. Constantinople would certainly have appealed to the Powers to permit

¹ *Syria and Egypt under the last five Sultans of Turkey, being the experiences during fifty years of Mr. Consul General Barker, chiefly from his letters and journals*, edited by his son, Edward B. B. Barker, London, Samuel Tinsley, 1876, vol. II, p. 120.

it to exclude Ibrahim from the Viceregal throne had there been the slightest doubt about his filiation.

Not only did the Turkish authorities unhesitatingly assume this attitude in 1841 but they confirmed it in 1863 when they recognized Ibrahim's son, Ismail, as Viceroy of Egypt. And equally important is the fact that during the reign of Muhammad Said, nobody raised the slightest question about Ismail's right, as the eldest male descendant of his grandfather, Muhammad Ali, to act as regent during his uncle's two absences from Egypt or to succeed to the Viceregal throne when Muhammad Said died.

CHAPTER II

THE CAMPAIGN IN ARABIA

ISLAM, like Christianity, has its Protestants, and like Protestantism its Puritans. They are known as Wahabis. Their name is derived from that of their founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd el Wahab, born about 1700 at el Hauta el Nejd. They are most austere. Severely simple in everything, they prohibit their men from wearing gold ornaments or silk garments. They look upon costly mosques as savouring of idolatry. Not only do they prohibit alcohol, but also every kind of stimulant; coffee and tobacco are anathema to them. They are not satisfied with propounding dogmas; they are prepared to fight for them. To quote Butler's lines, they

“prove their doctrine orthodox

“By apostolic blows and knocks.”

Their stronghold is Arabia. Mecca and Medina, the Holy Cities of Islam, the *Harramein* of the Muslim world, are in the heart of what was their bailiwick during those years when Muhammad Ali and the Mamelukes were wrestling for supremacy in Egypt. Orthodox believers look upon it as their duty to pray at Mecca and Medina at least once in their lives. The Wahabis denounced the practice of visiting the sacred shrines of the *Harramein* as idolatry. Their critics call them bandits who rob pilgrims and loot caravans. Whether these charges are well founded or not does not concern us. The salient fact on which we insist is that those Muslim Puritans became a political power in whose demesnes the writ of the

Sultan, as Khalif of Islam, did not run. The truculence of their insubordination thus made the heterodoxy of their creed doubly challenging.

There was another reason why the Sultan desired to castigate the obstreperous Saoud Ibn Abdel Aziz, who had capitalised the religious enthusiasm of the Wahabis and converted Arabia into his political fief. Selim, while not a strong monarch, knew that it would be highly expedient if he could arrange to kill two birds with one stone. He was jealous of Muhammad Ali, and was convinced that his vassal had become too powerful. He felt that if he could induce him to attack Saoud, Muhammad Ali, though he might be able to trounce the Wahabis, could not fail to suffer material loss as a result of the encounter. And, in order to persuade Muhammad Ali to undertake the task, Selim stressed the glory which would redound to Egypt were the Pasha to purge Islam of the pests which infested the *Harramein*.

Muhammad Ali saw, without difficulty, that the attack upon the Wahabis could best be made from Egypt. But the blandishments of his liege lord did not cause him to precipitate matters. Though illiterate, he had a ready tongue. Reports from him to the Sublime Porte bear witness to the fact that he knew how to repay in kind all that Constantinople felt called upon to write to him about the necessity of smiting the infidel. Here is but one typical instance of the Pasha's adroitness, taken from an unpublished report dated 1 Rabi et Tani 1224 (corresponding to 18 August, 1809):

“ When we see across the rays of that light which
‘ God alone controls, the sufferings which the
‘ *Harramein* have undergone ; when we see the
‘ humiliations and indignities which the rebels of the
‘ Hedjaz have imposed upon those who seek to visit
‘ the Kaaba and the Kibla, those shrines with which
‘ all the hopes of Muslims are indissolubly linked,

“ we cannot refrain from feeling a sense of deep sorrow
“ and of profound anger against the rebellious wrong-
“ doers. And we pray God to liberate, as soon as
“ possible, our Holy Land from such evil-doers ”.¹

It was not, however, until months had elapsed after the date of this letter, that Muhammad Ali considered that Ibrahim's work in Upper Egypt, in collecting taxes and pursuing the Mamelukes, had gone far enough to permit Toussun to embark on his campaign against the Wahabis. But Muhammad Ali, the practical statesman who used in his reports to Constantinople the language of religious fervour best suited to his official purposes, was also at heart a true son of Islam. He meant what he said. He stressed the point which he made because it suited his interests to do so, but he did not prevaricate.

As the months passed and became years and the preparations for the campaign grew apace, he became more and more convinced that he was equipping the army of God to fight the battalions of darkness. Soon he began to look on himself as what the Occident would call a Muslim Crusader waging war against the infidel and embarking upon an expedition for the redemption of the sacred places of his faith. He knew that his troops were about to fight an enemy who taught that all unbelievers, Muslims or Christians, who did not accept his doctrine were to be put to death. He had too much abiding common sense to expect his soldiers to be magnanimous to a foe who would not spare their lives if they were captured.

Among the men who followed Toussun was a Scotsman named Thomas Keith, who, with many of his comrades of the 72nd Highlanders, had been taken prisoner during the last English expedition against Egypt. He had saved his neck by embracing Islam. On his conversion he assumed the name of Ibrahim. Soon afterwards he had a quarrel with a

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives (Turkish Section), Document No. 16.

favourite Sicilian Mameluke of his master, killed his man, escaped, and sought the protection of Muhammad Ali's wife, the mother of Ibrahim and Toussun. She induced her younger son to enlist the Briton in his army. Before the troops departed he was condemned to death for some trifling neglect of duty. The brave fellow refused to surrender, defended the entrance to his room for half an hour against several assailants, then jumped out of the window and again took refuge with his kind protectress. She reconciled him with Toussun, who was so impressed by the Scotsman's courage that orders were given for Ibrahim to be made chief of the loyal Mamelukes. He acquitted himself so well that in April 1815 he became governor of Medina. Like most Scotsmen, Keith was a born banker. In time he became the treasurer of Toussun's forces, and subsequently died on the field of battle, literally hacked to pieces by innumerable sword wounds.¹

If Toussun had a Scotsman to look after his finances and to help him on the field of battle, Saoud had a heroine in his ranks. She was a Begoum Arab, a widow named Ghalye, whose husband had been one of the chief men of Taraba. She herself possessed more wealth than any family in the neighbourhood, and used to distribute money and provisions among the poor of her tribe. Her table was open to all faithful Wahabis, and their leaders held their councils in her house. As the old lady was celebrated for sound judgment, her voice was not only heard in these deliberations, but generally prevailed. Rumour exaggerated her astuteness. The legend soon spread that she was a sorceress and that she was able to cast a charm over the Wahabi chiefs which made them invincible.²

¹ *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys collected during his travels in the East by the late John Lewis Burckhardt*, London, Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1831, vol. II, p. 234 and 342.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 269.

We are not concerned to follow the details of Toussun's campaign against the Wahabis. Enough to say that Mecca and Medina and the three other cities of the Hedjaz were occupied by him, but that his expedition, as a whole, failed. All the tribes of the mountains that traverse the country from north to east still acknowledged the supremacy of Saoud.¹

Muhammad Ali met this setback by taking the field in person. Leaving his son Ibrahim in charge of Upper Egypt and Hussein Bey in command of Lower Egypt, he reached Jedda in September 1813. Before the resourceful Pasha had brought about any decisive result Saoud died of a fever then very prevalent in Nejd. He was succeeded by his eldest son Abdallah, a brave soldier to whom the principal Wahabi leaders had paid obeisance during Saoud's life.

It is difficult to say what would have happened had Muhammad Ali thrown his personality into the war against Abdallah. Félix Mengin, who was a French Consular Agent at Cairo during the earlier years of the reign of Muhammad Ali, wrote in 1823 that the Pasha heard in the heart of Arabia that Napoleon had escaped from Elba and therefore hurried back to Cairo in order to safeguard Egypt.² Mouriez, another French writer, but of a somewhat later period, rejects this theory, but offers no explanation of Muhammad Ali's decision.³ Burckhardt, who was in Arabia and had first-hand knowledge of the facts related by him, is not very complimentary to the Albanian. He writes :

"Toussun did not find his father at Medina ; for
"being convinced that the actual resources and means
"of war in those northern parts of Hedjaz were not
"sufficient to authorize hopes of success, Muhammad
"Ali resolved on leaving the doubtful chance to his

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 274 and p. 249.

² Mengin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 48.

³ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 157.

“son rather than incur the risk of diminishing the reputation which he had himself acquired.”¹

Whatever the cause of the Pasha's departure, Toussun and Abdallah saw the wisdom of signing a treaty of peace. The pact provided that the Wahabis should renounce all claims to the holy cities. The Egyptians abandoned to Abdallah all those towns of Kasym held by him. In other words, the accord was essentially a compromise. Underlying it was the demand on the part of Toussun that the enemy should return all the treasures which the late Amir Saoud had taken from the Prophet's tomb at Medina.² But both parties to the Convention were Muslims, although each looked upon the other as being a heretic. When they affixed their seals to the agreement they were not unmindful of the fact that it is written in the Quran :

“Say to the infidels : If they desist from their unbelief, what is now past shall be forgiven them ; but if they return to it, they have already before them the doom of the ancients.

“Fight against them till strife be at an end, and the religion be all of it God's ”.³

This means that both the Egyptians and the Wahabis looked upon their Treaty as nothing more nor less than a truce of indefinite duration which could be broken at will. It was not surprising, therefore, that Muhammad Ali and Abdallah prepared for the renewal of the conflict. The Pasha's first step was to choose a commander-in-chief who would be able to attack and defeat the Wahabis at their capital in the heart of Central Arabia. The astute leader may have left to his son, Toussun, the disagreeable onus of coming to terms with the enemy, but he thoroughly understood the strategic difficulty of the problem of conquering the Hedjaz. It was because

¹ Burckhardt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 347.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 336.

³ *The Quran*, translated by Rodwell, Sura VII/40.

Muhammad Ali knew exactly what was necessary that he took special pains to get the right man for the post.

He summoned in Cairo a general meeting of all his generals, ministers, officers and statesmen. Although a despot, the Pasha was a democrat. A spirit of good will and camaraderie pervaded his court. After explaining to them why he had called them together, and what was his plan of campaign, he pointed to an apple which was on the floor of the divan. It had been placed exactly at the centre of the large carpet spread in the hall before them. "Now", said he, "whoever can, with his hand, reach and give me that apple, but without placing his foot on the carpet, he shall command the expedition against Nejd."

Many a lithe Bey sprawled full length on the ground, with his heels just out of the carpet rim and his arm outstretched to the fruit. The distance was too great. The apple remained ungrasped. One after another, each tried some new device, but all in vain. At last the short, stout Ibrahim, Muhammad Ali's eldest son, rose, bowed to his father, and offered to try his hand.

Ibrahim was always the first to make fun of his own figure. On one occasion, in after years, when he had grown very heavy, somebody joked about the size of his waist-line. He rejoined: "I know that I have a big paunch. But it is not full of food and drink. It is loaded down with ruse and cleverness."¹ On that morning in 1816 all laughed when Ibrahim awaited the paternal authorization. Everybody took it for granted that he could not succeed. But their scorn was soon turned to admiration when he quietly set to work rolling up the carpet from its rim inwards, till the apple was within easy reach. He then took it up and handed it to his father,

¹ *Egypte depuis la Conquête des Arabes, sous la Domination de Méhémet Aly*, par M.M. P. et H., Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1877, p. 36.

who then and there made him commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army.

Sabry, who recounts this anecdote in his exceptionally well documented *Empire Egyptien sous Mohamed Ali*,¹ brushes it aside as a mere legend. But Palgrave, the Englishman who, according to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, was once a Jesuit and then became a diplomat, and who visited Central Arabia in 1862-1863, says that the story was told to him in Nejd and was there accepted as a fact. Whether it be true or false is really of no importance. It illustrates admirably the opinion that the children of Ibrahim's enemies had of his outstanding ability.

With his commanding officer thus chosen, Muhammad Ali bided his time. He did not have to wait very long. Abdallah did not deliver the treasures taken by Saoud from the Prophet's tomb at Medina. On the contrary, he sent a delegation to Cairo with a letter couched in these words :

"We have nothing left of the treasures which Saoud, our father, found at the tomb of the Prophet and which he took ; all have been sold and scattered. In regard to the government of the country, permit us to say that you may send someone to collect your tithes".²

This reply incensed Muhammad Ali, and he answered :

"Tell your master that I know that he has fortified his towns and raised armies. He is ready for war, and I know it. Say to him that I advise him to be prepared. I shall send my son Ibrahim to the Hedjaz. He will devastate your Master's territory and bring back its inhabitants to me dead or alive".

The gauntlet was thus thrown down and accepted. The story about the carpet illustrates the difficulty which confronted Ibrahim. Muhammad Ali and

¹ *L'Empire Egyptien sous Mohamed Ali et la question de l'Orient*, Paris, Geuthner, 1930.

² Mengin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 67.

Toussun had signally failed to reach the heart of the enemy's country. Fact or fable, the tale told by Palgrave emphasizes the strategic problem which confronted the invader. The Egyptian's supreme task lay in transporting an army across the broad desert which surrounds Nejd on every side. "Over this", says the British traveller, "many a conqueror's arm "had proved too short to reach, while the attempt "has led more than one Crassus to detach his heels—" "in this case his military communications—from "their necessary communication with a secure basis. "But the central plateau itself, if once attained, could "offer no more resistance than an apple to the fingers "which clutch it".¹

Faced with a task of such magnitude, Ibrahim made haste slowly. His father perfected arrangements to have an adequate fleet with transports brought together at Suez and Kosseir. At these points his army was assembled. Statistics in regard to its numbers are confusing. All that is known with certainty is that six months were devoted to getting everything into shape. M. Vaissière, a Frenchman who had served in the armies of Napoleon, was attached to Ibrahim's staff. Four Italians, Scoto, Gentili, Todeschini and Socio, formed the backbone of the medical corps.²

Abdallah knew from the reply given to his emissaries that war was inevitable. He hastened to send a spy to Egypt to gauge the situation and report on the military activities of his foe. When this spy returned Abdallah held a public audience and called on him to tell all that he had learnt. This is how Palgrave narrates what then took place :

"The unlucky man, on whose Arab imagination "the military force and organized display of Egypt

¹ *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1862-3, by William Gifford Palgrave, London, Macmillan, 1866, vol. II, p. 48.

² Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 186.

"and its armies had made the deepest impression, "proceeded to set forth before the eyes of his fellow-countrymen an appalling picture of the mighty Pasha and his troops, his cannons and regiments, horse and foot, and all to invade Nejd. Every cheek grew pale, but Abdallah cut short the recital by ordering the too faithful narrator to be led off and beheaded on the spot for weakening the hearts of the Muslims".¹

Ibrahim's mother took less severe measures to ensure the morale of her son. She prayed for the success of his mission. When, on 3 September 1816, she held him in her arms for her last embrace, she put round his neck a chaplet of precious stones with an injunction to wear it day and night and to place it upon the tomb of the Prophet. Ibrahim promised to respect her wishes, and then swore to her that he would not have his head shaved until he returned to her arms victorious.²

The militant pilgrim sailed from Kosseir on 23 September 1816. Six days later he landed at Ianbo. He entered Medina on 9 October, and at once hurried to the tomb of the Prophet, where he reverently deposited the beads which his mother had given him. The guardian of that sanctuary, a coal-black eunuch, was so pleased with the precious gifts that he raised his hands to heaven and exclaimed :

"Look, O great Prophet, at Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, who lies prostrate at thy feet. He has come hither in order to destroy the enemies of thy religion. Deign, O Prophet, to vouchsafe unto him the strength to defend thy laws and thy holy book, and to smite the rebellious Wahabis".

The young officer caught the note of this invocation and replied :

¹ Palgrave, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 49.

² Mengin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 78.

“ O, holy Prophet, it is I, Ibrahim, son of
“ Muhammad Ali Pasha, who have retaken the holy
“ cities, Mecca and Medina. I have come to thy
“ tomb to implore thy assistance in the war which I
“ have undertaken. Give, I pray thee, unto my right
“ arm the strength to conquer, and unto my spirit
“ the intelligence to fathom the designs of the rebels.
“ My enemies are thy enemies. With thy help they
“ will soon be dispersed. I shall not replace my
“ sword in its scabbard until they are entirely
“ scattered ”.¹

And then religious enthusiasm took possession of Ibrahim. He swore to liberate his white and his black slaves—though he obviously could not restore to the eunuch what the poor fellow had lost. He vowed never again to touch a drop of alcohol. He is even reported to have made a bonfire of several hundred bottles of rum and wine which were said to have been in his canteen.² But this outburst of zeal in no sense weakened the severity of the discipline of the Egyptian army. Disobedience meant death. The Arabs learnt this. They reasoned that if he was so inflexible with his own troops he would be all the more severe with them. The timid among them were afraid.

Abdallah was not a coward. Nevertheless, he felt that it would be most expedient to endeavour to conciliate Ibrahim. He accordingly decided to send an ambassador to treat of peace ; but he could no longer find anyone to undertake the mission. Everybody recalled what had happened to the spy. At last a sheikh came forward and offered to go, but on condition that he should be allowed to read the letter of which he was to be the bearer.

On a dirty piece of brown paper Abdallah had written to Ibrahim a short, unceremonious note

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 30.

² *L'Egypte au XIX^e siècle*, par Edouard Gouin, Paris, Paul Boizard, s.d., p. 276.

surcharged with contempt, which was obviously not such a diplomatic document as the circumstances warranted. The sheikh turned to his chief and said :

“ To take this with me were as much as my head is worth. You must let me write the letter in your name, otherwise I cannot go.”

Abdallah consented. The sheikh drew up a note worthy of an experienced diplomat. The Wahabi leader sealed it, after many misgivings. When Ibrahim received the messenger, he said, in that genuine Cairo slang which, to the end of his life, he never laid aside :

“ Well, man, what have you brought us from that dog of Nejd, your master ? ” The ambassador presented his letter. The Egyptian glanced over its contents and burst into a mocking laugh. “ Boy,” said he, turning to an attendant, “ bring me the letter which we received four days ago from Saadun, that son of a dog, who is courting our favour.”

The letter was produced. It was a note which Saadun had written, and with it was enclosed a letter addressed to him in which Abdallah said : “ Do not be deceived by that ass of Egypt and all his brayings, for he cannot avail you or injure you.”

“ Thus ”, exclaimed Ibrahim, “ does your master write to his friends about me, and thus ”, pointing to the fair-spoken document on the ground before him, “ does he write to me. “ Tell the pig that I shall bring him my answer in person at Deraiya. And now get you gone, you and your presents ; were it not for your character as ambassador, I would have you put to death.”

The Nejdean saw that there was no room for apology or diplomacy. He attempted neither, but hurried back to Abdallah. On his way he worked out his plan of procedure. He knew that if he reported the true facts to his master, he would lose his head. He

sold his horses, the intended peace-offering, at a good price. With the money he bought, when at some distance from Ibrahim's camp, a dozen Nubian slaves, whom he dressed most handsomely. He took them with him to the interior, and gave out everywhere that they were a present from the Egyptian Pasha to the Sultan of Nejd, and a token of alliance and friendship.

When the sheikh reached Deraiya the muezzin was summoning the faithful to the evening prayer. Abdallah was surrounded by the great men of his court. They witnessed the arrival of the ambassador and his gorgeous suite. They deduced that Ibrahim was a suppliant for peace. "Now let us see the 'infidel's letter,'" said Abdallah when the ear-pleasing narrative told by the sheikh had ended amid the *Allahu Akbars* of the townsmen. "But the messenger 'answered'," records Palgrave, "that the letter 'contained matters to be read in private council only' and begged Abdallah to defer until then. The 'monarch consented after some demur, took the 'envoy with him, and at once moved off to the palace, 'attended by his ministers and court, with the negroes 'in the rear.

"Once in the private divan", continues the same author, "Abdallah a second time demanded the 'supposed letter. 'It is of a very confidential 'nature' replied the discreet impostor, 'and can be 'entrusted to no eyes or ears but your own'. And "Abdallah, somewhat surprised, had to send his "councillors away."

"'There is no answer to your proposals except "what Ibrahim Pasha will give you himself in person "at Deraiya; and now, if you are a man, prepare to "fight it out', said the envoy, when alone with his "master, obliged at last to take the bull by the horns. "He then exposed to Abdallah all that he had seen "and heard, and apologized for the momentary "deception he had practised to prevent discouragement."

“ment and alarm from finding their way to the capital. But’, he concluded, ‘the danger is imminent, and you must expect a campaign in Nejd itself.’”

Palgrave, who heard this tale on the spot, several decades after the events described by him but from men who were able to vouch for the accuracy of the narrative, assures his reader that the life of the sheikh was spared. Abdallah was neither a fool nor a coward. He applied himself to concentrating his forces and awaited his enemy at the entrance of the inner Nejdean passes.

CHAPTER III

ABDALLAH IBN SAOUD

ABDALLAH showed admirable judgment in deciding to await Ibrahim's arrival. His plan assured him that his troops, fresh and united, would be fighting on their native soil against an enemy far removed from his original base of supplies. Such strategy took it for granted that the Egyptian forces would arrive at the crucial point weary and harassed by forced marches across the unfriendly desert. It assumed that the invaders would be annoyed and weakened by the marauding attacks of the neighbouring tribes.

Abdallah reasoned correctly, but he overlooked the personal equation. Presumably he had not been told the story of Ibrahim, the carpet and the apple. Had the Nedjean leader heard this tale and pondered over its meaning, he would have known that the son of Muhammad Ali would put into practice the carefully elaborated play of "rolling up the carpet". This is exactly what the Egyptian commander did. He carried it out by proceeding up the long valley that leads from Mecca to Nejd. He was thus able to avoid the fanatic population of that region known as Wadi Dowasir. No enemy dogged his steps. All that he had to fear were passing Bedwins and the ill-armed inhabitants of scattered villages. And he had a fair supply of water.¹

Ibrahim knew that the success of the expedition depended upon the friendship of the tribes whose lands he crossed. They were negligible factors in

¹ Palgrave, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 53 *et seq.*

a sense, but he needed their good-will. He could easily have mowed them down, but their support was just what he required in order to lighten his burden. He made it clear that he was advancing as a friend and not as a conqueror. Palgrave thus describes his procedure :

“ Every bucket of water that the inhabitants or the ‘ Bedwins drew for his army, every date the soldiers gathered, every stick of firewood they consumed, was at once and handsomely paid for ; while officers and men were alike strictly and efficaciously prohibited from offering the slightest insult or outrage to the unarmed and unresisting inhabitants. Village after village, tribe after tribe . . . tendered allegiance to the Egyptian. . . . A minority still refused to exchange the government of the ‘ Muslims ’ for the sovereignty of ‘ the ass of Egypt ’. No direct violence was employed even against them. . . With calculating clemency Ibrahim only obliged them to quit their abodes, and to precede him on his way to Central Nejd, there, said he with bitter sarcasm ‘ to swell the armies of the faithful ’, but in reality to exhaust Abdallah’s means and to depress his courage by the burden of a mixed and useless population.”¹

All this does not necessarily mean that Ibrahim’s heart was overflowing with the milk of human kindness. It merely implies that he was “ rolling up his carpet ”, and that it suited his strategy to win over these various elements. So well did he play his game, that Abdallah’s choice of position reacted against his own interests. But the Egyptian had to surmount a series of difficulties before definitely establishing his mastery. The battle around El Rass waged fast and furious. When Ibrahim had lost 3,000 men at the siege of that stronghold but when it was obvious to him that the place was bound to fall, he sent word to Abdallah

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 54.

to deliver it. "Come and take it", answered the Nedjean. The defiance was accepted. The final assault proved irresistible.¹ But when Ibrahim entered El Rass, the enemy had already departed. The Arabian Smolensk had been evacuated; Abdallah was hurrying to his Moscow, Deraïya, 800 kilometres away, across a treeless waste.

Ibrahim understood the mystery of the sands of Arabia better than Napoleon knew the secret of the snows of Russia. Anezeh, which proved to be friendly, was fortified in order to serve as a rallying point in case of an enforced retreat. Bereida, which resisted, was carried by storm and its garrison of 200 put to death. El Mazneh fell on 28 December 1817. El Shakra was reached on 13 January 1818. Its capitulation gave the invader control of the strategic road which led to Deraïya. A hospital was established at this outpost, and all who were unable to continue the march were left there to recuperate. The next point attacked was Dorama, 100 kilometres from Deraïya. The Moscow of the desert was thus almost within reach. On 6 April 1818 it was invested.

The siege had lasted for several weeks when on 21 June a sandstorm swept the Egyptian camp. It carried off a burning log from the camp-fire of the invaders and dropped it in their artillery dépôt. 200 barrels of powder and 280 cases of cartridges exploded. Tents were soon ablaze. The flames spread to the town, and it looked for a moment as if the elements were about to convert Deraïya into an African Moscow. Ibrahim sought to capitalize the situation by a surprise attack. Abdallah endeavoured to profit by the confusion to effect a sortie. Neither effort succeeded. The wind veered and the fire stopped.²

¹ *La Formation de l'Empire Egyptienne de Mohamed Ali de Arabie au Soudan (1814-1823)*, par Édouard Driault, Le Caire, Société Royale de Géographie, 1927, p. xxviii.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxxii.

The sandstorms played havoc with Ibrahim's eyes. Ophthalmia is one of the besetting evils which haunt the modern Egyptians. We do not know whether the commanding officer suffered from that malady when still in Cairo. All that we know is that during the siege of Deraiya this sandstorm and fire so aggravated the inflammation from which he was suffering that his eyes remained closed for eight days. Ophthalmia not only plays havoc with a man's sight, but it also tears his nerves to pieces. Had Ibrahim been an ordinary man, he would never have reached Deraiya. To have arrived at that point was a triumph of skill and endurance. Now he made light of his ophthalmia, and finally, on 4 September 1818, forced Abdallah to sue for peace. The Wahabi asked that the life of his family and troops be spared, that his capital be not destroyed and that he be given a safe-conduct.¹ The victor refused to agree to these terms. On 9 September Abdallah capitulated.²

Ibrahim's first care was to seize Abdallah and the other chiefs. Except for a few hours' looting, no violence was permitted. As soon as quiet reigned the defeated ruler and his kinsmen were summoned to the presence of the conqueror. Turning to Abdallah, Ibrahim said :

" ' I am the servant of the Sultan of Constantinople, and he must be your judge, not I. Meanwhile, awaiting his further pleasure, you will accompany me to Egypt, where you will be honourably treated ; when the Sultan's orders are known you will comply with them '. Abdallah made no reply except a phrase of the Quran. Ibrahim acted with equal leniency towards the other prisoners. . . . None were put to death or otherwise harshly used during the whole time that the Pasha remained in Nejd."³

¹ *Relation de la Campagne d'Ibrahim Pacha contre les Wahabites*, par N. Perrin, Paris, Regnoux et Cie, 1833, p. 21.

² Driault, *op. cit.*, p. xxxiii.

³ Palgrave, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 57. Abdallah was sent to Cairo, and thence transported to Constantinople and delivered to the Sultan, who had him executed.

We are tempted to call special attention to this quotation from Palgrave. It is not contemporary evidence, but it records the testimony of a man who got his facts on the scene from the children of Ibrahim's enemies.

Combatants may forgive a conqueror, but women, non-combatants and their offspring seldom do so. It is not rash to suggest that Ibrahim must have been most tolerant in dealing with the Wahabis. And yet Mouriez, who wrote at approximately the same time as Palgrave, but did not gather his information in Arabia, refers to the "sanguinary instincts of the Egyptian leader."¹ Mengin, who, it may be well to repeat, lived for years in Egypt and published his history in 1823, tells how, during the siege of El Rass, Ibrahim ordered the teeth of an enemy envoy to be pulled out because the man had been impolite, and how another enemy, for some similar reason, was blown to pieces by a cannon after he had been bastonnadoed.²

Djabarti, a contemporary whose journal has already been cited, indulges in bitter attacks on the cruelty of Ibrahim when tax collector in Upper Egypt. A pen-picture of him as a bloodthirsty despot is drawn by Prisse d'Avennes and Hamont.³ They were intimately acquainted with the Egypt of the latter days of Muhammad Ali's greatness. But one of them was an archæologist with a bad taste in his mouth and the other a veterinarian with bad marks entered against his reputation by his fellow-countryman, the brilliant Jean-Marie Carré.⁴ Another Frenchman, Gisquet, who visited Egypt in 1844, and felt impelled to rush into print, gives the same unfavourable verdict.⁵ So

¹ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 185.

² Mengin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 136.

³ P. and H., *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁴ *Voyageurs et Ecrivains Français en Egypte*, par Jean-Marie Carré, Le Caire, Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1932, vol. I, p. 290.

⁵ *L'Egypte, Les Turcs et les Arabes*, par M. Gisquet, Paris, Amyot, s.d., vol. II, p. 94.

do other writers, but they deal with glittering generalities and abhor "bills of particulars". In a word there seems to be more or less unanimity against Ibrahim, and yet Palgrave's point of view seems to be so reasonable that we are inclined to accept as accurate the statement of facts given by him.

Common sense guided Ibrahim's actions. He was a statesman as well as a soldier. He saw that it fitted in with his interests to attach to his government the hereditary rulers of the country. But he also perceived that the success of his administration depended upon extirpating the religious fanaticism of the Muslim Puritans. It is probably on account of his annihilation of these Muhammadan Protestants that he has been so severely attacked. He deemed their tenets to be incompatible with the maintenance of law and order. He thus set to work to attempt to wipe out what he considered to be not only the Wahabi heresy but also a focus of social unrest. Higher politics, rather than cruelty, may well have guided him.

After dismissing the royal family to guarded but honourable confinement, Ibrahim sent for the Wahabi doctors of law and theologians. There were five hundred of them. He told them that he desired to thrash out the dogmatic differences which separated the Wahabis from Orthodox Muslims. He added that he had brought with him from Cairo learned expounders of the latter sect, and that he would like the champions of the two groups to meet in the main mosque of Deraiya and debate the question in his presence.

For three days the orators held the floor, specializing in refined distinctions and filling their respective adherents with pride. Ibrahim listened to them. He did not nod, much less sleep. He was patience personified and the embodiment of impartiality. He did not interrupt a single speaker or even raise his

voice to enforce order. His presence sufficed to ensure absolute tranquillity and parliamentary courtesy. But, on the fourth day, he brought the discussion to a sudden halt. He did so by putting this question to the leader of the Wahabi group :

“Do you say that as there is only one God, there is, therefore, only one true faith, and that that true faith is your faith ?”

The answer was “Yes”. And then Ibrahim, lapsing into his Cairene slang, said :

“Well, you pig, what do you say about Paradise ? How big is it ?”

It was obvious that the man could give but one answer. It is traced by the Quran. It was that Paradise is equal in extent to heaven and earth, and that it has been prepared for the pious since the beginning of the world. “You say”, rejoined Ibrahim, “that Paradise is equal in extent to all heaven and earth. Should you and the like of you, by some incomprehensible act of God’s mercy, get admittance there, don’t you know that one single tree of its gardens would easily shelter all of you ? For whom, prithee, is the rest of the enclosure ?”

The Wahabi remained silent. So did his adherents. When it became obvious that his question was not destined to receive a reply, the Egyptian broke the tension by turning to his soldiers and saying to them : “Fall on these men and kill them”. “In a few minutes”, adds Palgrave, “the mosque of Deraiya was the bloody tomb of Wahabi theology”.¹

This incident seems, at first blush, to bear out the opinion that Ibrahim was a heartless tyrant who revelled in blood. But the facts should be gauged in their proper perspective. Palgrave also writes :

“After having, to borrow an Arab expression, made the inhabitants of Deraiya ‘taste his sweet and his bitter’, Ibrahim proceeded to a work in

¹ Palgrave, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 58.

“ which he was pre-eminent, if not singular among all
“ before or after him in the East, that of consolidation
“ after conquest. He visited in person the adjoining
“ provinces, everywhere pursuing the identical line
“ of policy which he had observed during his march
“ from Mecca and when at the capital ; conciliation
“ and gentleness towards the national chiefs and
“ common people, efficacious severity for religious
“ dogmatizers, order and progress, payment and
“ justice for all.”

After having thus expressed himself the British diplomat and traveller added :

“ My readers should observe that I am not here
“ writing an imaginative panegyric of the great
“ Basha. I am simply repeating what was told me
“ in Nejd, in the conquered land itself. To one point
“ of Ibrahim’s wise administration I can indeed bear
“ the testimony of an eye-witness, having myself seen
“ its abiding results. It was that he took an especial
“ care to observe and to fortify the strong points of
“ the land. At the same time he laid the foundation
“ for agricultural improvement, by causing new wells
“ to be sunk wherever he surmised the existence of
“ water hitherto unemployed.”¹

There is a further consideration which should not be overlooked in passing judgment upon this holocaust of theologians. It is that it saved the faith of Muhammad from Muslim Puritanism. It did not entirely wipe out Muhammadan Sunnite Protestantism, but it effectively stopped the spread of dissension in Sunnite Islam. It preserved, for all practical purposes, the unity of the non-Shiite Muslim world. It thus accomplished what Orthodox Muhammadans consider a positive good.

Ibrahim had not acted precipitately, but with due deliberation. He felt that he had saved the faith of his fathers. He was convinced that he had laid the

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 59.

foundation for a great Arabic Islamic power gravitating around Egypt. His father had looked upon the conquest of the Hedjaz as an incident. Ibrahim envisaged it as a great objective. In this apparently slight difference of opinion between father and son there is the germ of that divergence of view between the two men which will be noted, from time to time, in these pages. Nothing like a breach or coldness ever occurred in the warmth of their affections. No lack of respect or of deference was ever shown by Ibrahim to Muhammad Ali. But two strong minds met, and it was devotion and tact that eliminated the prospects of a clash.

Another factor tended to cause the son to stress the importance of the conquest of Arabia. He had come to Egypt, an Arabic-speaking country, when still a boy. He had mastered the Cairene dialect. He became genuinely fond of the Arab race, and found the Arab intellect more supple, more resilient and more responsive than that of the stolid Turk. He loved to mingle freely with his Arab troopers, sometimes joking with them and always praising the race from which they sprang and contrasting it with that of the stupid Turk. An Arab once asked him how he, a Turk, could say such things. He replied : "I came as a mere child to Egypt. The Egyptian sun has changed my blood and made it wholly "Arab."¹

To Muhammad Ali the Arab was always of an inferior race and should be treated as such. "He "fluctuated", as Dodwell so aptly expresses it, "between political independence and the reform of "the Turkish empire as his great political aim."² He held the Arabs in such contempt that during his reign the Turks had nearly a monopoly of all high official functions in Egypt, with the exception of those

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

² *Ibid.*, p. 556.

positions held by the Christians. Indeed, as John Bowring put it in 1840 in his *Report on Egypt and Candia addressed to Her Britannic Majesty's Foreign Secretary*, when Muhammad Ali held the sceptre of Egypt it was scarcely allowable even to send a message to a person in authority by an Arab servant. The meanest man who spoke Turkish was, *ipso facto*, considered as belonging to a caste high above the indigenous inhabitant.¹

Muhammad Ali, as a product of Islamic environment, looked upon nationality and religion as being convertible expressions. He thought in terms of a "Muslim nation", that is to say, he looked upon all Muhammadans as being fellow-citizens and as necessarily forming part of the same body politic. While he aspired to be independent of the Sublime Porte, his subconscious mind revolted at the thought of Egypt not forming part of the same governmental entity as Turkey. His instinct told him, in a vague sort of way, that he could not replace the Sultan as head of this Muslim community. It was the indecision born of this confused situation that makes his political strategy so baffling.

It is difficult to tell just how Ibrahim reconciled his idea of an Arab state gravitating around Cairo with, on the one hand, the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire and, on the other, the Orthodox Muslim conception that religion and nationality are synonymous terms and that the oneness of God carries with it, as a corollary, the unity of the State. The probability is that he did not go very deeply into the matter. That he cherished the hope of reviving the Arab Khalifate seems to be incontestable,² but that he ever worked out ways and means for carrying this

¹ *Report on Egypt and Candia addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Palmerston, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, by John Bowring, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1840, p. 7.

² Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

wish into effect appears to be most doubtful. The essential fact which interests our narrative, however, is that his attitude to the political problems, which he discussed with his father, did not regard the Sublime Porte as the centre of his universe, whereas to Muhammad Ali Constantinople was the axis around which the world rotates.

It was the devotion of the son, as well as the tact of the father, which avoided a clash between these two strong minds. Aimé Vingtrinier, the biographer of the picturesque Colonel Sève (Soliman Pasha), brings out Muhammad Ali's intuitive perception of what was the right thing to do. In describing the jubilation with which Ibrahim was received in Cairo when he returned, in December 1819, as the conqueror of the Wahabis, this author writes :

“The outstanding feature of these celebrations was that the Viceroy did not participate in them. He wanted his son to have all the glory for himself alone. With a delicacy of sentiment worthy of the heart of a mother, he remained hidden from view. Unperceived, he observed, from a window of the Sultan El Ghury mosque, the long procession of aghas, notables, people, the army, all of them raising their arms to heaven and praying for him who had that day made them so happy.”¹

¹ *Soliman Pacha*, par Aimé Vingtrinier, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1886, p. 89.

CHAPTER IV

THE SUDAN

AT an early period of his career Muhammad Ali became convinced of the superiority of European military tactics over those of the East. He had fought against the French army in Egypt and had conceived a high opinion of the value of Occidental methods. Toussun's campaign against the Wahabis had been carried out along the old Oriental lines. While Ibrahim had on his staff Vaissière, the French officer whose name has already been mentioned, the fundamental strategy of the past remained unchanged. An outstanding proof of Muhammad Ali's clearness of vision is afforded by the fact that after a victorious war he had both the moral courage and the broadness of view to scrap his old military machine and adopt a new one.

This change was initiated when Ibrahim's triumph was assured, but before he had returned to Cairo. Full credit should be given to Muhammad Ali for the innovation. Like most self-made men he was conceited. Like all who are the architects of their own fortune he reposed implicit confidence in the infallibility of his own judgment. As late as 1840 he said to John Bowring :

" I have been almost alone for the greater part of
' my life, finding nobody except Boghos Bey to second
' me. It is only for the past fifteen years that I can
' say I have lived. . . . I doubted the aptitude even
' of my own children—even of Ibrahim Pasha ;
' but now I have learned that he is to be relied on
' and fully trusted ".¹

¹ Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

Fate was kind to Muhammad Ali in sending Anthelme Sève to Cairo in 1819. A native of Lyons, he had served in the armies of Napoleon. When the Corsican's star set at Waterloo the East beckoned to the young Frenchman. He had never been a Colonel but the title was euphonious so he conferred it upon himself. His ready wit gained him the ear of the Pasha of Egypt. His first assignment was to bring coal across the desert. After some time had elapsed he was ordered to take charge of 300 blacks at Asswan and make soldiers out of them.

It was an enterprise which involved no small risk, as the recruits were unruly, wild and reckless. Sève, by the pliancy of his manners, obtained an extraordinary influence over them. They had never seen a musket. He excited their curiosity by explaining its use and the power which it gave the Franks. Little by little he placed muskets in their hands. They employed their new weapon to fire upon their master. This gave Sève his complete ascendancy over them. He retaliated by insulting them grossly. He abused them for their want of spirit and ability and for their cowardice and clumsiness. They expected that he would report their misdeed to his superiors. When he heard this he told them they had attempted to murder him and had failed, but that he had sought to let them know his opinion of them and had succeeded. If they were satisfied so was he. This generous conduct awakened great enthusiasm in his favour.¹

Born in 1788, and reared during those years when France knew practically nought of religion, Sève found it expedient to become a Muslim. He is known to fame as Soliman Pasha. He had been a nominal Christian, he died an official Muhammadan. One of his descendants, a great-grand-daughter, is now Queen of Egypt.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

The officers who had accompanied Toussun and Ibrahim to Arabia did not take kindly to these modern military tactics. They felt that what would now be called in America the "new deal" meant their relegation to the dustheap. They did their utmost to oppose the success of the innovation. Ibrahim saw this, and determined to put them to shame by enlisting as a private in the Sève training corps. The Frenchman did not welcome this proposal. "But", said he, "if you desire to do so, of course I do not oppose your wishes. It would, however, be pre-judicial to discipline if, during the entire period of your service, you be not absolutely under my orders". Ibrahim agreed.

He was told to get a musket and join the squad which was then drilling. His shoulders were broad, his chest deep, and his beard long, but his legs were short. He instinctively walked to the head of the column. "Come down from there, you short-legged fellow, can't you see that you belong at the end of the line?" at once roared Sève, who had not yet become Soliman, and he pointed to the place where Ibrahim should go.

If the Egyptian hesitated for a fraction of a second, the Frenchman's gesture remained fixed and his eye did not flinch. Ibrahim obeyed. The soldiers had seen him take his place at their head and leave it unceremoniously at the foreigner's command. They were uncouth blacks, and had not understood a word of what had been said. Ibrahim had also failed to follow the literal sense of Sève's outburst, for he did not speak French, not at all events in 1819, and in that year the drill-master knew but little Turkish or Arabic. But everybody grasped what was meant, and the hero of Deraiya hastened precipitately to the end of the column. Men and officers caught the significance of what had transpired. They saw that obedience involved no loss of self-respect.

While this new military machine was thus being created, Muhammad Ali turned his eyes towards the South. It is not quite clear just why he did so. Several reasons probably concurred. The problem will be left unsolved. The expedition was placed under the command of Ismail, the Pasha's third son. Another contingent, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali's son-in-law, known as the Defterdar, was also despatched to the Sudan. A letter written by the father to Ismail, dated 17 January 1821, defines the general policy to be followed by the Egyptian army. It gives an insight into the character of Muhammad Ali, for in it he impresses upon Ismail that while courage is necessary, constancy of purpose is essential and discernment and affability equally important.¹

Unfortunately, the young officer failed to heed his father's sage counsel, and was somewhat truculent in dealing with a chief whom he had conquered; he paid with his life for his lack of discernment. Before Ismail's death, Ibrahim was ordered to reorganize the provinces of Upper Egypt.² A letter addressed to him by his father, dated 24 October 1821, shows that when this task had been accomplished he was sent on mission to the Sudan.³ While Ibrahim was thus engaged in this work of general supervision and in what might be called colonial warfare, Muhammad Ali wrote him, on 29 November 1821, that the insurrection which had broken out in the islands of the Mediterranean, the Morea and Crete had assumed such proportions that he should hasten to send as many slaves to Egypt as possible.⁴ He wanted them for his new army.

Ill-health caused Ibrahim to hasten to Egypt before

¹ *Recueil de la Correspondance de Mohamed Ali, Khedive d'Egypte*, Le Caire, Imprimerie Nationale, 1913, Document No. 59.

² *Ibid.*, Document No. 65.

³ *Ibid.*, Document No. 86.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Document No. 93.

he was able to complete the programme which had been marked out for him. It had been proposed that he should take possession of what is now known as Darfur. Shortly after his return to Cairo an incident occurred upon which his critics have laid great insistence. Prisse d'Avennes and Hamont say that he killed, with his own hand *Moallem* Ghali, the head of the Coptic or native Egyptian Christians.

They tell us that Ghali had been suspected by Muhammad Ali of having sold to the Sublime Porte inside information about the amount of the Pasha's revenue, and that as this revelation enabled Constantinople to extract more money from Cairo than the Pasha wanted to pay, father and son conspired to make away with the Copt. Here is the Prisse d'Avennes-Hamont version of what took place :

"In his perplexity Muhammad Ali consulted Ibrahim, and the son agreed to assume charge of taking the proper vengeance. He sent for the *Mobacher* (Ghali) and ordered the Copt to accompany him on a tour of Lower Egypt. Ghali, suspecting nothing, did so. After they had travelled along for several days in pleasant companionship, Ibrahim invited his guest to play backgammon with him. During the game the Muslim harassed Ghali to such an extent that a quarrel was forced upon him. Ibrahim accused the Copt of insolence and, taking a pistol from his belt, drew it and killed him on the spot."¹

The facts, as thus related, do not ring true. Ibrahim may have been the most bloodthirsty of despots. The reader will be left to pass judgment on this point, but anybody who knows the East does not need to be told that a Muslim prince was not obliged to resort to stratagem in 1822 to put a Copt to death. If Muhammad Ali or his son felt that Ghali was in their way, no such backgammon subter-

¹ P. et H., *op. cit.*, p. 40.

fuge would have been resorted to. We, therefore, do not hesitate to discard the Prisse d'Avennes-Hamont fable.

Unfortunately, we do not know exactly what did occur. All that we can affirm is that a letter, written by Muhammad Ali to Ibrahim, dated 27 April 1822, says that Ghali was putting obstacles in the way of collecting the tax assessed on date-palms, that the matter was of the utmost importance, and that if Ibrahim found himself unable to make the Copt desist from his illegal interference, he should have the man executed. "You will do your utmost", concludes the letter, "to convince him of the error of his way. If you succeed, so much the better. If you do not, have his head cut off, because the interests of the State are supreme and we cannot permit them to be jeopardized by his illegal ideas. Please keep me posted."¹

Ten days later Muhammad Ali wrote to Ibrahim acknowledging receipt of a letter announcing the death of *Moallem* Ghali. It said :

"Neither you nor I have killed *Moallem* Ghali. He died as a result of his headstrong rashness and his mania for contradiction. Replace him either by a Frenchman or by his cousin *Moallem* Bichara."²

The last words of this letter, and particularly the very last, bring out the fact that religious fanaticism had not prompted what we shall call the summary execution of *Moallem* Ghali. An excerpt from the confidential report which was submitted in 1840 to the British Foreign Office by its trained observer supports this statement :

"Nobody is now visited with the slightest molestation on account of religious opinion. The Catholic Coptic Bishop at Cairo said that the improvement in this respect was almost incredible.

¹ *Recueil de la Correspondance, op. cit.*, Document No. 111.

² *Ibid.*, Document No. 112.

"The profession of Christianity formerly subjected a person to perpetual annoyances, and any public exhibition of the insignia of Christianity would have exposed the party to extreme danger. The Bishop told me that he now invariably walked the streets wearing the cross on his bosom and carrying his episcopal staff in his hand without any molestation whatever. Nor does this state of things apply only to the capital, for even in the smaller towns the Copts are protected in the free and open exercise of their religion and the authorities are willing to come forward whenever there is a disposition to interfere with the rites and observances of the Christians".¹

While this picture of religious toleration applies to the period when *Moallem* Ghali met his death, when this story about the game of backgammon and his murder was first put into circulation, Ibrahim personified the Turkish opposition to the independence of Greece. It will be recalled that the celebrated *Philike Hetaerae*, or Friendly Society, a revolutionary organization with centres at Moscow, Bucarest, Trieste and other points was formed in 1815 with the object of expelling the Turks from Greece. The revolt of Ali Pasha of Janina against the Sultan in 1820 formed the prelude to the Greek uprising. In March 1821 Alexander Ypsilanti entered Moldavia from Russian territory at the head of a small force. In the same month Archbishop Germanos of Patras unfurled the standard of insurrection at Kalavryta in the Morea.

The effete Sultan was unable to stem the tide thus set in motion. His predecessor had appealed to Muhammad Ali to drive the Wahabis out of Arabia. He turned to the same strong sword in his hour of need. It was to Ibrahim that the Pasha gave the

¹ Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 149. See also *La Règne de Mohamed Aly d'après les Archives Russes en Egypte*, par René Cattani, Le Caire, Société Royale de Géographie d'Egypte, 1931, vol. I, p. 37.

necessary orders. The Greeks of Egypt, born propaganda agents, trained their batteries on the general whose leadership they very properly feared. They knew that Lord Byron and Philhellenes all over the world were marshalling sentiment against what Mr. Gladstone subsequently called the "Terrible Turk". They revelled at the opportunity of distorting and capitalizing the *Moallem* Ghali incident. It afforded them something concrete, with just that element of local colour and circumstantiality which means so much to the adroit publicity agent. And with the possible exception of the ancient Greeks, history has never known such masters of the art of propaganda as the modern Greeks.

Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim had been more than generous in their treatment of the large Hellenic colony established in Egypt. The *Philike Hetaerae* had been most active in that country.¹ Theodore Tossizza was one of its most indefatigable agents. Athanase Politis, the distinguished young Greek diplomatist, says in his recent *Hellénisme et l'Egypte Moderne*, that "*le Pacha non seulement n'entravait pas, au début, la Révolution grecque, mais même la favorisait*".²

But, if Muhammad Ali did not thwart the activity of the Hellenes of Egypt when their movement was in its infancy, because he then looked upon the Greek question as one that interested Constantinople and not Cairo, he saw the problem from another angle when the Sultan appealed to him to save the Star and Crescent. When he entered the lists, the Greek propaganda machine, radiating from Alexandria, was working night and day. Ibrahim became its pet aversion, because it was his sword that stood in the way of the realization of independence. It was good publicity to call him bloodthirsty.

¹ *Hellénisme et l'Egypte Moderne*, par Athanase G. Politis, Paris, Alcan, 1929, vol. I, p. 189.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 189.

When Muhammad Ali received the Sultan's summons to save the integrity of the Ottoman Empire from the Greek menace, he had, so says James Augustus St. John, who reached Alexandria on 8 November 1832, and who in 1834 published two volumes on *Egypt and Mohammad Ali*, an army of "about one hundred and twenty thousand men. "This, considering the resources of the country", said the same writer,

"is a large army ; much too large to be permanently maintained. In Egypt, as I have already remarked on several occasions, the population is inadequate to supply the fields with labourers, and the cities with artisans. . . . When Muhammad Ali commenced the organization of the new troops, he attempted to supply the deficiencies in his armies with black slaves from Kordofan, Sennaar and other countries of the interior, partly purchased from Tripoli, partly from slave dealers at Cairo. But the physical constitution of these negroes was soon found incapable of resisting the effects of the climate. When Ibrahim Pasha undertook the expedition to the Morea, he was accompanied by six or eight hundred black soldiers, whom he intended to constitute his bodyguard ; but although no epidemic prevailed in the army, the greatest number of them died during the voyage."¹

While Ibrahim's black recruits failed to give satisfaction, because they were unable to resist cold weather, his father's foresight created for him a navy which proved equal to the normal strain put upon it. It was Admiral Nelson who had taught the Pasha what control of the sea really meant. Muhammad Ali was a keen observer, and invariably profited from every lesson which opportunity made available to him.

¹ *Egypt and Muhammad Ali, or Travels in the Valley of the Nile*, by James Augustus St John, London, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green and Longman, 1834, vol. II, p. 475.

He had the greatest admiration for Bonaparte, but was impressed by the fact that the Corsican had to escape from Egypt like a thief in the night, because he had no adequate fleet to support him. Angelo Sammarco, the indefatigable and erudite student of the reign of the Founder of Modern Egypt, speaks of the Pasha's "*passione per la Marina*" and refers to the navy as being *la gran passione di Muhammad Ali*¹. Georges Douin of the French navy, now seconded to the Suez Canal Company, published in 1926 an interesting monograph dealing with the earlier frigates of Muhammad Ali.² Professore Sammarco's volume treats solely of Italy's contribution to this navy. He found enough material to cover 340 pages. In a word, the proof of the Pasha's interest in the Egyptian navy is now indisputably established.

The unpublished archives of Abdine Palace, Cairo, show that as early as 1810 Muhammad Ali stressed the necessity of building up Egypt's strength on the sea. He had barely learnt how to read and write when he called the attention of the Sublime Porte to the need for ships. "I had not the benefit of early "education", said he to John Bowring, "I was "forty-seven when I learnt to read and write. I have "never seen countries more civilized than my own, "so I do not expect to do what you [meaning the English] are able to do and to reach the height at which "you have arrived". And then and there he declared what he thought of the influence of sea power, for he said :

"The English have made many great discoveries, "but the best of their discoveries is that of steam "navigation. I told him," said Bowring, "that the "inventor of steam navigation was an American,

¹ *La Marine Egiziana sotto Mohammad Ali. Il contributo Italiano*, di Angelo Sammarco. Société Royale de Géographie d'Egypte, 1831, pp. v and vi.

² *Les premières Frigates de Mohamed Aly (1824-1827)* par Georges Douin, Société Royale de Géographie, 1926.

"and he replied : 'Had they not a father like you they would not have been such children.'"¹

There is no proof that Ibrahim in any way contributed to the task of convincing Muhammad Ali of the paramount importance of sea power. In 1810 he was too young to have had the slightest influence upon his father. But, when the years had passed and the young man had become not only the hero of Deraiya but also an administrator who reasoned like a statesman, his official letters teem with evidence that he knew what sea power meant and that he was alive to the necessity of fighting for it. One sentence, attributed to him by Dr. Yates, an English medical missionary who lived in Egypt for many years, shows that he had an Englishman's conception of things nautical. He is reported to have said : "The French neither understood building nor managing ships".²

The Greeks had been for generations the great sailors of the Ottoman Empire. They were efficient mariners and dominated the waters which Ibrahim had to reach in order to put down the insurrection in the Morea. The heroes of the Greek war of independence were largely sons of Hydra and Spezia. The names which have lived until to-day, Conduriotis, Colocotronis, Colettis, Canaris and Miaulis are predominantly those of Greeks who were connected with the sea. And it was the piratical practices of men whom the Hellenic world now reveres as heroes which gave to the Greek revolution a matter-of-fact significance to the Occident. The sea thus means a great deal in the second phase of Ibrahim's career.

¹ Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

² *The Modern History and Condition of Egypt*, by William Holt Yates, M.D., London, Smith Elder and Co., 1843, vol. II, p. 192.

CHAPTER V

THE GREEK INSURRECTION

THE sixty Greek patriots who assembled at Epidaurus on 12 January 1822 and declared the independence of the "Greek nation", have carved out for themselves a permanent place in the international hall of fame. To paraphrase the inscription on the walls of that Pantheon where France honours many of her illustrious sons, "*ils ont bien mérité de la civilisation entière*". While there may be to-day some discussion in regard to the proper boundaries of the "Greek nation" thus called into being, the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal is so committed to the principle of nationality that it now joins in the universal acclaim which applauds the vision and courage of Alexander Mavrocordato and of his followers. But the spirit of the Congress of Vienna then dominated the Occident. Metternich was still in the ascendant. Wellington was the outstanding star on the British political horizon. A Bourbon sat on the throne of France. In a word, the Concert of Europe was thrown out of tune because the Greek patriots had dared to speak of liberty thereby striking a discordant note in the harmony which then prevailed.

The truth of the matter is that in the early twenties of the nineteenth century the diplomatic world was afraid that if the Greeks gained their independence Russian influence would be enhanced. It was feared that the triumph of Orthodoxy would add to the prestige of the Czar. Sentimentalists may have been moved by the appeal of the Philhellenes, but the hard-headed men who conduct Chancelleries thought of the

balance of power. There was then a great deal of the same kind of camouflaged comedy that goes on to-day. Conferences had become so frequent that George Canning announced "We shall have no more "Congresses, thank God!"¹ But he was mistaken. The Greek insurrection and other problems called for a world conclave which met at Verona in the summer of 1822. Byron knew that it would be "love's labour lost", for he welcomed its advent in these words :

"Strange sight this Congress ! destined to unite
 "All that's incongruous, all that's opposite.
 "I shall not speak of the sovereigns—they're alike,
 "As common coin as ever mint could strike ;
 "But those who sway the puppets, pull the strings,
 "Jews, authors, generals, charlatans combine,
 "While Europe wonders at the vast design."

The poet was right. Metternich, "power's foremost parasite", had determined that nothing should be said on the floor of this convention about Greek independence. His policy was to permit the delegates to foregather but to avoid official meetings and solemn protocols.² He played his cards so adroitly, he entertained so hospitably that the Verona Congress adjourned on 21 November 1822, with all the Powers satisfied and the Greek question still in abeyance. Metternich thus summed up its achievements in a letter addressed to Prince Ghika on 6 December 1822 :

"All idea of interfering in the affairs of the Ottoman
 "Empire is thus definitely abandoned. This is
 "something remarkable. It is worthy of entry in the
 "history of our times that after such tumultuous
 "discussions, after so much diplomatic manœuvring,
 "after all the excitement which this famous insurrection has caused in all the nations of Europe, not a

¹ Quoted in *The Duke*, by Philip Guedalla, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1931, p. 336.

² *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, par Edouard Driault, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, s.d., vol. I, p. 191.

"voice was raised at the Congress of Verona in "favour of the Greeks".¹

It would carry us far afield to attempt to follow the ups and downs of the heroic campaign of the Greeks for their independence. While poets grew eloquent over the woes of Hellas, while editors increased the circulation of their newspapers when they fulminated against the Turks, and while politicians added to their popularity when they clamoured for official recognition of the independence of the "Greek nation", those statesmen whose decision counted did absolutely nothing. They were adamant in their imperturbability, intransigent in their intractability and serenely indifferent to the call of righteousness.

But Greeks are extremely adroit. Their forebears were clever and their children are most dexterous. They capitalized their grievances on the London Stock Exchange by raising a loan in the City. Two of their far-seeing delegates, Orlandos and Lourioti, obtained from Loughman Sons and O'Brien on 21 January 1824, £800,000 sterling at 5 per cent. It is said that with commissions, rebates, etc., the interest ran up to 59 per cent. per annum.² These details meant nothing to the two patriots. Their objective had been attained. What the music of Byron's lyre could not do for Greece they did by getting bankers and brokers financially interested in Greek independence.

Orlandos and Lourioti do not appear to have attempted to get any money out of the French. They were psychologists; they were realists. They did not believe in wasting their energies. They applied their keen intellect to things which were feasible. They—or another Greek committee—directed their efforts to making the most of that love of glory which appeals to France. They thought of that *panache*

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 194.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 231.

which has prompted *Le Nouveau Petit Larousse* to proclaim that "*le Français aime le panache*". In other words, the name of a Frenchman, the Duc de Nemours, was brought forward for the non-existent throne. The Prince was a member of the house of Orleans, and the Bourbons were still in power. The President of the Provisional Government was too shrewd to commit himself to this candidacy. The fact, however, that Greek independence might add to the prestige of France served to make the salons of Paris sympathetic to the liberation of the Hellenes.

Both these considerations were, nevertheless, too indefinite to move the diplomatic world. It was only when the piracy of the Greeks threatened to exterminate the Levant trade of the Occident that Europe awoke to the appeal of the Greek patriots. For a time the tide of battle had run against the Turks. The armies of the Sultan were, however, too strong for the insurgents. It was only on the sea that the revolutionaries were able to retain the upper hand. Continental Greece was vanquished. It was insular Greece, under the lead of Hydra and Spezia, that held aloft the cross of Orthodoxy.

These two islands were inhabited by a population of approximately 25,000 or 30,000 seafaring men. They were merchants as well as sailors. They had acquired wealth by trading with the Black Sea and the Eastern end of the Mediterranean. Their money was poured into the coffers of the Greek patriots. They financed the revolution ; they armed their ships. Their leaders, Miaulis and Canaris, carried out exploits which read like fiction. But their wealth was not inexhaustible. It was soon spent. Nor could the money raised in London last indefinitely. But the war could not cease. The patriotism of these men was inextinguishable even if their funds were not inexhaustible. They knew of one way only of raising revenue ; it was by becoming pirates *pro bono publico*.

Begotten by necessity and born of patriotism, there thus came into being that Greek piracy of the Mediterranean "which", as Lieutenant Douin expresses it, "by devouring the substance of neutrals, "replenished the exchequer of the insurgents".¹

This piracy began most innocently. Europe had proclaimed its neutrality in the conflict pending between the "Greek nation" and the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks were quick to see the potentialities of this decision. They declared a blockade against the Turkish littoral. They had not the fleet with which to make their decree effective, but their proclamation gave them an admirable pretence to further their piratical designs. "The progression was rapid", says an official report to the French Ministry of Marine dated 25 April 1826. "There soon sprang up the "most outrageous maritime brigandage that the "world has ever known".²

This piracy took manifold forms. The islands of the Greek Archipelago are, in many cases, separated from one another by a narrow passage-way. These conditions enabled the islanders to co-operate with the marauders and converted the Greek coast into a network of pirate havens and corsair retreats. Things reached such a pass, the combination between the pirates and the official Greek navy became so intimate, that the French naval officer in command of the French fleet, Admiral de Rigny, advised his Government that one of the marauders, the *Epaminondas*, captured by him in *flagrante delicto* of piracy, was the property of Conduriotis, then President of the Provisional Government.³ The reports submitted to Saint Petersburg by the Cairo Russian Consulate give instances of repeated depredations made by these Greek pirates upon neutral shipping.⁴

¹ *Navarin* (6 Juillet-20 October 1827), par Georges Douin, Le Caire, Société Royale de Géographie, 1927, p. 3.

² Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴ Cattani, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 77, 79, 95, 97, etc.

It is all very well for the student of history to argue that love of church and of country had made pirates of patriots, but English, French, Sardinian and Russian shipowners cared nought for such considerations. They knew that their cargoes were lost, the lives of their crews in jeopardy and their vessels sunk. The appeal to Christendom, the clarion call of nationalism and the sentimentality of Philhellenism had left them cold. When their pockets were touched they began to act. They built fires under their chancelleries. They demanded that pressure should be brought to bear in the proper quarter to make these depredations cease. And their diplomats, following their usual procedure of attacking along the line of least resistance, trained their batteries on the Sultan and demanded that he should put a stop to these piratical practices of the Greeks.

What we have written sounds so cynical that it may be challenged. We support it by quoting George Canning, who in September 1822 succeeded Lord Castlereagh at the London Foreign Office. "His fame as a statesman", the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* tells us, "is based mainly on the foreign policy which he pursued in those years—the policy of non-intervention, and of the patronage, if not the actual support of national and liberal movements in Europe".

He had not got into his stride when Castlereagh's sudden death forced the Verona Conference on him. As a man he ardently sympathized with the Greeks. He had a heart of gold, nerves of steel and a mind that was as clear as a bell. His cousin, Sir Stratford Canning, who subsequently became Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, was then His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. The two men were most anxious to free Greece from the Turkish yoke. But—

"George Canning, feeling perhaps that his 'higher

“ ‘ground’ for poor humanity’s sake might not prove
“ a firm footing for negotiation, suggested that it
“ might be well to press the more earthly point of our
“ ‘commercial policy’ ”.

The British Foreign Secretary, therefore, wrote to his cousin :

“ Take them up (the commercial grievances) and
“ press them hard. If we are to have a quarrel, we
“ must have the mercantile interests with us :
“ hitherto their claims have been somewhat postponed
“ to Russian accommodation. Take them up now.”

After having quoted this letter, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe’s biographer adds :

“ The piracy had indeed gone to such lengths that
“ it formed a proper subject of remonstrance on the
“ part of a ship-holding nation ; but the worst part
“ of the matter was that the pirates were for the most
“ part Greeks, and when pressed on the subject the
“ *Reis Effendi* had the obvious reply : ‘ Let us put
“ ‘down our rebellious *rayas* in Greece, without any
“ ‘more of this foreign meddling and disavowed
“ ‘support to the rebels, and you will hear no more of
“ ‘piracy.’ ”¹

When Europe, thus hearkening to the cause not of self-determination but of self-interest, began to assail the Turk, the Sublime Porte had already asserted its supremacy on land. It had little or no carrying trade. What happened on the sea was therefore of but secondary interest to it. It could afford to view these piratical acts with relative equanimity because their effect upon Turkey was entirely indirect and not understood by the dullards in command at Constantinople. The Star and Crescent was then supreme on land. That was what was of supreme moment to the Sultan. All of which leads up to the statement that when, yielding to the insistence of the Occident,

¹ *The Life of the Rt. Hon. Stratford Canning Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*, by Stanley Lane-Poole, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1888, vol. I, pp. 403 and 404.

the Ottoman Government resolved to put pressure to bear on the Greek pirates, it did so at the behest of Europe and in order to rid the sea of this menace to neutral shipping.

Constantinople appealed to Cairo to apply the necessary pressure. Muhammad Ali had defeated the Wahabis. It was felt that he could stamp out the Greek insurrection. The Pasha was appointed *Seraskier* or marshal of the troops of the Empire. He had already in 1823 sent an army to Crete under the command of his son-in-law, Hassan Pasha. He put the new Egyptian expeditionary force under the orders of Ibrahim. There was nothing fanatical in the mental outlook of either father or son when they began this campaign. But both of them were Muslims and, just as the sympathy of all Christians was, more or less, enlisted in favour of the Greeks in their warfare against the Turks, these two Muhammadans felt drawn towards their brothers in faith in the strife that had then been going on for some time. Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim were prone to look upon the insurrectionists as bloodthirsty pirates who should be treated as social outcasts. They believed every word of the hard things that the European Consuls reported to their Foreign Offices about the rapacity, the cruelty and the villainy of the Greeks.

It is of interest to note that on 18 February 1824 Bernardin Drovetti, who was then Consul at Alexandria for both Russia and France, advised St Petersburg that Muhammad Ali "has announced that he is "determined to get the Greeks to look upon him as a "benefactor. He has persuaded himself that he will "be able to finish this war by using conciliatory means "and without shedding much blood".¹ In two other reports submitted to Paris as well as to St. Petersburg this same Consular officer expressed the hope that the

¹ Cattai, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 50.

Pasha would be able to remain true to his "philanthropic views". "His plan", says Drovetti, "is to adhere to conciliatory and moderate measures before resorting to violence or severity".¹

We have found no official evidence that either Muhammad Ali or Ibrahim abandoned this hope of winning over the Greeks. But it is obvious that, as practical men, they left nothing to chance. They devoted their energies to getting their army and navy into the best possible fighting shape. The Pasha sought to persuade His Most Christian Majesty, the King of France, to lend him the assistance of a French military mission in order to aid the Egyptian Muslims in subduing the Christian Greeks. He sent to France, in the summer of 1824, a M. Tournau, a merchant doing business in Alexandria, with instructions to get in touch with the proper authorities.

This emissary consulted General Belliard, a peer of France and a Lieutenant-General in the French army, who turned him over to General Boyer, an officer who had served under Bonaparte in Egypt and Syria. The latter was on friendly terms with M. de Villèle, who was then temporarily acting as Prime Minister of Louis XVIII. A military mission was formed of General Livron, Colonel Gaudin, Captains Adolphe and Paulin de Tarle, Cheneville and Pujol, to whom were added a surgeon and a physician. This mission had the approval of the French King², but it appears to have been kept a secret, as it would not have been politic to let the French people know that their Sovereign, a Bourbon and a Catholic, was aiding a Muhammadan Power to coerce a Christian nation.

There was also a French naval mission, or at all events a contingent of French naval officers, attached to the Egyptian navy. There were in it, among

¹ *Expédition de Crète et de Morée* (1823-1828), par Charles Driault, Le Caire, Société Royale de Géographie, 1930, pp. 11 and 23.

² *Une Mission Française Militaire auprès de Mohamed Aly*, par Georges Douin, Le Caire, Société Royale de Géographie, 1923, p. xxi.

other Frenchmen, MM. Letellier, Bompard, Chabert, Reynier, Le Dentu, d'Isnard, Matraire, Briand, Maffre, and Lucciani.¹

Official France was, in this way, unquestionably encouraging Muhammad Ali to wipe out the Greeks, however ardently French public sentiment, inspired by Philhellenism and the *panache*, may have hoped for Greek success. The voters and tax-payers obviously knew nothing of this clandestine backing given to the Muslims.

If the Bourbons supported Islam against Christendom, the French Ministry knew that there were Frenchmen in the Greek army. The guiding spirit of the military machine of the revolutionists was, at this early moment, Colonel Fabvier, a Frenchman who had served under Napoleon until after Leipzig and under Louis XVIII during the Hundred Days, who subsequently became disgruntled with the Restoration and whose heart called him to Greece where his abilities made him the commander of the disciplined Greek military forces. There was also a Frenchman in the Greek navy. It will suffice to cite the name of Frigate-Captain Jourdain. There is no available evidence that either Fabvier or Jourdain was acting with the approval of the Quai d'Orsay, but the meaning of their presence in the Greek ranks merits at all events, an interrogation mark.

There is no proof that England played fast and loose in this manner. Muhammad Ali's correspondence, however, contains a letter addressed to Ibrahim, dated 11 November 1824, in which the Pasha advises his son that certain contracts with English captains have been renewed.² There is nothing to show that these officers belonged to the Royal Navy or that they wore an Egyptian uniform. The probability is that they were merchant seamen engaged in transporting Egyptian troops. The same correspondence contains

¹ *Les Premières Frégates de Mohamed Aly, sup. cit.*, p. 112.

² *Recueil de la Correspondance de Mohamed Ali*, Le Caire, Imprimerie Nationale, 1931, Document No. 160.

at least one letter in which Muhammad Ali complains that the British were supporting the Greeks.¹ On the other hand, Jourdain, the French naval officer to whom we have just referred as serving in the revolutionary ranks, accuses the English of intriguing against the Greeks, but it cannot be said that he has made good his charge.

The Egyptian fleet left Alexandria on 19 July 1824. It consisted of 51 men-of-war and 146 transports.² It is assumed that the fighting vessels were Egyptian. There is no way of telling what flag floated at the stern of the transports. At the time of sailing Constantinople had not decided who should have control of the joint forces. A Corsican named Mari, who had renounced Christianity and was known as Bekir Aga, but who was never destined to acquire a good Arabic accent or to get rid of his Corsican conception of French pronunciation, held high rank in the Egyptian contingent. So did Soliman Pasha, the colourful Frenchman from Lyons. The other French officers did not join the expedition until a few months later.

Ibrahim was then a short fat man with large, clear blue eyes, a high forehead, and a brownish-red beard struggling from beneath a face much marked with smallpox. His whole appearance, in spite of corpulence and shortness, was that of an active, intelligent man full of enterprise and eager for instruction.³ A writer who had first-hand knowledge of Ibrahim's characteristics gives these details about his personality :

"He is always dignified and just ; his word is law ; he is firm and resolute, valiant, and though a strict disciplinarian, kind and indulgent ; and he never expects the meanest man in his army to do that which he would not do himself. No man is more rigorously obeyed, for he is able to punish ; nevertheless, he is in full possession of the hearts of his soldiers. . . . As distinctions of rank among

¹ *Ibid.*, Document No. 170.

² Driault, *Expedition de Crète et de Morée*, *sup. cit.*, p. 23.

³ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 469.

“ the Arabs are not incompatible with candour, they
“ frequently tell him home-truths. During the late
“ wars, he might be seen at all hours, ever watchful
“ and circumspect ; he would move about with
“ astonishing rapidity and secrecy, with only four or
“ five attendants, and often slept on the bare snow as
“ an example to others. He would sympathize and
“ converse with his troops, listen to their stories,
“ encourage them and enter without reserve into their
“ feelings and associations. He would sit down,
“ making himself as one of them, during their bivouacs,
“ yet he never forgot his rank, never sacrificed his
“ honour by sanguinary acts of passion. Ibrahim
“ knows that he is constitutionally hasty and irascible ;
“ and sometimes when his wrath was kindled, he has
“ been seen to walk up and down, take snuff and call
“ for a pipe as it were to cool his temper, before
“ issuing orders ”.¹

From the same source we also learn :

“ In the field he is collected ; when danger is at
“ hand, or when the neighbouring tribes rebel, he is
“ always cool ; and not only inspires his troops with
“ courage, by displaying the most undaunted intre-
“ pidity, but by his fore-thought and sagacity he has
“ often detected the snares which were laid for him.
“ . . . Malcontents there must always be in every
“ army ; and the wisest and best generals have had
“ to contend with secret enemies, even in their own
“ camp. We must not form an opinion of Ibrahim
“ by the accounts of angry French renegades ; and
“ we should read with caution the statements of some
“ of the Continental journals. Ibrahim Pasha, no
“ doubt, had his faults ; but he is neither a barbarian
“ nor an ignorant aspiring barbarian. Muhammad
“ Ali could not have accomplished half of what he has
“ done, but for the exertions of his son, and this he
“ knows full well ”.²

¹ Yates, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 174.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 17.

CHAPTER VI

THE MOREA

IBRAHIM's campaign began inauspiciously. After a short sojourn in the Bay of Magri the island of Rhodes was reached on 13 August 1824. Contact was there established with the Turkish contingent under Khosrew. Both commanders felt that they should celebrate the union of their forces by inflicting a signal defeat upon the Greeks. Miauli and Canari were just as anxious for a fight. They were experienced seamen, and thoroughly understood the psychology of their enemy. They knew that Khosrew, or at all events the Turkish officers under him, had not the stamina to stand up against a surprise attack. Their strategy was, therefore, to take the offensive and to disperse the Ottoman vessels before the Egyptians could throw in their weight.

A French officer attached to Ibrahim's fleet gives this summary report of the engagement :

"The Captain Pasha (Khosrew) had sailed during the morning. Our forces got under way at five in the afternoon. The Captain Pasha and his vessels, after having fired a few shots, abandoned the field of battle in a most cowardly fashion and returned to their anchorage. They had fled before armed merchantmen whose captains, discounting this cowardice, had been rash enough to enter a narrow passage in the face of overwhelming odds. At six o'clock we got into touch with the enemy. But several of our frigates thought it more prudent to get out of the way. We were left almost alone. Ibrahim, 'brave as his sword', was able to arrest

“ the impetuosity of the Greeks, who, finding themselves stopped by a resistance upon which they had not counted, decided to retreat, which they did with signal ability ”.¹

This defeat forced Ibrahim to fall back to Crete. There he waited for a favourable moment to land his forces in the Morea. It need not be said that the strange conduct of Khosrew off the coast of Rhodes had not reconciled either Muhammad Ali or his son to the principle of dual command. Khosrew and the Pasha had long been at loggerheads with one another. Their enmity went back to the old days when Muhammad Ali was still battling with the Mameluks for supremacy. But something bigger than personal dislike now actuated him. He had always been opposed to the conception of divided authority. It was, therefore, with regret, but not without a measure of personal satisfaction, that he wrote to the Sublime Porte on 13 September 1824 :

“ I am very much chagrined that my request to entrust the sole command of the entire fleet to one officer was not followed and that this honour was not committed to my son Ibrahim. It is obvious that success cannot be obtained in important engagements when the supreme command is entrusted to more than one person. Divergence of views is bound to produce this unsatisfactory result, and I regret to say that recent events have made this but too evident ”.²

The veiled threat contained in the final paragraphs of this letter that Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim might be constrained to consider the eventuality of retiring from the war if the latter were not appointed to the supreme command of the joint naval and military forces bore fruit. Ibrahim was placed in sole control

¹ Driault, *Expédition de la Crète et de Morée* (1823-1828), *sup. cit.*, p. 40.

² *Recueil de la Correspondance de Mohamed Aly*, Le Caire, Imprimerie Nationale, 1913, Document No. 158.

of the Turco-Egyptian expeditions. He decided to establish winter quarters in Crete.¹ At the first sign of spring he sailed for Modon, a port in that part of the Ionian sea known in antiquity as Methone. He reached there with his first contingent on 2 March 1825.²

Ibrahim had been most anxious to make this early start because his intelligence service had reported to him that dissension reigned in the Greek camp. "History repeats itself", as Plutarch wrote centuries ago. Modern Greece was born of the womb of discontent and knew nought of internal peace when still struggling for existence. Hellenic factions fought one another with the same implacable hatred in 1824 as they did in 1934, or as they have done in any other year which we might suggest at random.

The first civil war between the Greek parties broke out in 1823. "The large loans raised in Europe (in 1824) the first instalment of which Byron had himself brought over, while providing the Greeks with the sinews of war, provided them also", says the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "with fresh material for strife. To the struggle for power was added a struggle for a share of this booty, and a second civil war broke out".³ Kolokotronis, the leader of the defeated faction, was put in jail, just as was Gounaris a century later. Kolokotronis was not executed, but his good faith was assailed. We do not imply that the charges made were any better founded than are those which were directed against Gounaris or which are now being levelled against Venizelos. All we mean is that when Ibrahim was in winter quarters in Crete in 1823-1824 he saw that it behoved him to hurry to the Morea in order to take advantage of this internal controversy.

The Greek sailors of those days, whether we call

¹ Cattani, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 54.

² Driault, *Expédition de Crète et de Morée*, p. 55.

³ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 13th Edition, S.V. "Greek Independence, War of," vol. XII, p. 494.

them patriots or pirates, were both skilful and brave. The Greek islanders, who fought in the Hellenic army under Church, Cochrane, Fabvier, Roche and Regnauld de Saint Jean-d'Angély, were men of courage and determination. But daring and fearlessness, intrepidity and resourcefulness, hampered as they were by dissensions and disloyalty behind the line of fire, cannot stand up against equal determination, equal strategy and equal patriotism when a man like Ibrahim leads the attack. The Egyptian was thus able on 25 March 1825 to lay siege to Navarino, "the boulevard of Greece". That stronghold fell on 18 May. 23 June witnessed the capitulation of Tripolitza and 25 June saw his forces heading for Nauplia, the capital of Greece.¹

Europe stood aghast at the rapidity of this conquest. It resolved that the Cross should not go down before the Crescent, that Fabvier, the "French officer of distinguished merit" who commanded "reduced and disheartened troops"² should not be driven into the sea by Ibrahim, that something had to be done to force the diplomatists to save a heroic race from annihilation. But these results could not be accomplished, the victorious Muslim could not be halted on the threshold of definitive victory, unless the propagandists were able to drive home the fixed conviction that the Egyptian general was a fiend incarnate, an Attila, a murderer of women and children. Honest men thus let their prejudices run wild and gave their imaginations full scope in order to convict Ibrahim of every breach of the code of "civilised" warfare.

We have already referred to what Drovetti, the Consul who represented both France and Russia in Egypt, calls the "philanthropic views" which guided Muhammad Ali when he sent Ibrahim to Greece.

¹ Sabry, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

² Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 442.

Instructions to officers in the field mean little however. What counts is the way in which these orders are executed. We are fortunate in having the testimony of a Frenchman, named Lauvergne, who was in the Morea during the campaign of 1825, and whose work, published in 1826, bears internal evidence of sincerity. He writes :

“The next morning I had a long interview with ‘Soliman (the Frenchman who found polygamy so ‘attractive that he preferred the pain of circumcision ‘to the discipline of monogamy). He told me that ‘Muhammad Ali had given orders to his son to mark ‘his first steps in the Morea by acts of clemency in ‘order to impress upon his new subjects that his ‘objective was not war but pacification”.

After having thus confirmed what the official consular dispatches have already told us, Lauvergne speaks of the effect upon the morale of the Greeks of the money brought to them from Europe by Byron and, after having inferred that Ibrahim could, in all probability, have bought his way into Navarino, he adds :

“The inhabitants would have acclaimed him as ‘Pasha of the Morea and he would have proclaimed ‘a general armistice in favour of the Greeks who ‘submitted to him. What fortifies me in the opinion ‘which I thus advance is what I saw in the plains of ‘Modon. I saw Greek peasants kiss Ibrahim’s ‘hand. He dismissed them, saying : ‘Tell every- ‘body that I am your father and that my severity ‘will be directed solely against rebels’ ”.¹

We do not insist unduly upon this testimony. The statement that “my severity will be directed solely “against rebels” may, perhaps, be interpreted as showing that Ibrahim treated his enemies with the utmost rigour. We do not accept this point of view.

¹ *Souvenirs de la Grèce pendant la Campagne de 1825*, par H. Lauvergne, Paris, Avril de Gastel, 1826, p. 67.

We prefer to look at the question from another angle and to take our evidence from the *Life* of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Stanley Lane-Poole there quotes George Canning, then British Foreign Minister, as having written to his Ambassador at Constantinople :

" I think I see what will give you joy, if not credit, " for having shewn me a new ground of interference " much higher than any we have yet had open to us— " I mean the manner in which the war is now being " carried on in the Morea—the character of barbarism " and *barbarization* which it has assumed. Butchering " of captives we have long witnessed on both sides of " the contest. But the selling into slavery—the forced " conversions—the dispeopling of Christendom—the " recruiting from the countries of Islamism—these " are topics (not topics merely but) facts new in " themselves, new in their principle, new and strange " and hitherto inconceivable in their consequences, " which I do think may be made the foundation of a " new mode of speaking *if not* acting . . . which I " like the better because it has nothing to do with " Epaminondas nor (with reverence be it spoken) " with St. Paul ".¹

It strikes us that this message sent by a Foreign Minister to his Ambassador, even though it was in the form of a personal note, clearly defines the Occidental attitude towards Ibrahim. He is accused of butchering captives. But so were the Greeks. We are not told who began this dastardly practice. If the revolutionaries started the game, they should be held responsible for what took place. We do not know all the facts, and we confess that we are unable to find out the whole truth. We do feel justified, however, in deducing from what George Canning wrote to his cousin that the Foreign Office was seeking for evidence to justify an attack upon Ibrahim. Indictments drawn

¹ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 403.

up in such a spirit are almost invariably open to criticism.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's biographer concurs in the view that what George Canning called the "barbarization" of the Morea was largely propaganda, for he writes :

"When these enormities were urged the *Reis Effendi* would shrug his shoulders, deny some reports, call others exaggerations, and finally retort that the Greeks were quite as bad themselves. This was unhappily true enough, as the fall of Navarino and Tripolitza have shewn ; the rebels took their full share of treachery and murder, and Canning himself was obliged to admit that, wishing well as he must to the Greeks, there is no denying that, with few exceptions, they are a rascally set".¹

We cannot concur in any such sweeping accusation against the Greeks as Lane-Poole thus attributes to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. We have quoted his words, not because they coincide with our views, but because we desire to bring out the spirit which has caused Ibrahim to be pilloried before the bar of history for the "barbarization" of the Morea. It shows that the Occident was prepared to condone offences of which the Greeks were admittedly guilty, but that it used charges, allegations and strictures to put the ban of outlawry upon the Muslim leader. Such an approach to a moral issue is "neither that of Christianity nor of cricket" ; however, it was that of a policy which has caused the same author to write :

"Probably no chapter of diplomacy, if fully revealed, would display so shameful a series of falsehoods and unworthy stratagems as that which included the early negotiations for the pacification of Greece".²

While the Chancelleries of Europe had virtually

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 403.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 410.

made up their minds that Ibrahim's character must be blackened in order that Hellas might be free, the Egyptian leader was hammering away at his enemy. In September 1825 he joined Reshid Pasha, the Turkish leader, who had been laying siege to Missolonghi for several months. Its resistance was heroic, but at last on 22 April 1826 it fell.

This siege and the inevitable eventual capitulation of Missolonghi, opening up as it did the path to Athens, aroused George Canning to the realization that the fate of Greece was in the hands of the Powers and that intervention of some sort was necessary if Hellas was to be saved for European culture. His active mind at once grasped the fact that the Duke of Wellington was the ideal man to carry out the strategy of acting in concert with the Czar without conferring with France, Prussia or Austria. Wellington, who was then out of office, had already announced that he was ready, at all times, to serve his Sovereign in any station. The St. Petersburg mission was broached to the Duke. "He not only accepted but jumped " at the proposal ".¹

Wellington began his Russian campaign in February 1826. "He plunged", to quote Guedalla, 'into a vortex of diplomacy mitigated by that Russian 'hospitality which consists of 'pallid asparagus and 'foetid oysters'. His nights, as some one wrote, 'were 'nothing but blows-out for the Duke', his 'days all 'politics and pipeclay' ".² From this atmosphere of conviviality there emerged a protocol which guaranteed Greece a qualified degree of independence under Anglo-Russian auspices.

It seems, however, that the Duke had transcended his instructions. George Canning,³ though essentially a Liberal, was in office. He was thus more

¹ *The Duke*, by Philip Guedalla, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1931, p. 346.

² *Ibid.*, p. 348.

³ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

Conservative than the reactionary who was out of office. His wishes were compressed into the statement we have already cited : " Take them up (our " commercial grievances) and press them hard. If we " are to have a quarrel we must have the mercantile " interests with us ". George Canning knew that in the spring of 1826 these " mercantile interests " were favourable to Greece, but he feared that they were not favourable enough to make it certain that they would applaud the protocol signed on 4 April 1826.

" The Duke was moving with the times, though " his critics have preferred to think that he was " unaware of what he was doing ".¹ In other words, if what Guedalla says be correct, the definitive orientation of the policy which led to the independence of Greece was really set in motion by a man who did not know what he was doing but who nevertheless acted in violation of the letter of his instructions. But whether Wellington transcended the terms of his mandate or not is really beside the issue. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 4 April 1826 was a living reality and had to be dealt with as such. It roused Metternich from his obscurantist torpor. He called George Canning the " scourge of the world ".²

It did not take Metternich long to see that recriminations would do him no good and that it was the part of wisdom for him to swim with the current. France watched the weather-vane and acted accordingly. Her king had received four horses and a young elephant, and his son, Monseigneur le Dauphin, four horses but no elephant, for having sent to Egypt a military and a naval mission to take part in the war against the Greeks.³ The advisers of Charles X were incensed at the march which England and Russia had stolen on them but the King and the Crown Prince kept the

¹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

² *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, par Edouard Driault, Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1925, vol. I, p. 320.

³ Driault, *L'Expédition de Crète et de Morée*, p. 52.

elephant and the horses, and the French missions demanded that the Wellington-Nesselrode Pact should be enlarged into a general one adorned with the signature of a representative of France.¹

This insistence on the part of M. de Villele that a guarantee was not sufficient, but that France wanted to appear as "a contracting party", brought the matter into a new phase. In reality, it meant that the Powers were beginning to vie with one another to see which could burn the greatest amount of incense to the new star which was about to shine in the galaxy of nations. The result of this rivalry was what is known as the Treaty of London of 6 July 1827. By this agreement England, Russia and France offered their mediation to Turkey with a view to bringing about a reconciliation with Greece.

One of the articles of this accord sets forth that if, within a month, the Sublime Porte fails to accept this mediation, and to agree to an armistice, the Powers covenant with one another "to obtain the immediate effect of an armistice by preventing any further collision between the belligerents but without taking any part in the hostilities".² How England, Russia and France expected to accomplish this result is not explained in any of the clauses of the Treaty. The Pact, however, recites that "the admirals commanding the respective squadrons in the waters of the Levant will receive the necessary instructions". They were put into writing and can now be analysed.

Ibrahim had not been idle while all this diplomatic manoeuvring was proceeding. Not only had he taken Missolonghi, but Athens also had fallen. The Acropolis was besieged. The war centred around it. The Greeks under Colonel Fabvier fought valiantly, but were defeated. In February 1827 they handed over the chief command of their navy to Lord Cochrane

¹ Driault, *Historie Diplomatique*, vol. I, p. 345.

² *Ibid.*, p. 366.

(Earl of Dundonald) and that of their land forces to General (afterwards Sir Richard) Church. But Kismet had already registered its decree, and on 5 June 1827 the Acropolis fell.

It is obvious that this fatality hastened the signature of the Treaty of London of 6 July 1827. The Powers saw that if they did not intervene, Ibrahim's triumph would be complete. The worst enemy of the Greeks had been their own incurable spirit of faction. During the siege of Missolonghi rival assemblies and opposing presidents had struggled for supremacy. In March 1827 anarchy broke out within the Greek lines. "There was"—we quote the *Encyclopædia Britannica*—"war of Rumeliotes against Moreotes, of chief against chief; rival factions bombarded each other from the two forts of Nauplia over the stricken town and in derision of the impotent government".

After having thus brought out the fact that the Greeks of 1827, however brave they may have been, had momentarily become a rabble torn by factional strife, the *Encyclopædia* adds :

"Finally, after months of inaction, Ibrahim began once more his systematic devastation of the country. To put a stop to this the Powers decided to intervene by means of a joint demonstration of their fleets, in order to enforce an armistice and compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea".

It is thus clear that George Canning's charge of the "barbarization" of the Morea is advanced as the reason for the final decision of the Powers to intervene in Greece. It is, however, admitted that Ibrahim had been inactive for months. It strikes us as not inconceivable that the carnage which shocked Europe may have been the work not of Ibrahim's sword but of the Greek internecine strife. Fraternal hatred makes mad men and blind men of saints. And besides, with whom was Ibrahim to treat when village

after village fell into his hands, if there was no constituted authority within the Greek ranks to personify law and order? He may have been compelled to take draconian measures, not because he was cruel, but because Greek anarchy may have forced his hand. Those who assail his reputation overlook these facts and seem to prefer to portray him as a bloodthirsty barbarian.

An insight into the difficulties with which Ibrahim had to contend is afforded by this official despatch sent by Admiral de Rigny to his Ministry :

"It is generally assumed that the Greek Government
"is a recognized power, at all events in that part of
"the country not ruled by the Turks, that it dictates
"the movements of the military forces of the country
"and that it also has control of a navy. This is a
"mistake. The army, when there is one, is dominated
"by this captain or that captain for a day or so. The
"vessels belong to individual owners who give them
"their orders. The same crews one day serve the
"Miaulis, abandon them the next, go over to the
"Canaris and seldom remain loyal to the same chief."¹

The Greek coast was nothing but a nest of pirate dens. Douin paints this picture of the condition which there obtained :

"A lone vessel cannot proceed ten leagues without
"being assailed. Hidden behind their rocks the
"pirates keep a look out for the approach of merchant-
"men. As soon as it is seen that they are unaccom-
"panied and becalmed, the brigands emerge in fisher
"boats from their hiding places. They never take
"to the water except when they are sure of their prize.
"They cannot be captured. Fifty men of-war could
"not run them down. To deal with them troops
"would have to be landed and chase them in the
"interior".²

¹ De Rigny au Ministre, 23 March, 1826, cited in *Navarin*, by Douin, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

This is precisely what Ibrahim did. He fought the battle of civilization against piracy. He led the fight of decency against depredation ; but because he happened to be a Muslim and the desperadoes were Christians, his reputation is a target for criticism. We are not endeavouring to create the impression that Ibrahim deserves a martyr's crown. We are not pleading for his canonization. We cannot do so in the face of this statement by Mouriez :

“ The fall of Missolonghi brought about that of Athens and of all Hellas. Ibrahim returned to the Peloponnesus, angered by the heavy losses he had sustained during the siege. He resorted to reprisals and subjected that country to atrocities which considerably exceed those formerly committed by Turks and Albanians. What had principally excited his anger was the insolence of those bands of Kleptes, which, always fleeing before his battalions, attacked his convoys and his outposts. Being unable to seize them he ravaged the countryside to avenge himself, tore up olive trees, burnt harvests and massacred un-armed inhabitants ”.¹

It is facts such as these which warranted George Canning in saying : “ butchering of captives we have long witnessed on both sides of the contest ”. But the circumstance that Ibrahim resorted to reprisals and does not appear to have begun his attacks until Greeks had fired upon Greeks, until he had found nobody behind the Greek lines with whom he could treat and until guerillas had defied the rules of civilized warfare, while not excusing his action, at all events goes a long way towards stressing the arrant hypocrisy of the attitude of the Powers and towards justifying the statement of Lane-Poole, already quoted, that :

“ probably no chapter of diplomacy, if fully revealed, would display so shameful a series of falsehoods and unworthy stratagems as that which included

¹ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 298.

"the early negotiations for the pacification of "Greece".

It does honour to the heart of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe that when he was assigned to Constantinople as His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador he had resolved that Greece must never again be under the Turkish yoke. "He was sent out to secure that "end," asserts his biographer, "and although he saw "from the first that the odds were heavily against him, "he took up the cause *con amore*".¹ The Christian student of history applauds his motives, admires his tenacity and rejoices at the result achieved. But he cannot give his approval either to the barrage of fire centred upon the name of Ibrahim, or to the smoke-screen generally thrown round the contributory shortcomings of the Greeks and their butchery not only of the foreign enemy but of the domestic foe.

¹ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 398.

CHAPTER VII

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

ADMIRAL DE RIGNY was more than a sailor ; he was a diplomatic scout. He knew every nook and corner of the Eastern Mediterranean. His reports kept the French Government fully posted with regard to conditions in the Levant. While he did not fail to stress the fact that the Greek navy had ceased to exist and had been supplanted by pirates, nor hesitate to denounce the Greek soldiers as freebooters who cared more for factional politics than they did of uniting to fight the Muslim enemy, his opinions were those of a Christian who believed in self-determination and who desired to see the Cross triumph over the Star and Crescent. In a long note, written in June 1826, he spoke of the necessity of early intervention and " of the physical and moral situation of this " unhappy country (Greece) which grows worse every " day and may soon become such that any intervention " on behalf of its inhabitants may be impossible or " useless ".¹

If this French naval officer thus vied with Greek propagandists and French Philhellenes in bringing pressure to bear on the Quai d'Orsay to support Greece, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was the English de Rigny. He frankly took the position that the Greeks were at their last gasp, and that nothing but the interference of the Powers could save them.² It was because he

¹ French Ministry of Foreign Affairs—*Memoires et documents, Grèce*, No. 8, quoted in *Navarin*, by Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

² Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 445.

felt so strongly on this point that he wrote to Lord Dudley, who had succeeded George Canning as Foreign Minister :

"Put your shoulder to the Greek treaty and enable us to carry it through with acclamation. If not—good my Lord, pray let me go. I have been leading a dog's life here for some time, but I do not wish to be treated like a dog".¹

We have spoken of this attitude of the British Ambassador and the French Admiral because the Treaty of 6 July 1827 left the practical mechanics of the execution of that Pact in the hands of the diplomat accredited to the Sultan and the seamen in charge of the squadrons assigned to the Levant. When we turn to Blue Book and White Book material we find documents appended to the Treaty which read :

Annex A. "Identical instructions to the Ambassadors at Constantinople of England, France and Russia".²

Annex F. "Second identical instructions issued to the officers commanding the Levant squadrons of the High Contracting Parties".³

It will have been recalled that this Treaty was vague enough to satisfy the most fastidious. It had been signed because the public conscience of the Occident wanted the Turks driven out of Greece, but did not have the courage to make a mockery of the tenets of international law and express their wants in black and white. Secret clauses were added to the patent terms of the Convention, but these too were permitted to remain nebulously indefinite. These Annexes were called into being, as it were, "to keep the record straight but to get the facts right." We shall quote from Annex F. Its opening paragraphs read :

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

² Douin, *Navarin*, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

“ In determining to offer their mediation to the
“ Ottoman Porte, the Courts of France, England and
“ Russia have been obliged to foresee the eventuality
“ that this proposal may not be accepted. They have,
“ therefore, agreed by a secret clause that if, after the
“ delay of one month, the Porte refuses to accept
“ the mediation of the three Courts, they will take
“ steps to obtain the immediate effects of the armistice
“ which they desire to see put into execution.

“ The measures thus envisaged consist in the
“ immediate establishment of friendly relations with
“ the Greeks and the joining together of the squadrons
“ of the High Contracting Parties to the end that no
“ Turkish or Egyptian supplies in men, arms, vessels
“ or munitions may reach Greece or the Archipelago ”.¹

When it is recalled that one of the copies of this Annex F was intended for Admiral de Rigny, it is not difficult to surmise what these instructions meant to him. We know nothing of the temperament of the Russian Officer in Command. We shall not look up his record for he fades out of our picture. We are interested in having the limelight turned upon the British Commanding officer. We cannot visualise an Englishman taking second place in an Anglo-Franco-Russian naval demonstration. The Briton thus thrust into the foreground was Sir Edward Codrington. He was destined to come into personal contact with Ibrahim. He had received these general orders marked Annex F. They were clear enough in their way, but he wanted something more explicit. He did not hesitate to write to the British Ambassador at Constantinople for additional information. We shall allow Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's memoirs to explain what took place. The Great Elchi wrote :

“ Sir Edward Codrington, who had sailed from
“ England with the famous motto of ‘ Go it Ned ’ in
“ his thoughts, if not on his flag, no sooner reached

¹ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

“ the station off Morea than he wrote privately to me
 “ professing an uncomfortable uncertainty as to what
 “ he was to do, and requesting some information which
 “ might help him to see his way more clearly. It so
 “ happened that I had always entertained a strong
 “ opinion as to the unfairness of giving any equivocal
 “ instructions to an officer charged with the necessary
 “ responsibilities of his calling, and therefore my reply
 “ to the Admiral was couched in terms as explicit as
 “ my own instructions allowed. I answered :

“ “ I have considered and talked over with my
 “ “ colleagues, Ct. Guilleminot and M. de Ribeaupierre,
 “ “ the several questions mentioned in your letters,
 “ “ marked secret, as having been subjects of con-
 “ “ versations between you and Admiral de Rigny in
 “ “ anticipation of your being called upon to execute
 “ “ the instructions contingent upon the Porte’s
 “ “ rejection of our proposals. . . . On the subject
 “ “ of *collision*, for instance, we agree that, although
 “ “ the measures to be executed by you are not adopted
 “ “ in a hostile spirit, and although it is clearly the
 “ “ intention of the Allied Governments to avoid, if
 “ “ possible, anything that may bring on war, yet the
 “ “ prevention of supplies, as stated in your instruc-
 “ “ tions, is ultimately to be enforced, if necessary,
 “ “ and when other means are exhausted, by cannon-
 “ “ shot ’ ”.¹

This extract from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe’s memoirs and his letter, while very illuminating, fail to throw any light upon Codrington’s temperament, although the reference to “ Go it, Ned ”, tends to show that daring rather than prudence, and impetuosity rather than circumspection, were that gallant officer’s predominant characteristics. We attach considerable importance to these factors because we are convinced that the personal equation often plays a great part in determining matters of state. Long days of summer

¹ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 448.

and early autumn spent in Greek harbours and near the Hellenic coast can be extremely hot and nerve-destroying. Ibrahim was face to face with this Allied squadron for several weeks, and Codrington's idiosyncracies are certainly elements to be considered in dealing with the historical aspects of the problem revolving round Navarino.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe helps to reconstruct this background, for he writes :

"In truth, I should have avoided the expression of 'cannon-shot' and used, though writing privately, the more diplomatic phrase of coercion or forcible measures, had I received the slightest intimation of Sir Edward's fiery and enterprising spirit."¹

It strikes us as savouring of causticity to seek to differentiate between "cannon-shot" and "the more diplomatic phrase of coercion or forcible measures." In Fowler's *Dictionary of Modern English Usage* there is an article on "Genteelism", or the substitution for the ordinary natural word that first suggests itself to the mind of a synonym that is thought to be less familiar. The distinction drawn by the British Ambassador recalls to our minds the examples quoted by Fowler.

Verbiage cannot hide the fact that this reply sent to Codrington meant to say that, given certain conditions, he should fight. When Lord Stratford de Redcliffe made use of this unfortunate phraseology he did not know that on 28 July 1827 the Admiral had written to his brother :

"I have never felt a wish to see another war till now, and I really think it might prove a more humane way of settling affairs here than any other. One strong act of coercion would place the Porte at our mercy, and we could then settle the whole matter as we chose, and take Candia to ourselves in the bargain—a consummation, in my opinion, devoutly

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

"to be wished. However, it is to be presumed I shall have orders to guide me instead of my own speculation".¹

This means that when the Ambassador's letter was received the instructions which it contained, and particularly the reference to cannon-shot, harmonized with Codrington's frame of mind. It is thus obvious that with a blistering sun beaming down upon the fleet all day long, the allied squadrons were commanded by a Frenchman who pleaded with his Government for immediate intervention in favour of Greece and by an Englishman "of a fiery and enterprising spirit" who had received orders which coincided with his aspirations. This demonstrates that Ibrahim had a difficult task confronting him when he faced the fleet of the Great Powers.

Muhammad Ali foresaw the potentialities of the situation. He was placed in a most invidious position. If he refused to recede from his attitude because of the Anglo-Franco-Russian veto, it meant that he was courting eventual humiliation and inevitable defeat. He had no illusions. Strong common sense was his dominant virtue. If he correctly interpreted the meaning of the handwriting on the wall, his conduct would be open to the imputation of disloyalty to the Sultan. When he was carefully examining the matter from all possible angles, the Austrian Consul-General accredited to him—Acerbi by name—tried to persuade him to dispatch his fleet without delay and to strike with it a blow that would frustrate the possibility of the intervention or mediation of the allies.² That it was not officiousness which had prompted this advice is established by the fact that Austrian vessels hovered round Navarino and appeared to be bent on giving

¹ *Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington*, edited by his daughter, Lady Bouchier, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1873, vol. I, p. 395.

² Douin, *Navarin*, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

trouble until the British Admiral took effective steps to force them to behave.¹

But even if Metternich's representative urged Muhammad Ali to defy London, Paris and St. Petersburg and to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Vienna, the Pasha was far too astute to let himself become a tool. His heart was in his navy. He grasped the fact that command of the sea meant not only the defeat of the Greeks but his primacy in the Levant. He knew that it would take him until the beginning of August to get his fleet into shape. He hoped that during this interval such pressure would be put upon him by the Allies as would enable him to explain to the Sultan that Allah had registered his verdict and that further opposition to the decree of fate would be useless. Both Salt, British Consul-General at Alexandria, and Captain Huder, a special envoy sent by Count Guilleminot to Muhammad Ali, reached this conclusion. On 21 July 1827 the Englishman reported to the British Ambassador at Constantinople as follows :

" His Highness continues to adhere to the declarations that he has already made to me. He would be most pleased, I am certain, to see our fleets appear off the coast of Egypt to prevent his expedition from putting to sea. But being uncertain, as he is, in regard to a more effective intervention of the Allies (more effective than that of mere formal written protests) he feels that it is difficult for him to delay any further the departure of his expedition."²

Huder's report to his Ambassador bears the same date. Days passed. The Allies did not appear off the coast of Egypt. They did not make a naval demonstration against Alexandria. His fleet caused Muhammad Ali's soul to swell with pride. He wrote to Ibrahim on 24 July 1827 :

¹ Metternich's *Memoirs and Documents*, vol. IV, p. 399, cited by Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

² Foreign Office, 78-160, cited by Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

"My son here we are, with Allah's help, in possession of the most magnificent fleet ever owned by a Muhammadan power. It answers all our needs in respect of speed, armament and discipline. It is not the fleet which you knew. It is a splendid fleet, modern in every way, and such as no Muslim ruler has ever before possessed. If God so wills, you will soon see it for yourself."¹

With such thoughts occupying his mind it may be assumed that Muhammad Ali reasoned somewhat on these lines :

"I have, with Allah's help, built a fleet which makes me stand out among Muslim potentates as the *Harramein* do among the cities of the world. The eyes of Islam are centred upon me. I have made it clear to Salt and Huder—to England and France—that I do not desire to use this great navy to challenge the Occident. I could not be more explicit than I have been. These two men understood my meaning and have obviously reported to their Governments what I have said. The fact that no Allied naval demonstration has been made either off the coast of Egypt or in Alexandria unquestionably means that Acerbi, Metternich's mouthpiece, is right. England, France and Russia are merely bluffing ; they are bombarding me with paper ; they have no intention of fighting me. They cannot get together upon a concerted plan of action. If I, knowing that they are merely bluffing, give in to them, I shall appear in a ridiculous light before all True Believers. I must let my expedition set sail when it is ready."

He did. Its final contingents sailed on 4 August 1827. Including the Turkish and Tunisian elements it consisted of 2 men-of-war, 11 frigates, 18 corvettes, 5 brigs, 6 geolettes, 6 fire-ships and 40 transports.²

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Cairo, Turkish Section.

² Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

When it had disappeared beyond the horizon Muhammad Ali received Captain Huder in audience and said : " A great weight has been taken off my " soul ; the rest is in the hands of Allah " .

We have said that the Pasha was convinced that this fleet would not be attacked by the Allies because he had given France and England every opportunity to prevent its departure and they had not acted. With Acerbi continually telling him that London, Paris and Saint Petersburg did not mean business, it is reasonable to suppose that the Austrian agent reported to Muhammad Ali all gossip that he could pick up about the bad blood between Codrington and Admiral de Rigny. We know that the Englishman wrote to his wife :

" Everything around me cries out : ' Treason ' ,
" but I prefer to believe that it is professional incom-
" petence, which differs somewhat from intrigue and
diplomacy " .¹

One of the reasons which made Codrington write of treason was the fact that French naval officers held important posts in the Egyptian fleet. Codrington was a man of sterling integrity and of rugged honesty. It is all very well for a professional diplomat to animadvert upon his " fiery and enterprising spirit " , but he was fundamentally and uncompromisingly straightforward. He refused to admit that the French were sincere when they allowed their nationals to act as technical advisers to the Egyptian fleet then on the high seas. He shows this in a letter to his Foreign Minister.

The Austrian intelligence service learnt of this friction between de Rigny and Codrington. At any rate it may be taken for granted that Acerbi drove home to Muhammad Ali the significance of the presence of these French officers in the Egyptian fleet and stressed the point that until they were recalled

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

the good faith of French co-operation in the Allied pressure was open to doubt. This argument was strengthened by the delay that elapsed before Russian units joined the British and French vessels.

Four days after the departure of the Egyptian expedition Major J. H. Cradock, an emissary of the British Foreign Office, reached Alexandria. He had been deputed by George Canning to speak frankly to Muhammad Ali, to point out that England was most serious in her opposition to the departure of the Pasha's fleet and determined to enforce the provisions of the Pact of London. This arrival, belated though it obviously was, impressed Muhammad Ali with the danger of the situation. He did not have to be knocked down with a club to know that he had been struck. He listened to what Cradock had to say, and became convinced that while London had perhaps procrastinated, the British decision was irrevocable and British guns were ready to make it effective.

The Pasha spoke frankly to Cradock. He could be delightfully frank and charmingly sincere when he wanted to be. Salt was able to make it clear to the Foreign Office delegate that Muhammad Ali had been willing to withhold his fleet and had not allowed it to sail until convinced that loyalty to the Sultan, in the absence of an Allied hostile demonstration, had left him no alternative. The personal ties which linked Salt to the Pasha made it desirable that he should continue the negotiations, strengthened by the moral backing of Cradock. The results of the diplomatic "conversations" thus engaged in are summarized in a report by Salt from which we extract this passage :

"Here is my decision", said Muhammad Ali.
'Let Major Cradock find your Admiral at once and
'tell him that he recommends that the Commanders
'of the Allied fleets send immediately an officer with
'a letter addressed to Ibrahim Pasha to the effect
'that matters have reached such a pass that he should

"no longer think of attacking Hydra because the Allies are determined, should he do so, to use force to prevent him. Let the officer await an answer. Let him confine his action to delivering this letter to Ibrahim in person."

"All this is very well", I said, "but I fear that the effect of this letter would be practically nil if it is not backed up by secret instructions from Your Highness."

"Leave this to me", said the Pasha with a look full of expression.¹

A day or so later Muhammad Ali received Major Cradock in audience and confirmed what he had told Salt. "*Ce jeu tout en nuance et en finesse, le Pacha ne le joua qu'avec les Anglais. A l'égard des Français il se montra plus réservé*" ("The Pasha played this Machiavellian game solely with the English. He was more cautious in dealing with the French"), is how Douin sums up the situation born of the Cradock mission.² We accept this analysis. It means that the wily Muhammad Ali had become convinced that England was acting in good faith but that the French were not. The failure of London and Paris to act upon his hints to Salt and Huder had satisfied him that Allied solidarity was a pretence. He learnt from what Cradock told him that whether France was playing fast or loose, England was prepared to fight rather than sacrifice the principle defined in the Pact of London. It was recognition of this fact which determined his frankness towards England and his reticence towards France.

The British Admiral in the *Asia*, with the *Genoa* and the *Albion*, arrived off Navarino on 11 September 1827. The whole of the Egyptian expedition was then at anchor in that harbour, having reached there on 9 September. The Allied squadron did not put

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

² *Ibid.*, p. 161.

in an appearance until 22 September. In the meantime, while waiting for the French Admiral who had been placed under his orders ¹, it became necessary for Sir Edward Codrington to notify the officer commanding the Ottoman forces in the port of Navarino that he would be prevented by force from attacking any part of Greece.

This was done by a note dated 19 September. But nevertheless, on the twenty-first a division of the Turkish (not the Egyptian) part of the Expedition sailed out of the port. The English, although outnumbered, prepared for battle and approached the Turkish fleet. A clash seemed to be inevitable, but at the critical moment the French appeared upon the horizon. This completely changed the aspect of the situation. The Ottoman leader made no further attempt to leave the harbour, and was, according to Sir Edward Codrington's biographer, permitted to rejoin the Egyptian fleet in the harbour after Ibrahim had agreed to a conference with the Allied Admirals.²

So far nothing untoward had happened. The General Order issued by Codrington and dated *Asia* at sea, 8 September 1827, had, it is true, repeated that regrettable term "cannon-shot". It had laid down the principle that,

"the armistice proposed to each (the Turks and ' the Greeks) has been acceded to by the Greeks whilst ' it has been refused by the Turks. It becomes, ' therefore, the duty of the allied naval forces to enter, ' in the first place, into friendly relations with the ' Greeks ; and next to intercept every supply of men, ' arms, etc., destined against Greece and coming ' either from Turkey or Africa in general". It had then gone on to announce that

"All possible means should be tried, in the first " instance, to prevent the necessity of proceeding to

¹ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 437.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 472.

“extremities ; but the prevention of supplies, as
“before mentioned, is to be enforced, if necessary,
“and when all other means are exhausted, by cannon-
“shot ”.¹

The letter written to the Ottoman commander on 19 September 1827 had been correct in tone and fully warranted by the circumstances. We are not convinced that good judgment was shown in addressing a like note to Ibrahim, dated 21 September 1827, written, like the first communication, in the frigid third person and couched in these words :

“That his Highness Ibrahim Pasha may have no
“doubts as to the intentions of the Allied Sovereigns,
“Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, Commander-
“in-Chief of his Britannic Majesty’s naval forces in
“the Mediterranean, has the honour to send his
“Highness copies of certain papers on this important
“subject by which his conduct is guided. His
“Highness will see that the Admirals have no
“other alternative but to carry the Treaty into full
“execution whatever may be the consequences ”.²

Sentiments which do honour to the heart of the British Admiral dictated this note. He desired to be punctiliously correct. But unfortunately he did the very thing most likely to ruffle Ibrahim and complicate a situation already pregnant with all kinds of unpleasant possibilities. Codrington did not write or speak Arabic. Ibrahim, at that time, knew little or no French. The result was that the two men, both of them candid, straightforward and sincere, remained insulated from one another by the barrier of language. They were bluff and abrupt fighters held at arm’s length by interpreters and never able to establish that personal contact and individual sympathy which would have brought them together in an instant if they could have understood one another. They could not.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 452.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 475.

This cold, official letter written in the third person, was just the kind of communication that an interpreter's translations turned into a formal ultimatum.

To make matters worse, the next day de Rigny felt called upon to turn the unfortunate letter into French. The signatures of both admirals were affixed to it. The interpreter thus had another opportunity to add fuel to the flames. Not content with driving home the literal sense of Codrington's words, the French Admiral proposed that he should call upon Ibrahim in person and insist "upon the reality and imminence of the menace contained in these letters".¹ He had in his possession a personal note from Muhammad Ali to Ibrahim in which the son was told "to understand fully the importance of the news which will be transmitted to you".² Such language was cryptic enough to mean almost anything. It had been adopted by Muhammad Ali for reasons of his own. De Rigny expected to convert it into a threat with which to frighten a man who is known to fame as "the lion of the brave whose counsel hath always proved fortunate" and who is so designated in an official dispatch sent to the British Foreign Office on 8 March 1816.³

Ibrahim received the French Admiral with great courtesy. De Rigny's report to Paris is quite lengthy. It does not speak of threats. It contains the words :

"Ibrahim did not seek to conceal his embarrassment. . . . 'You insist' he said, 'that I suspend all operations and yet you allow the Greeks to do whatever they want. Here you make demands upon me which could more appropriately have been made when my fleet was still at Alexandria. If you had done so everything would have been settled long ago'".⁴

¹ Douin, *Navarin*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

² *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

³ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁴ Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

The net result of this interview was that while Ibrahim made it perfectly clear to the French Admiral that he would be more than happy to find a way out of his difficult position, and would cheerfully accede to any orders given him by Muhammad Ali, he insisted that if the Allies expected him to suspend hostilities, it was incumbent upon them to apply similar pressure to the Greeks. He refused to allow his hands to be tied if his enemy were to be permitted freedom of action.

It is not difficult to follow his point of view. It is just what would have been expected of a prudent commanding officer. Had de Rigny and Codrington placed themselves in Ibrahim's place, they would never have lost sight of this fact. Had they done this, had they borne in mind that the language difficulty made it almost impossible either for them to understand Ibrahim or for Ibrahim to follow their exact meaning, and had they known that interpreters seldom do their full duty, the Battle of Navarino would probably never have been fought or would have taken place immediately following this first interview.

CHAPTER VIII

A FATAL MISUNDERSTANDING

THE report of this interview with Ibrahim which de Rigny submitted to Paris, was far more explicit than the summary he sent to Sir Edward Codrington. The French Minister of Marine was able to grasp the salient fact that while the Egyptian was amenable to reason, he was not disposed to bind himself if the Greeks were granted freedom of action. The memorandum transmitted to the British Admiral was quite succinct. Its dominant theme was—"I do not doubt that Ibrahim intends to remain here", but it did not show that he insisted that he would refuse to be bound unless the Greeks were bound also.¹

We do not mean to imply that de Rigny intended to lead his colleague into error; he did not. He merely failed to lay emphasis on a phase of his interview which he stressed in the more prolix report. He no doubt contemplated filling in these details verbally. But the result of his mission was that Codrington's first impression of Ibrahim failed to register one of the outstanding facts brought out in the opening conference with de Rigny.

Not satisfied that his formal note to Ibrahim, dated 21 September 1827, had produced the proper effect, Codrington addressed a second communication to Ibrahim. It ran as follows:

"Sir

"As I am come into this port (Navarino) to explain the orders under which I am acting, and the necessity I am under of obeying them to the fullest

¹ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 3.

“ extent, whatever may be the consequences, it is my
“ wish that I may be permitted to do so in the presence
“ of all the principal chiefs commanding in the
“ Turkish expedition ”.¹

The interview which followed this letter plays such an important part in assessing Ibrahim's rôle in history, that we are tempted to quote in full the report which Sir Edward Codrington's officers made of it. It bears the caption “ Memorandum of the Conference at “ Navarino, 25 September 1827, with Ibrahim “ Pasha ” and reads as follows :

“ Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington having
“ entered the port of Navarino on the 24th September,
“ 1827, with the intention of having a conference
“ with Ibrahim Pasha, the next morning was appointed
“ by Ibrahim for receiving Sir Edward, as well as
“ Rear-Admiral de Rigny, who had likewise entered
“ Navarino at the same time with the English
“ admiral.

“ On the 25th, at 10 a.m., Sir E Codrington
“ landed, accompanied by Captain Curzon, of the
“ ‘ Asia ’, Lieutenant Dilke, his flag-lieutenant ; Mr.
“ Dyer, his secretary ; the Honourable Colonel
“ Cradock, and Mr. Codrington, midshipman ; and
“ joining the French Admiral on the beach, who was
“ accompanied by some of his officers, they proceeded
“ together to the tent of Ibrahim Pasha. All the
“ Turkish and Egyptian chiefs, with the exception of
“ Tahir Pasha, who was said to be unwell, were
“ ranged on one side, and the officers of the French
“ and English squadrons took their seats on the
“ other.

“ After the introduction and usual Turkish compli-
“ ments had passed, the Admirals began by informing
“ Ibrahim that, in consequence of a treaty which had
“ been signed by England, France and Russia, it
“ became their imperative duty to intercept every

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 4.

“ supply sent by sea of men, arms, &c., destined against
“ Greece, and coming from Turkey or Africa in
“ general ; and in order to show the perfect frankness
“ which they wished to use in all their relations with
“ him, they read to him, *in extenso*, those parts of their
“ instructions which were applicable to the case in
“ point.

“ Ibrahim replied that the Admirals must be aware
“ that he was a soldier, like themselves, and that to
“ obey orders was an imperative duty to him as to
“ them ; that his orders were to attack Hydra, and
“ that he must put them in execution ; that it was his
“ part to act and not to negotiate, and that he must
“ refer them to the Grand Signior for any diplomatic
“ arrangement.

“ The Admirals answered that they were aware
“ what must be the feelings of a brave man under such
“ circumstances, and that they congratulated him on
“ having a force opposed to him which it was impossible
“ to resist. They reminded him that if he put to sea
“ in defiance of their amicable warning, they must
“ carry their instructions into execution, and that if
“ he resisted by force, the total destruction of his fleet
“ must follow ; and that it would be an act of madness
“ which the Sultan could not applaud. The Admirals
“ said that perhaps if they regarded their feelings as
“ military men, his obstinacy would only afford them
“ a means of distinction which they might wish ;
“ but in the present friendly relations between the
“ Allies and the Turks, they would deeply deplore
“ any circumstance which could tend to compromise
“ the good terms which subsisted. It was the sincere
“ wish of the three Governments, and their positive
“ instruction, to avoid whatever might tend to a
“ rupture ; and that it was with this view at heart
“ that they had come thither to open his eyes to the
“ situation in which they stood ; that they wished
“ to make this declaration before an assembly of his

“ chiefs, in order that no doubt might be entertained
“ as to the real intentions of the Admirals ; that no
“ distrust might be generated amongst his officers
“ with regard to the communications of the Admirals
“ with himself.

“ Ibrahim then replied that he acknowledged the
“ weight of what he had heard—it was true that when
“ his orders had been sent to him from Constantinople,
“ the actual state of affairs, and the risk of a collision
“ with the combined fleet, had not been foreseen.
“ He would therefore take upon himself to suspend
“ all operations of the land and sea forces forming
“ the expedition from Alexandria till he received
“ answers from Constantinople and Alexandria by
“ couriers, which he would immediately despatch ;
“ until that period the expedition should remain
“ stationary at Navarin. He, at the same time, asked
“ permission to send two despatch vessels, one to
“ Alexandria and the other to Previsa, which was
“ immediately granted. The Admirals offered even
“ to send a vessel with them to ensure their safety ;
“ but this, he said, would compromise the dignity
“ of the Turkish flag.

“ The Admirals then said that his promise satisfied
“ them, and that they would trust to his word of honour
“ as they expected that he would trust to theirs.
“ Ibrahim put his hand upon his heart and said that
“ it was sacred ; but added, ‘ when I have promised
“ ‘ this, I must say that I cannot think it just you should
“ ‘ impose this obligation on me, and allow the Greeks
“ ‘ to prosecute hostilities ’.

“ The Admirals answered that it was not a parallel
“ case, for that the Greeks had accepted the mediation
“ of the Allies, and that the Turks had not. Sir E.
“ Codrington then said that, to prove to Ibrahim the
“ fairness with which he wished to act, in consequence
“ of information he had received of Lord Cochrane’s
“ intention to excite an insurrection beyond the actual

“ theatre of war, he would himself put a stop to his proceedings.

“ The conference here ended, and the Admirals re-embarked. Next morning (the 26th) Mr. Abro, the Pasha’s interpreter, came on board the ‘ Asia ’, and told Sir Edward Codrington that Ibrahim had received intelligence in the interval, of Lord Cochrane having made a descent upon Patras ; that his first impulse had been to cut his cables, break the armistice, and sail in the night, but that fortunately he had thought better of it ; and that he came on board from the Pasha to request permission to send a part of his fleet to Patras. This was peremptorily refused, and it was agreed that, if the Pasha still showed a disposition to assert a right to reinforce Patras, that Mr. Abro should return on board ; but if, on the contrary, the Pasha acquiesced in the prohibition of the Admiral according to the arrangement of the day before, that no further communication was necessary. Mr. Abro did not return, and on the same night the ‘ Asia ’ and ‘ Syrene ’ put to sea.

“ Ibrahim wished, after the conference, and more particularly when he had pledged his word of honour to observe the armistice, to talk on other subjects not connected with the treaty, &c. ; but Sir Edward Codrington said to the dragoman (Abro) : ‘ I wish to understand before the conversation ends, whether His Highness fully comprehends all that has been communicated from me and Admiral de Rigny to you ; ’ to which he replied ‘ Yes, fully ’.

“ HENRY S. DYER, Secretary to Vice-Admiral.

“ SIR EDWARD CODRINGTON, K.C.B.

“ HOBART CRADOCK, Lieut.-Colonel.

“ EDWD. CURZON, Captain of H.M.S. ‘ Asia ’.”¹

This memorandum is not dated. It gives a synopsis

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 5.

of what took place at the Conference held on 25 September 1827. It was written, we suspect, after the Foreign Office had put Codrington on the grill. We say this because we take it for granted that the formal official report, the contemporaneous document, was drafted by him and bears his signature. The obvious sincerity and unimpeachable truthfulness of this memorandum require no comment. It scintillates with good faith.

“He would therefore take upon himself to suspend ‘all operations of the land and sea forces forming ‘the expedition from Alexandria till he received ‘answers from Constantinople and Alexandria by ‘couriers which he would immediately despatch ; ‘until that period the expedition would remain ‘stationary at Navarino ”.

This language is specific ; it refers to a designated contingent. It does not embrace all the troops and men-of-war under Ibrahim’s command ; it applies simply and solely to “the land and sea forces forming “the expedition coming from Alexandria”. Unfortunately the exact nature and strength of this naval and military detachment were not “nominated in the bond”. We might be able to get the figures by referring to other records, but our attention is not, at present, centred upon the objective facts of the case. We are dealing with the point of view of two straightforward soldiers who were, we repeat, insulated from one another by the barrier of language.

Ibrahim’s mind’s eye covered all the naval and military forces under his command. He had been in the Morea for many months and had led his forces to victory on land before the expedition from Alexandria had reached him, before these reinforcements had been sent. Codrington, like most sailors and soldiers, had a single-track mind. His thoughts were centred upon this Alexandria expedition, and he may well have confused that

contingent with the whole of Ibrahim's army and navy, completely overlooking the existence of the troops that had been in the Morea for months and the ships that had supported them during that period. But, at all events, the memorandum drawn up by the British officers makes it clear that Ibrahim did not agree to suspend all operations "till he received answers from Constantinople and Alexandria".

The fact that the next morning "Mr. Abro, the Pasha's interpreter, came on board the 'Asia' and told Codrington that Ibrahim had received intelligence in the interval of Lord Cochrane having made a descent upon Patras; that his first impulse had been to cut his cables, break the armistice and sail in the night", shows how Ibrahim construed the understanding. Had he felt bound hand and foot his "first impulse" would not have been to break the armistice and sail, possibly with the pre-Alexandria expedition vessels.

All that we know of Ibrahim's "first impulse" is what the interpreter reported to the British Admiral. We do know, however, that Codrington refused to allow him to reinforce Patras and that the dragoman was told that, "if the Pasha still showed a disposition to assert a right to reinforce Patras, that Mr. Abro should return on board; but if, on the contrary, the Pasha acquiesced in the prohibition of the Admiral according to the arrangement of the day before, that no further communication was necessary. Mr. Abro did not return, and on the same night the 'Asia' and the 'Syrene' put to sea".

This incident brings out the important part that interpreters played in the whole affair. We have no knowledge of the antecedents or subsequent record of this Mr. Abro. From our own acquaintance with the East we assume that he was not a Turk or an officer in the Turkish army, but a Levantine polyglot overflowing with vanity and overjoyed at the thought of

being in the centre of the limelight. We do not know whether he found Ibrahim immediately upon returning to headquarters and within the period of delay fixed by the Admiral. All that we can affirm is that Codrington's reply makes this Mr. Abro the pivotal factor in the negotiations and that it is difficult to judge just what he reported to Ibrahim, who had, according to the literal terms of the memorandum, a perfect right in dealing with the situation which had developed at Patras to make use of any elements under his command other than "the land and sea forces forming the expedition from Alexandria".

A letter written by the Admiral to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, immediately upon his return from the Conference, shows that he did not grasp the meaning of the words which have just been quoted. He reported to the British Ambassador that "it will probably be a month before he (Ibrahim) can receive his answers and during that time he is bound to remain inactive".¹ We learn, however, from what Codrington wrote to his wife on 6 October 1827, that Ibrahim did not remain inactive while the Greeks were massing troops against him.

"We anchored", says this letter, "under Cape Papa, where we now are, at 9 p.m. last night. . . . Cape Papa is at the entrance of the Gulf of Patras which is at the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto. My last letter left me on the 3rd at Zante, whilst Ibrahim and his fleet we supposed to be obediently working towards Navarin. It seems that in the night, inspired by the *dirty* weather, the *dirty dog* edged away for Patras and was stopped by a violent wind down the Gulf from proceeding beyond this cape, where we saw him and his admirals etc. at anchor, after we had approached in chase to intercept his movements."²

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 39.

If Codrington, in writing to his wife, spoke of *dirty* weather and *dirty dog*, his formal letter to the Turkish officer who was in command of the Ottoman fleet, while more parliamentary in its language, was equally categorical. It read :

“ Sir :

“ His Highness Ibrahim Pasha gave his word of honour to the French Admiral and myself, in the presence of his chiefs and by their consent, that none of the ships of the Turkish fleet should leave the port of Navarin without our permission. He has forfeited that word of honour, and I will not again trust the word of honour of him or any chief under his command. The ships now here under the command of Mustafa Bey shall not re-enter the port of Navarin, or any port in Europe this side of the Dardanelles ”.

While the British Admiral thus stressed the fact that he interpreted the agreement of 25 September 1827 as applying to all the ships in the port of Navarino, and while his good faith in so doing is irrefutably established, it is only fair that an attempt should be made to follow Ibrahim's line of thought. We shall not again refer to the text which demonstrates that his undertaking was not anything like so absolute as Codrington assumed it to be. We prefer to cite that part of the memorandum which reads as follows :

“ Sir Edward Codrington then said that, to prove to Ibrahim the fairness with which he wished to act, in consequence of information he had received of Lord Cochrane's intention to excite an insurrection beyond the actual theatre of war, he would himself put a stop to his proceeding. The conference here ended and the Admirals re-embarked ”.

In other words, the memorandum shows :

(1) that Ibrahim had said “ I cannot think it just

“ that you impose this obligation on me, and allow the
“ Greek to prosecute hostilities ” ;

(2) that Codrington gave assurances that he would
take steps to stop the insurrection which Lord
Cochrane had started “ beyond the actual theatre
of war ” ; and

(3) that the next day Ibrahim sent word that “ he
“ had received intelligence in the interval of Lord
“ Cochrane having made a descent upon Patras ”.

This chain of circumstances tends to show that
Ibrahim construed Codrington's ability to control
Lord Cochrane as an integral and essential part of the
gentleman's agreement. It is reasonable to suppose
that he would have remained inactive at Navarino
had the Admiral been able to control the Englishman
who commanded the Greek forces. Whether this
assumption be unfounded or not, we know from a
report sent by Codrington to the British Admiralty,
on 10 October 1827, that Lord Cochrane refused to
comply with the request made to him. This official
paper states :

“ I have more than once had to complain of the
“ irregular conduct of Lord Cochrane. You will
“ now inform his Royal Highness, the Lord High
“ Admiral, that I received a letter from His Excellency
“ Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Adam on the
“ 23rd of last month, stating that information had
“ reached him of a Greek squadron under his Lordship,
“ having on board a considerable body of troops under
“ the command of General Church, being about to
“ make an attack on some parts of the Albanian
“ provinces to the north of the Gulf of Prevesa. . . .
“ I immediately sent the ‘ Philomel ’ to wherever
“ Lord Cochrane might be, with directions to Com-
“ mander Lord Viscount Ingestrie to make known
“ to the commanders of the expedition that I considered
“ it my duty in the present state of affairs to prevent
“ such a measure being carried into execution ; and

' that I should shortly present myself in that neighbourhood. The 'Philomel' joined me off Cape Papa on the 5th inst. ; and Lord Ingestrie reported that upon his showing the order to Lord Cochrane his Lordship promised to guide himself by the spirit of it. Lord Ingestrie then passed into the Gulf of Lepanto, where he made a similar communication to General Church, who equally expressed his decision to attend to it. That general was at Vostitza on the 4th inst., meditating the blockade of Patras by land. Yesterday, I received another despatch from Sir Frederick Adam, reporting to me the occupation of the island of Petala by a part of Lord Cochrane's force, and requiring the assistance of a frigate. As the 'Ariadne' must have reached Corfu very soon after the date of this last letter, and as I hear the 'Hellas', with a steamer in tow, was seen on September 28, off 'Cephalonia', steering to the southward, I trust the Lord High Commissioner will have had sufficient means of restoring that island to its former state of neutrality ".¹

This dispatch sent to the British Admiralty indubitably establishes the self-evident fact of Codrington's good faith. Lord Cochrane and General Church, although they were Englishmen, were leading the Greek forces, and were not in any way under the orders of the British Admiral. But what we know and what history registers have nothing to do with Ibrahim's approach to the question. He had the words of the British Admiral ringing in his ears. He had to consider his responsibility to his father and to the Sultan. He could not understand how Codrington was unable to compel Lord Cochrane and General Church to obey orders given them. His good faith appears to us to be as unassailable as that of the British Admiral. We know of no greater tribute that

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 46.

we could pay to his sincerity than the words we have just used.

But so convinced was Codrington of Ibrahim's dishonesty that he wrote to his wife :

"The Turkish Rear-Admiral then came to me to explain, when I told him that before they broke their word I esteemed the Turks, and wished to save them as much as possible, but now that I looked for an opportunity of punishing them, and that whenever I found one I would do so severely".¹

When a man looks for an opportunity of punishing somebody it is not difficult for him to create an occasion for doing so. We do not say that the officers of the Allied fleet did this. We merely cite the fact that the Russian Commander joined his colleagues on 13 October 1827, and that four days later the three Admirals issued a joint manifesto reproving Ibrahim for having advanced into the plain of Kalamata, ravaging the country and preparing an expedition for an attack upon the districts of Maina. "These acts", says this manifesto, "are violative of the armistice which Your Highness pledged his word to respect until the return of his messengers".²

Had the Allied Admirals accused Ibrahim of using, in these offensive movements, "land and sea forces forming (part of) the expedition from Alexandria", the reproach addressed to him would have harmonized with the idea that the recalcitrance of Lord Cochrane and General Church had not annulled the Agreement of 25 September 1827. But these officers said nothing about the expedition from Alexandria. Their incriminatory language is all-embracing. It overlooks the terms of the memorandum drawn up by Codrington's subordinates. It shows that any element of what lawyers call an *aggregatio mentium*, a meeting of minds, was so com-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 56.

pletely absent from the agreement entered into on the oft-quoted date that when the Allies construed it, in their indictment of 17 October 1827, they overlooked their own summary of what had taken place. And, to make matters worse, when Captain Fillowes sought to serve this summons upon Ibrahim, the Egyptian was in the interior and could not be reached.¹

Before accusing Ibrahim of breach of faith de Rigny recalled that there were French naval officers in the Ottoman fleet. He did not desire to fire upon them without giving them an opportunity to retire from the Viceregal service. He met this situation by sending them a letter which read as follows :

" From Admiral de Rigny to *Messieurs* Letellier, Bompard and other French officers aboard the Turkish fleet :

" Syrène,

" 15 October, 1827.

" Gentlemen :

" The situation in which you see the Ottoman fleet blockaded in the port of Navarino, and the circumstance that His Highness Ibrahim Pasha has broken his word in not living up to the armistice agreed to by him, should tell you that you should no longer be found face to face with your own flag. You know the chances you are taking and in summoning you to leave the Turkish service at a moment when the Ottoman fleet has put itself in an aggressive attitude where it is called upon to take all kinds of chances, I am giving you a notice which you should take advantage of, if you have remained French".²

We are told by Douin that all the French naval officers "remained French".³ They left their old comrades at 6 a.m. on 18 October 1827. The next day the British Admiral issued his "Instructions as

¹ Douin, *Navarin*, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

² Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 55.

³ Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

“to the manner of placing the combined fleet in the “Port of Navarin”. It would seem from the text of these orders that he did not then know that the French officers had retired from the Egyptian service. He stressed the point that “no gun is to be fired from “the combined fleet without a signal being made “for that purpose, unless shot be fired from any of “the Turkish ships ; in which case the ships so firing “are to be destroyed immediately”.¹

The following excerpts from Codrington's report to the Admiralty, dated H.M.S. *Asia* in the Port of Navarino, 21 October 1827, tell what took place on 20 October :

“Count Heiden and the Chevalier de Rigny, “having agreed with me that we should come to this “point, in order to induce Ibrahim Pacha to dis- “continue the brutal war of extermination which he “has been carrying on since his return here from his “failure in the Gulf of Patras, the combined “squadrons passed the batteries in order to take up “their anchorage, at about 2 o'clock yesterday “afternoon. . . .

“I gave orders that no gun should be fired unless “guns were first fired by the Turks ; and these orders “were strictly observed. The three English ships “were accordingly permitted to pass the batteries “and to moor, as they did with great rapidity, without “any act of open hostility, although there was evident “preparation for it in all the Turkish ships ; but “upon the ‘Dartmouth’ sending a boat to one of the “fire-vessels, Lieutenant G. W. H. Fitzroy and several “of her crew were shot with musketry. This “produced a defensive fire of musketry from the “‘Dartmouth’ and ‘La Syrène’, bearing the flag “of Rear-Admiral de Rigny ; that was succeeded by “a cannon-shot at the Rear-Admiral from one of the “Egyptian ships, which, of course, brought on a

¹ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 69.

“ return ; and thus very shortly afterwards the battle
“ became general.

“ This bloody and destructive battle was continued
“ with unabated fury for four hours, and the scene
“ of wreck and devastation which presented itself at
“ its termination was such as has been seldom before
“ witnessed. As each ship of our opponents became
“ effectually disabled, such of her crew as could
“ escape from her endeavoured to set her on fire ; and
“ it is wonderful how we avoided the effects of their
“ successive and awful explosions. . . .

“ When I found that the boasted Ottoman’s word
“ of honour was made a sacrifice to wanton, savage
“ devastation, and that a base advantage was taken
“ of our reliance upon Ibrahim’s good faith, I own I
“ felt a desire to punish the offenders. But it was my
“ duty to refrain and refrain I did ”.¹

Codrington’s letter to his wife was written at
10 p.m. on the very day of the battle. Its opening
sentences read :

‘ Well, my dear, the Turks have fought, and fought
“ well too ; and we have annihilated their fleet.
“ But it cost us dear. We have lost poor Smith,
“ Captain Bell (R.M.) and many good men. I was
“ *slued round* more than once and Harry (his son) has a
“ slight wound which will ensure him his promotion
“ directly he has served his time. He wants to write
“ to you himself, but I wish to keep him quiet, that
“ he may not get the least fever, and I do not think
“ I shall let him. He was sound asleep when I went
“ down to see him in one of the cockpit cabins ”.²

We learn from a letter sent by the British Admiral
to his brother that “ my dear Harry is wounded, and
“ severely wounded too, but is doing quite well, and
“ will, I am sure, go on so, owing to absence of fever
“ and a placidity of temper which is quite lovely ”.³

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 71.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 77.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 90.

This battle, fought owing to a fatal misunderstanding, took place when Ibrahim was miles away from the scene of activity. His fleet was destroyed when he was in the heart of the hinterland pursuing the Greeks. A braver man than Ibrahim never lived. Had he broken faith with the Allies, he would have known that hostilities with them were inevitable. He was not a fool. The fact that he did not receive the letter of 17 October 1827, and that he had left Navarino to attack the enemy with what we may assume to be troops that did not belong to the "land" and sea forces forming (part of) the expedition from "Alexandria" demonstrate how completely he and Codrington had failed to understand one another. Had he known what was in the mind of the British Admiral, he would have been at Navarino on 20 October 1827.

CHAPTER IX

THE AFTERMATH OF NAVARINO

As soon as London heard of the victory at Navarino the King was pleased to nominate and appoint Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington a Knight Grand Cross of the Military Order of the Bath. This honour was given him on the recommendation of the Duke of Clarence, who was then in charge of the Admiralty. But from a letter dated the very next day, 14 November 1827, addressed to Codrington by his friend Sir John Gore, we learn that his Royal Highness said :

“ I have been obliged to fight a battle to overcome the obstinate prejudices which exist in that Board-room of which you can form no idea—yes you can, from their treatment of you respecting the Signal Committee ; but I conquered, and will again, in order to do justice ”. “ He then told me ”, Sir John Gore continued, after he had quoted the exact words of the Duke of Clarence, “ that Ministers are thrown on their backs by your splendid achievement in chastening the faithless Mussulman ; that they could not imagine the probability of such results, and that he had a personal altercation almost amounting to open quarrel with Mr. Canning for sending the ‘ Genoa ’ and ‘ Albion ’ to you, and that the ‘ Warspite ’ is now on her way to you unknown to the Cabinet (*ex officio*) ”.¹

When we turn to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and consult its article referring to Sir Edward Codrington we are informed that,

“ as the battle had been unforeseen in England,

¹ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 118.

“and the result was unwelcome to the Ministry of
“the day, Codrington was entangled in a correspond-
“ence to prove that he had not gone beyond his
“instructions, and he was recalled by despatch dated
“the 4th of June”.

To follow the ramifications of this correspondence would lead us into an almost interminable by-path. Enough to say that Lord Dudley, then British Foreign Secretary, on 17 November 1827 submitted to the Admiralty ten questions upon which specific replies from Codrington were desired. The Admiral answered them with a frankness and thoroughness which do him honour. The Foreign Office wanted to know, among other things, whether the memorandum transmitted in Codrington's despatches was the only written document in which there was any specific reference to the conditions of the armistice, and whether that memorandum had been communicated to Ibrahim or to any officer of the Turkish forces present at the conference. It is clear that the reply to the first question was in the affirmative and to the other in the negative.

If the Foreign Office laid stress upon the fact that Codrington had allowed an element of doubt to creep into the terms of the Armistice, he saw that the strength of his position depended upon placing proper stress upon Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's "cannon-shot" instructions. He thus appended to his replies a statement couched in these terms :

“But I will beg leave to trespass further upon the
‘time of His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral,
‘by adverting in the first place to that part of the
‘second instruction emanating from the Treaty,
‘which says : ‘Should this hypothesis be realized
‘‘you will be informed thereof directly by the King’s
‘‘ambassador at Constantinople, who is instructed
‘‘to correspond with you, &c. The informations
‘‘which you may receive and the directions which

“ ‘ may accompany them, to which you will be pleased
“ ‘ to conform, will be concerted between the three
“ ‘ ambassadors ; and the proceedings and arrange-
“ ‘ ments which these ambassadors shall have pointed
“ ‘ out, as well as those which circumstances may have
“ ‘ rendered necessary, must be arranged between
“ ‘ you and the French and Russian commanders.’ ”

“ Now, upon weighing the possible, if not probable,
“ effect of carrying this Instruction into execution, I
“ wrote on the 11th August to His Majesty’s
“ ambassador at Constantinople :— ‘ Neither of us can
“ ‘ make out how we are by force to prevent the
“ ‘ Turks, if obstinate, from pursuing any line of
“ ‘ conduct which we are instructed to oppose, without
“ ‘ committing hostility. Surely it must be like a
“ ‘ blockade—if an attempt be made to force it by
“ ‘ force only can that attempt be resisted ’ . ”

“ To this he replied in a *confidential* letter dated
“ 19th August, 1827. . . . ”

“ And in another confidential letter dated 1st
“ September, 1827, he further replied : ‘ On the
“ ‘ subject of *collision*, for instance we agreed that,
“ ‘ although the measures to be executed by you are
“ ‘ not to be adopted in a hostile spirit, and although
“ ‘ it is clearly the intention of the Allied Governments
“ ‘ to avoid, if possible, anything that may bring on
“ ‘ war, yet the prevention of supplies, as stated in
“ ‘ your Instructions is ultimately to be enforced, if
“ ‘ necessary, and when all other means are exhausted,
“ ‘ by cannon shot ’ . ”

“ These documents will show that it was my duty
“ to execute the Treaty, by persuasion if I could, but
“ if not, by the employment of actual force, and that
“ force is defined by Mr. S. Canning to be *cannon*
“ *shot* ”.¹

This meant that Codrington threw down the
gauntlet to one of the most influential and combative

¹ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 132.

servants of the British Crown. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, or Mr. Stratford Canning as he then was, was an implacable foe. His most recent biographer, E. F. Malcolm-Smith, asserts most positively that "personal pride was not one of the ambassador's besetting sins. His faults were of a different order. He bullied and browbeat the Turks until he undermined their self-respect".¹ A man of such a temperament was not likely to permit a naval officer to accuse him of being responsible for bloodshed without fighting back. It is thus obvious that Codrington's reply, however convincing it may be, challenged a powerful diplomatist who was striving for the independence of Greece but who, at the same time, was reluctant to see Turkish blood shed—and charged up to him.

During these trying weeks, when Codrington was being harassed by his superiors, Ibrahim was still in the Morea. The Russian commander apprised his Alexandria Consul, on 24 October 1827, that the Egypto-Turkish fleet had been destroyed and that Ibrahim had not surrendered but was, on the contrary, in the interior devastating the country. He advised that the Consular officer should evacuate Alexandria through fear of reprisals, although he hastened to add this postscript: "There are at present at Navarino some twenty of Muhammad Ali's vessels which were not destroyed. This proves that our intentions in entering Navarino were not hostile".

We do not know when this message reached Alexandria. The Russian archives tell us, however, that the Egyptian geolette *Washington* arrived on 26 October 1827, bringing word from Ibrahim that he had obtained the submission of sixty villages, that he was awaiting instructions in regard to the blockade maintained by the Allies and that Lord Cochrane

¹ *The Life of Stratford Canning, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*, by E. F. Malcolm-Smith, London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1933, p. 175.

had laid siege to Missolonghi. This news disconcerted Muhammad Ali and made him fear that the Sublime Porte would be obstinate and refuse to make any concessions.¹ It was not until some time later that he learnt that his fleet had been destroyed on 20 October. His first step was to assure foreign consuls and residents that they need have no fears for their safety.²

Constantinople refused to admit that the destruction of the Ottoman fleet meant the end of the war. Muhammad Ali remained true to his liege lord. On 25 November 1827, a messenger from Ibrahim reached Alexandria confirming the report of the naval disaster but insisting that he had taken steps to counteract the consequences of the defeat and was prepared to continue the struggle. The final days of 1827 witnessed a revival of Muhammad Ali's confidence in the eventual success of Ottoman arms. 16 January 1828 brought him a letter from Ibrahim asking for reinforcements and particularly for more ships. He pointed out that his army consisted of 12,000 disciplined men, 4,000 irregulars and 2,000 horsemen, and that Soliman Pasha (Colonel Sève) had occupied Tripolitza with 3,000 men and had provisions for four months.³

Ibrahim did not mark time while awaiting reinforcements. He advanced upon Philippopolis. But, face to face with a possible food shortage, he repatriated 10,000 Turkish sailors and 1,000 wounded men. He also sent to Alexandria 4,500 slaves.⁴ His father did not disapprove of these tactics, but being a most prudent man and never losing his head, kept in touch with the diplomatic pulse of Europe, while Ibrahim was thus looking after the purely military aspects of the problem. The Russian archives tell us that the

¹ Cattau, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 134.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 140.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 170.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 176.

same Mr. Cradock who had already been in Egypt in the summer of 1827, as a representative of the British Foreign Office, again established contact with the Viceroy. He was accompanied by a son of Admiral Codrington, whom we assume to be the young man who was wounded at the battle of Navarino.¹

Things rarely move rapidly in the Near East. Cradock and Muhammad Ali were still sparring for an opening, when the British Cabinet fell. This change brought the Duke of Wellington into power. This fact and the speech from the Throne caused the Pasha to think that the days of the Alliance between France, England and Russia were numbered.² It is remarkable how closely Egyptians followed English politics even in those times. The passage in the King's speech which made such an impression upon Muhammad Ali was the following :

"In the course of the measures adopted with a view to carry into effect the object of the Treaty, a collision, wholly unexpected by His Majesty, took place in the port of Navarino between the fleets of the Contracting Powers and that of the Ottoman Porte. Notwithstanding the valour displayed by the combined fleet, His Majesty laments that this conflict should have occurred with the naval force of an ancient ally : but he still entertains a confident hope that this untoward event will not be followed by further hostilities, and will not impede that amicable adjustment of the existing differences between the Porte and the Greeks, to which it is so manifestly their common interest to accede".³

This pronouncement provoked a full-dress debate in both Houses of Parliament. Knowing as we do from the reports of the Russian Consulate, that the King's speech made such a marked impression on Muhammad Ali, we may assume that these discussions

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 182.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 193.

³ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 178.

were followed with the greatest interest. Not only the Duke of Wellington, but Lord Holland, Earl Grey, the Marquess of Lansdowne, Earl Dudley and Viscount Goderich spoke in the House of Lords. In the Commons Mr. Brougham, Lord Althorp, Lord Palmerston and others raised their voices.¹ Their remarks centred largely upon the word "untoward". Lord Holland said :

"I cannot but lament the use of the word 'untoward' as applied to the battle of Navarino". The Duke of Wellington retorted : "It was intended by 'untoward' to convey that the event referred to was unexpected—was unfortunate. . . . But, in making this statement, do I make the slightest charge, do I cast the least imputation upon the gallant officer who commanded at Navarino? Certainly not."

Muhammad Ali was not so sure that he did not, and decided to make haste slowly. He knew that his fleet had been defeated, and that Ibrahim was in the interior and apparently fully capable of taking care of himself. He preferred to allow events to shape their own course, though he studiously refrained from breaking off negotiations. He was interested in watching the effect that the blockade maintained by the Allies would have upon the fortunes of his son. He soon learnt that London was dissatisfied with the manner in which it was enforced and that the Russian and French Admirals had had a quarrel. The circumstance should not be overlooked that the Austrians were very friendly to Muhammad Ali and that they had every interest in keeping him informed of what was known in diplomatic circles. He may even have heard that as early as 3 May 1828, the Duke of Wellington entered this note in his papers : "The time has come for the Cabinet to

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 179.

“deliberate whether Sir Edward Codrington shall or shall not be recalled”.¹

But little time elapsed before Codrington was advised that he was no longer *persona grata* to the British Cabinet. The Earl of Aberdeen wrote to him before the end of May 1828 a lengthy official letter which begins :

“ Sir,

“ After carefully examing the orders conveyed to you by His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, and comparing them with the explanations now received from you, I regret to be under the necessity of stating that His Majesty’s Government, however they may lament the circumstance, cannot reconcile your proceedings with the Instructions conveyed to you, more especially those of October 16 last.

“ The Instructions contained in Mr. Croker’s letter to Vice-Admiral Sir Harry Neale of February 8 1826, which were handed over to you on March 3 1827, and of which you acknowledge the receipt as Instructions executed, but transferred to you, in the event of a possible recurrence to the subject of them’, have put you in possession of the intentions of His Majesty’s Government that the transportation of the Greeks of the Morea to Egypt should not be permitted.”

The concluding paragraph of this communication is thus expressed :

“ Upon a consideration, therefore, of all the circumstances connected with this unfortunate misconception of the views and intentions of His Majesty’s Government, they have found themselves under the necessity of writing to His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral requesting His Royal

¹ *Wellington Papers*, vol. IV, p. 423, quoted in Bourchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 245.

"Highness to relieve you in the command of the
"squadron in the Mediterranean."¹

It will have been observed that Codrington was not recalled because he had fought the battle of Navarino, but on account of alleged subsequent shortcomings. Such details obviously were unknown to Muhammad Ali. The only things that he knew were the terms of the King's speech, that the Russian and French Admirals had quarrelled, and that the British Commander-in-Chief was in trouble with his superiors. These deductions convinced him that the day of hope had dawned for Egypt and that peace would soon be available to him upon satisfactory conditions. But if he remained convinced that Codrington had been recalled because the "untoward" battle of Navarino had been fought, he was not alone in reaching this conclusion. The British Admiral agreed with him. He wrote to the Duke of Clarence on 22 June 1828 :

"The despatch of Lord Aberdeen announcing my
"being to be superseded, reached me yesterday.
"The decision having been taken, it is not necessary
"that I should enter on my defence against the
"accusations on which it has been grounded, until a
"more leisure moment. But I will not lose the earliest
"opportunity of assuring your Royal Highness that
"I shall be able to repel all the charges which are
"contained in this remarkable document. Your
"Royal Highness will see at once that my original
"sin was the battle of Navarino ; and that this
"predetermined mode of throwing upon me the
"natural, the inevitable consequences of the Treaty,
"though prevented heretofore by the kind protection
"of his Majesty and your Royal Highness, has been
"persevered in till a better opportunity has offered".²

Possibly the British Cabinet may have delayed making its choice ; in any case Codrington's successor

¹ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 310 and 312.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 318.

was slow in getting under way. All we know is that on 6 July 1828, the Russian and French Admirals and a representative of Codrington met Ibrahim off Modon and discussed the preliminaries of the evacuation of certain places then occupied by the Egyptians. Before word of this conference had reached Alexandria the Russian Consul informed Nesselrode that the last mail from Malta had brought news that Codrington had been recalled and would soon leave for London. "He is accused of not having blockaded the Morea and Alexandria after the battle of Navarino, as called for by his instructions".¹ The next item made available to us through the Russian archives is that Codrington and Muhammad Ali met on the evening of 5 August 1828, to carry out the agreement envisaged by the conference held off Modon on 6 July.² The Admiral was obviously anxious to have the terms of peace agreed upon before he was relieved of his command. This appears from the fact that he wrote to his wife on 25 July :

"De Heiden having joined us this afternoon, we had our conference at Stovin's parlatorio, which ended in the Protocol of which Datchkoff made the copy. . . . This being settled I got on board after four o'clock, weighed, and came away for Navarino, where we shall be in the course of the night. If I escape to-morrow being called to Malta, I shall push on towards Alexandria, as required by the Protocol, in order to contribute personally, as much as I can, to the fulfilment of this primary object to the Treaty".³ And again on 30 July :

"If I can once see the Viceroy's fleet outside under our control, I shall send you word of it ; for then I shall have carried my point, let me be superseded whenever I may".⁴

¹ Cattani, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 268.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 279.

³ Bouchier, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 381.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. II, v. 383.

John Barker, the British Consul at Alexandria, had paved the way for Codrington's interview with the Pasha and everything went off most satisfactorily. Before the discussion got under way the Admiral said that he would like to have whatever accord might be arrived at reduced to writing as, on a former occasion, there had been a misunderstanding due to the absence of a written agreement. To this the Pasha consented.¹

The destruction of the main elements of his fleet was obviously a blow to Muhammad Ali's pride, but if we can accept as accurate the information passed on by the British Consul-General to Captain Richards, on 6 September 1827, that is to say before the battle of Navarino, Muhammad Ali was prepared to welcome the destruction of some of his vessels. We prefer to let Mr. Salt's letter speak for itself. It says that Boghos Bey, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, had pointed out that Muhammad Ali could not then come to an arrangement with England on account of his commitments at Constantinople, and then went on to add :

"He (Boghos Bey) further said that the Pasha
"was prepared to hear of the destruction of some of
"his ships, nay, that he even thought that a little
"damage might do him a service in the eyes of the
"Porte, but that even if he sustained a total loss it
"would not cause any change in his sentiment towards
"the English, and that the Consuls and merchants
"might be assured that themselves and their property
"would be respected, and that, even if orders of a
"rigorous nature were sent by the Sultan, he would
"find means to protect them and ensure a safe
"residence if they should choose to remain".²

This means that while the battle of Navarino may have been an "untoward" event from the point of view of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the Duke of

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 388.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 447.

Wellington and the British Cabinet, Muhammad Ali saw the silver lining in the clouds. It afforded him an admirable opportunity for making peace with the Allies and for relieving him from the invidious position of pulling chestnuts out of the fire for the Sublime Porte. He had to accept the alternative of having the blockade of Alexandria made more and more stringent and of having Ibrahim's army deprived of supplies or of agreeing to the honourable terms offered him by Codrington. He yielded to the inevitable. The terms of peace contemplated the evacuation of Greece by Ibrahim's forces and the surrender of the Greek slaves. When, during the conference, the Pasha spoke of his hesitancy to assume certain obligations the minutes drawn by Codrington's aide-de-camp show that :

"the Admiral said that *his* responsibility was great 'in treating on this subject under present circumstances, without a knowledge of the terms on which the Allies might now insist from the Pasha ; that the Ambassadors might, for all that he knew, have received different instructions ; and that whilst he was certain that any treaty entered into with His Highness would be ratified by them and their Governments, still his conduct might be disapproved of, and he himself hanged for it on his return to England'".¹

He was not hanged on his return to England. The *Encyclopædia Britannica* says that "his services were recognized by the grant of the Grand Cross of the Bath, but there is no doubt that he was treated as a scapegoat, at least to some extent". We know, however, that he obtained his Grand Cross of the Bath on 13 November 1827,² and that this honour had nothing to do with his negotiation of the Treaty. It was given to him before the Foreign Office coterie got

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 390.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 115.

their claws into him for having won an "untoward" victory. He became and remained a scapegoat because he proved that he had respected the letter and the spirit of the "cannon-shot" instructions given him by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

During the earlier months of the period when Codrington was appreciating the applicability of that text of the Bible which reads :

"But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the "scapegoat, shall be presented alive before the Lord, "to make atonement with him, *and* to let him go for "a scapegoat into the wilderness",¹ Ibrahim's forces were being evacuated from the Morea and the other conditions of the Treaty were being carried into effect. He reached Alexandria on 9 October 1828. "His return", the Russian Consul-General advises us, "produced an effect of satisfaction upon those attached "to the Court".² He arrived with the last contingent. He was evidently in good health and spirits, for no less an authority than Lord Stratford de Redcliffe saw him at Navarino as late as 5 September 1828. We would not like to run the risk of misquoting the Great Elchi. We shall let him speak for himself. His memoirs contain this passage :

"My next pause was made in the harbour of "Navarino. Our Admiral (not Codrington) was "there, and there I also fell in with Ibrahim Pasha. "A deep quiet had replaced the thunder of battle, "and to a classical fancy it might have seemed that "the mild spirit of old Nestor had breathed from the "neighbouring site of Pylos over that water-field of "terrific strife. . . . Admiral Malcolm was in command of the squadron. His presence and friendly "intercourse with Ibrahim were forerunners of that "peace which the approach of the Turkish expedition "promised to secure. The ground was in a fair way

¹ Leviticus XVI, 10.

² Cattai, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 307.

“ to be cleared for the Ambassadors and their work.
“ Ibrahim, though coarse in manner, and little
“ scrupulous in war, was not of an obstructive temper.
“ He called upon the Admiral one day when I was
“ present. A courteous and hospitable reception
“ brought out his good humour, and the conversation
“ had no savour of belligerent recollections. When
“ he took leave I followed him to the cabin door,
“ and on passing a swing table, which held what
“ remained of the refreshments, he winked at me and
“ helped himself to a parting supplement ”.¹

¹ Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 468.

CHAPTER X

THE ALGERIAN INTERLUDE

IN a despatch to Polignac, dated 3 April 1830, the French Consular Agent at Cairo refers to "the indefatigable energy and concentration of will with which Ibrahim had applied himself to superintending the work of the naval arsenal at Alexandria".¹ The general had been untiring in the discharge of his duties ever since his return from Greece. He had reached Alexandria on 9 October 1828 and as early as 16 January 1829 began to reform the administrative machinery of the Egyptian province of Sharkiah. He there applied the new code adopted by his father,² but so real was his share in the improvements thus decreed that Muhammad Ali informed the Russian Consul on 21 July that Ibrahim had taken a heavy burden off of his shoulders.³

The son assumed no sinecure when he thus undertook to lighten his father's load. The Pasha was a vigilant executive and his coadjutor imitated him. Pezzoni, who had replaced Drovetti as Russian Consul, advised his chief on 25 August 1830 that

"Ibrahim, being now at the head of the civil as well as the military administration is indefatigable in his work of inspection. He often appears two and three times a day at the *Khasné* (treasury) in order to see what is going on. He found that the Tribunal of Commerce was ill suited for a Court of Justice. He at once ordered that the sofas be removed and

¹ *Mohamed Aly et l'Expedition d'Alger* (1829-1830), par Georges Douin, Le Caire, Société Royale de Géographie d'Egypte, 1930, p. 330.

² Cattani, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 329.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 354.

“replaced by chairs. A special clerk has been appointed to draw up the minutes of proceedings. All the administrations have received orders to keep their accounts in double entry and to use European numerals”.¹

The sad side of the picture is shown by a report from this same Consular officer that “the jails are now full of unfortunate debtors put there by Ibrahim because they cannot pay what they owe”.² The unfavourable effect created by this comment is, nevertheless, attenuated, if not wiped out, by this entry, dated 18 November 1829 :

“Ibrahim is now convening together the notables of the country, the *Kachefs* and the heads of administrative departments. This assembly will consist of some 400 members. Its deliberations will be secret. It is said that this call has been issued in order to devise ways and means for improving the lot of the people, stopping emigration, correcting abuses and encouraging agriculture. It is hoped to reduce taxation. We should all of us like to know how all this can be accomplished”.

Ibrahim also summoned the religious chiefs to meet. We do not understand what the Consul means by “religious chiefs”, as Islam is a layman’s religion and knows of no ecclesiastical hierarchy ; it admits of no intermediary between God and man. It has no priests. What the language probably implies is that the *Ulema*, or men versed in theological lore, were convened. But however this may be, the outstanding point is that the proof that Ibrahim was very busy is unmistakable. The report gives this keen appreciation of his zeal and fearlessness :

“Ibrahim Pasha is so feared in Egypt that men tremble when his name is mentioned. It is thus felt in consular circles that this fear may mitigate,

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 356.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 350.

“ at least in a measure, the oppression which the people
“ have suffered at the hands of the Governors and
“ administrative heads of the different provinces ”.

The man who thus put the fear of God into the breast of dishonest officials was ever on the move. He covered the entire country. Never stopping, he was one day inspecting troops at the Second Cataract and the next on his way back to Alexandria as rapidly as his camels could carry him to assist at the launching of a frigate. Egypt is essentially an agricultural country. He therefore took a lively interest in the lot of the *fellah*. James Augustus St. John, who visited Egypt during the period of which we are now writing, brings out the fact that Ibrahim introduced into Modern Egypt the culture of olives.¹ So much has been said of the cruelty of *corvée* or forced labour that it may not be amiss to point out that this author writes :

“ Ibrahim Pasha is very punctual in the payment
“ of his work-people. The wages of a child are thirty
“ paras per day : excavators, drivers and overseers,
“ able-bodied men, obtain, upon an average, two
“ piastres or sixpence per day. In the gardens of
“ Sheikh Ibrahim, chief of the Shiah sect at Cairo,
“ are about twelve trees of the cassia fistula which
“ produce annually three thousand piastres. This
“ fact coming to the knowledge of Ibrahim Pasha, he
“ immediately caused several hundreds of these trees
“ to be planted along one of the new carriage
“ roads ”.²

Ibrahim also paid special attention to cotton culture and sought to introduce pineapples into Egypt. But what impresses us even more than his tireless energy, his ubiquity, or his tenacity, is his tact. Tact is not a virtue that one would have expected to find in a rough and ready warrior. It is, perhaps, because

¹ St. John, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 445.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 446.

Ibrahim was not a soldier of that type that he possessed this rarest and most precious of virtues.

We insist on this point, because, while he was a strong personality and did not see eye to eye with his father about a salient feature of Muhammad Ali's economic policy, nothing ever marred, so far as we know, the serenity of the relations between the two men. Ibrahim held to his views. They must have been known to the Pasha, as they are referred to in official reports and in contemporaneous publications. We refer especially to the system of monopolies then applied by the Egyptian Government.

We shall not speak of the tenure of land. That is a complicated question and is foreign to our theme. We shall centre our attention upon what Dodwell calls "the Pasha's trade policy", which made of him the chief merchant of the country over which he ruled. We read in *The Founder of Modern Egypt* that "he not only compelled the *fellah* to cultivate, but in some acres he determined what crops should be grown, and required the produce to be delivered into the Government warehouses at a fixed rate. . . . The resources of the country were being developed as they had not been for ages. . . . At one time the Pasha had almost realised at all events one aspect of the socialist ideal".¹

Dr. William Holt Yates, who published his work in 1843, says that :

"Ibrahim is opposed to his father's policy in many respects : he considers that a system of monopoly and extortion is calculated to ruin the resources of any country ; that it is like cutting down a goodly tree which promises a rich harvest in due season, for the sake of obtaining an inconsiderable quantity of unripe fruit for present uses ; but he is aware that the Pasha is too obstinate to listen to *him*. In order, therefore, not to quarrel with Muhammad

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

' Ali, he has kept himself aloof as much as he consistently could, patiently submitting to his authority and obeying his commands. But I am much deceived if, after the old man's death, Ibrahim do not appear to more advantage : the powers of his mind will then be developed ; they will have full scope ; hitherto, they have been cramped : he has been *restrained*, notwithstanding he is looked up to in Egypt by the people, and feared quite as much as Muhammad Ali in certain matters, having been invested with full powers ; and his word concerning these is absolute ; his father does not interfere in them at all : the people know this and their minds have long been prepared to acknowledge him as their chief as soon as the Viceroy expires."¹

While Ibrahim was thus dutifully serving his father without effacing his own individuality, French diplomacy sought to draw him within the vortex of its machinations. It appears that about this time some difficulties had arisen between France and the Dey of Algiers with reference to debts due to Bacri and Busnach, two Algerian Jews who had supplied corn to the French Government under the Directory.² This question would not have been sufficient to bring about a rupture, but the Dey, Hussein, struck the French Consul, Deval, on his face with his fly-flap. This occurred on 30 April 1827. The French Government does not appear to have paid the bill. It thought in terms of reparations and blockaded the port of Algiers. The Minister for War, the Duc de Clermont-Tonnerre, would have gone further, but the President of the Council, the Comte de Villèle, opposed the sending of an expedition. M. de la Ferronaye, the Foreign Minister, insisted upon negotiations.

It needed a second insult to spur the French

¹ Yates, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 172.

² *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 13th Edition, s.v., "Algeria," vol. I, p. 650.

Government to further action. This affront took the form of firing on a French vessel carrying a flag of truce. This occurred on 3 August 1829. An expedition against Algiers was then decided upon and on 14 June 1830 French troops landed at Sidi-Ferruch.

The three dates which have just been cited seem to tell a tale of great forbearance. They appear to record the fact that on 30 April 1827, in a discussion between a French Consul and the Dey of Algiers about a bill due to two Algerian Jews since 1799, the French official was struck on his face ; that a French vessel bearing a flag of truce was fired upon on 3 August 1829, and that French troops were not landed on Algerian soil until 14 June 1830. The truth of the matter is that between 30 April 1827 and 3 August 1829 the European situation was so involved that France was reluctant to take on any new commitments. These complications need not concern us. What does concern our narrative is the fact that between 3 August 1829 and 14 June 1830 the Quai d'Orsay was applying all the art of Machiavelli to make Ibrahim thrash the Dey of Algiers for the benefit of France.

It was Bernardin Drovetti, the French consul accredited to Muhammad Ali, who had worked out this idea. It appears that on 1 September 1829, that is to say as soon as he had heard of the attack on the French vessel, he wrote to the Prince de Polignac, then President of the French Council of Ministers, in these terms :

" France is engaged in a quarrel with the Dey of Algiers which her dignity requires that she terminate in a manner worthy of her. Experience has demonstrated that the means already employed are insufficient. The sending of a military expedition to the coast of Barbary presents many difficulties and is open to many dangers. The expedition, however

"successful it may be, would be expensive and would
 "perhaps arouse the jealousy of a rival nation. . . .
 "It would be possible to have the robber dens of these
 "Muhammadian barbarians destroyed by coreligionists
 "who have already known something of discipline
 "and who are in closer touch with civilization. . . .
 "Muhammad Ali would not be unwilling to send an
 "army to these parts, in conjunction with France,
 "in order to bring these countries into the orbit of
 "civilization, etc."¹

The cupidity, the avarice, the greed of gain of General Boyer, the head of the Military Mission sent to Muhammad Ali by Louis XVIII, played a big part in frustrating Drovetti's designs. We shall use his own official despatches to show this. It appears that he felt constrained to advise his chief on 7 August 1826 that :

"the time has gone by to advise Your Excellency
 "of the manner in which Generals Boyer and Livron
 "and the officers in their suite have behaved. Since
 "their arrival there has obtained among them a certain
 "misapprehension about the nature of their mission,
 "as approved by the government of His Majesty and
 "as intended to prepare the way for the events which
 "should place us one day in possession of this country.
 "The chief of the mission (Boyer) soon showed that
 "he had come here to build up his fortune and not
 "to serve French interests. He left everything to
 "Colonel Gaudin, who is active and ambitious".²

In a report dated 11 January 1827 Drovetti states that General Boyer says that "he came to this country
 "in order to earn enough money to get together a *dot*
 "for his daughters". His enormous salary, remarks the Consul, joined to his cupidity, made it possible for him to achieve this end.³ Bad blood broke out among the French officers. The upshot of all this

¹ Douin, *Mohamed Aly et l'Expedition d'Alger*, *sup. cit.*, p. 1.

² Driault, *Crète et Morée*, *sup. cit.*, p. 189.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

friction was that on 14 August 1826 General Boyer and nine of his companions-in-arms resigned from the Egyptian service and left for France.¹

These resignations and the circumstances stressed in these consular reports made Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim more than cautious when the agents of the French Government, MM. Mimaut and Huder, took up the matter with them in November 1829. While the son was not present at the preliminary audience between the diplomats and the Pasha, his name dominates the memorandum submitted by the French officials. In fact, the entire proposal revolved round his personality, so much so that in certain additional instructions sent by Prince de Polignac to Mimaut and Huder, dated 7 January 1830, we read :

" We consider it very important that this act (the
" proposed agreement between France and Muhammad
" Ali) which may in time be one of the mainsprings
" of the power of Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim, should
" be signed not only by Muhammad Ali but also by
" Ibrahim. The latter attaches great importance to
" his word and will consider himself more personally
" committed if his signature should be obtained.
" And, besides, we must think of the future. But
" as this reference to what may happen is quite a
" delicate matter, it would be better that M. Huder,
" whose position is less official than that of M. Mimaut,
" should broach the subject. The point that he should
" stress is that the agreement should bear Ibrahim's
" signature because he will command the expedition ".²

The memorandum submitted by the French delegates to Muhammad Ali at the initial audience is couched in terms which tend to create the impression that the original proposal had emanated from the Pasha. It sets forth in its opening sentence that
" the King of France gives his approval to Muhammad

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

² Douin, *Mohamed Aly et l'Expedition d'Alger*, *sup. cit.*, p. 90.

“ Ali’s expedition for the submission of the Barbary States and the destruction of piracy ”. It then goes on to say that the campaign shall be carried out solely by the troops of the Pasha and that the French fleet will cooperate should Muhammad Ali so desire. There are additional clauses of no general interest except one which contemplates a loan to Egypt of 10,000,000 francs payable when the Egyptian troops shall have begun their march. An annex specifically sets forth that the expeditionary force should be under the command of Ibrahim.¹

The insistence on this reference to Ibrahim is brought out in the instructions given to the French agents. We there read :

“ It is necessary that the expedition be of imposing number. It is also indispensable that Ibrahim should command it in person. His presence at the head of the troops is the best possible guarantee of success.”²

The French Ministry feared that a lazy and incompetent Turk might be put at the head of the invading army. Prince de Polignac laid such stress upon the choice of Ibrahim not only because he had confidence in the bravery of that officer but also because of the necessary eventual cooperation between the Egyptian army and the French army. “ In leaving to Ibrahim’s discretion the power to instruct the French naval authorities what they shall do ”, wrote the Prince, “ the King has given to him a proof of confidence such as has never been given to anybody else ”.³

If the French thus made the entire campaign gravitate around Ibrahim’s sword, Muhammad Ali entrusted the negotiations set in motion to the statesmanship of his son. This was done in a note couched in these laconic terms :

“ *Honorable mon ami Drovetti :*

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

" I have received your letter and have noted its contents. My son Ibrahim Pasha has been directed by me to reply to it ".¹

It would appear that when Muhammad Ali had received MM. Mimaut and Huder at the audience to which we have already referred, nothing was done apart from the presentation of credentials, exchange of compliments and the submission of the memorandum in which the French defined their proposals. When the real business began the Pasha preferred to eliminate his personality and to bring Ibrahim to the fore. One passage, chosen almost at random from among the reports sent to Paris, illustrates the dexterity with which the soldier discharged this trust.

We know that he was essentially gregarious and that nothing delighted him more than to mingle with his troopers and to converse with them. The French agents, nevertheless, refer to " the discreet taciturnity of Ibrahim ", who, at the decisive interview, would let nothing escape his lips other than : " my father has said, my father has written ".² Three weeks earlier the Quai d'Orsay had been informed of " the indefatigable activity and of the driving will-power " ³ of this tongue-tied statesman, who on 2 March 1830, in submitting to the diplomats a letter written to them by his father, " had himself read to them every word of it and had had it translated to them in his presence ".⁴

The negotiations broke down at the end of April 1830. We have, perhaps, unduly stressed the effect which General Boyer's cupidity may have had upon their failure. We know that the French emphasized the personal equation by insisting upon Ibrahim's leadership. It is not improbable that the bad impression created by the military mission may have

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 254.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

ill-disposed the Egyptian to the entire plan. Then again he may have resented the attempt to create the impression set forth in the original memorandum, that the proposal had emanated from Muhammad Ali when we know, from Douin's scholarly monograph, that Bernardin Drovetti was its author.¹ But, in any case, the official reason for the failure of the plan has nothing to do with such matters.

It will be recalled that the original memorandum had offered Muhammad Ali a loan of 10,000,000 francs payable when the Egyptian troops should have begun their march. The Pasha had insisted upon an immediate advance of 4,000,000 francs and the gift outright of four men-of-war each of 80 cannon.² It would appear that the cash features of the counter-proposition could have been arranged. The stumbling-block was this transfer of the ships. It brought out the fact that Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim wanted not only to control the land operations but to have a dominant, or at all events a prominent, part in the naval demonstration.

They may, perhaps, have had a deeper design. They may have envisaged the effect which this alliance with France would have had upon their views upon Syria. It should not be forgotten that the orientation of Ibrahim's mind turned towards the East rather than towards the West. He was ambitious. He aspired to make Egypt the pivotal power of a great Arab Empire. The occupation of Syria fitted in with his hopes. The conquest of Algeria would have meant to him a deviation from his main objective.

Ibrahim knew that British hostility would render insurmountable the realisation of the task which was dear to his heart. He might have embraced the opportunity of the French alliance offered to Egypt by the Prince de Polignac had he not, as we already

¹ *Ibid.*, p. v.

² *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

know, felt that "the French neither understand building nor managing ships", and had not the conduct of General Boyer and his suite aggravated him. Who knows? All that we do know is that the reasons advanced for the failure of diplomatic negotiations are seldom consonant with the whole truth. It is thus quite probable that Ibrahim, as a diplomatic strategist, merely masked his batteries during those conversations marked by his "discreet taciturnity".

CHAPTER XI

THE INVASION OF SYRIA

RESILIENCY of spirit is the hall-mark of leadership. It is the ability to withstand defeat which distinguishes the great captain from the merely successful soldier. The English nation frequently muddles through the earlier stages of its wars, and often loses all its battles except the last and decisive engagement. The resourcefulness with which Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim set to work to obliterate the sting of Navarino stamps them as possessors of the supreme attribute of leadership. The fact that they concentrated on rebuilding their destroyed fleet emphasizes their clearness of vision.

Sammarco's invaluable *La Marina Egiziana sotto Mohammed Ali* draws a vivid picture of the courageous way in which they set about reconstructing their navy. In May 1828, when Ibrahim was still in the Morea, St. Petersburg was informed by its Alexandria Consulate that the new Egyptian fleet already consisted of 52 units made up principally of corvettes, brigs and goelettes.¹ Two months later the same Consular officer reported that not only had Muhammad Ali determined to have a powerful navy but that he had perfected arrangements to import the necessary timber from Carmania and copper from Tokat in Asia Minor and had begun building shipyards in Egypt. So systematic was his procedure that he had even introduced the culture of exotic plants in order to obviate the necessity for importing raw material for making ropes and sails.² A Frenchman,

¹ Cattani, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 223.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 263.



MUHAMMAD ALI PASHA

named de Cérisy, was appointed in February 1829 to superintend the construction of the new Egyptian fleet.¹

Muhammad Ali knew that sooner or later he was bound to come to grips with Abdallah, the Pasha of Acre, the stronghold of Syria. He was preparing for the inevitable. There was really no room in the Ottoman Empire, much less in the Eastern Mediterranean, for both Abdallah and Muhammad Ali. They were ambitious men who needed plenty of elbow-room. Propinquity, in their case, meant eventual trouble. It is obvious that each stood in the way of the other. It was merely a question of time before they would fly at one another's throat. The necessary pretext came when Abdallah flaunted the Egyptian. It is said that he had already attempted to poison both Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim and that he had turned his Pashalik into a veritable nest of anti-Egyptian conspirators.² These practices did not worry either the Pasha or his son. Such risks were an inevitable condition of their high rank. But when Abdallah opened his doors to Egyptians who sought to evade military service, they felt that the time had come for them to take up arms.

The Sultan had foreseen that trouble would break out between his two powerful vassals. Mahmud was not a strong ruler, but he knew enough of what was going on to know that the Egyptian was unquestionably the more formidable of the two Vizirs. He therefore determined to attempt to weaken Muhammad Ali by courting Ibrahim in the vain hope of detaching the resourceful son from the redoubtable father. His procedure was quite a simple one. He conferred upon Ibrahim the title of Amir of Mecca, in belated recognition of the capture of the *Harramein*. This honour, the highest in the gift of the Sublime Porte,

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 333.

² *Histoire de la Guerre de Méhémet Ali contre la Porte Ottomane*, par M.M. de Cadalvène et Barrault, Paris, Arthur Bertrand, 1837, p. 41.

carried with it precedence over all the Vizirs of the Ottoman Empire, and thus made its beneficiary the hierarchical superior of Muhammad Ali. The attempt to humiliate the Pasha of Egypt and to sow discord between him and his son came to nought, for, as Mouriez expresses it,

“the most remarkable of all of the characteristics of Ibrahim is a constant and respectful submission to his father. His glory, as he saw it, was that he was his father’s right-hand man.”¹

This attempt to alienate Ibrahim from Muhammad Ali reacted upon Mahmud. Secret agents had reported to them that the Sultan had encouraged Abdallah’s truculence. Orientals view intrigue with equanimity, and they accepted these underhand manœuvres with complacency. But when they saw that Constantinople was endeavouring to humiliate the Pasha, they set their teeth and resolved to inflict such a chastisement upon Abdallah that it would have its repercussion upon Mahmud. It need not be said that they did not renounce their allegiance to the Sublime Porte or declare war upon it. They merely determined to smite the Pasha of Acre and to give him a doubly severe blow as an earnest on account of their grievance against their liege lord.

In furtherance of this well-defined policy an envoy was sent to Abdallah with instructions to demand (1) the payment of the sum of 11,000,000 piastres which Muhammad Ali claimed was due to him; (2) the extradition of Egyptian *fellaheen*; and (3) a solemn promise to close the Pashalik of Acre to further Egyptian emigration. Abdallah looked up the law and replied:

“I am, like you, a Vizir of our glorious master, Sultan Mahmud, upon whom may the victorious protection of God descend. I have no more right to prevent faithful subjects of our supreme master

¹ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 149.

“ from leaving Egypt to enter Syria than you would have to impede them from going to Egypt from Syria. Get the Sublime Porte to order me to deliver these *fellaheen* and I shall hasten to do so ”.¹

Cholera and the plague kept Muhammad Ali from an immediate invasion of Syria. While fighting the pestilence he put the finishing touches to his military and naval machines. Ibrahim was ubiquitous. Nothing escaped him, not even the charms of fermented grape-juice. We know that when he visited Mecca he consigned to the flames his supply of rum. When preparing to invade Syria “ he ”, we quote the Russian Consul, “ became more civilised, for he then drank wine and a good deal of it without adding any water to it. A happy laugh was always on his lips. He familiarly placed his hand on the shoulders of those with whom he conversed. In a word, his politeness was that of a soldier ”.²

The army and navy, which were thus called into being while Ibrahim was adding to his store of Occidental culture, was ready for the supreme test in the autumn of 1831. The fleet weighed anchor at noon, 4 November. Ibrahim boarded the *Kola*, a frigate built at Archangel. He sailed for Jaffa where the commander of his cavalry, Selim Bey, Abass Pasha and other officers were to join him with 8,000 camels and men. 7,000 infantrymen accompanied him. 21 vessels made up this expedition.³ We know from an earlier Russian Consular report that this fleet consisted of 1 frigate of 110, 4 of 60 and 2 of 44 guns, and 14 of lesser capacity, exclusive of transports and fire-boats.⁴ And this same authority informs us that this expedition departed without the consent of the Sultan.⁵

¹ Cadalvène and Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

² Cattani, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 362.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 448.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 446.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 447.

Jaffa may have been the port at which Ibrahim was to meet the various detachments which had proceeded to Syria by land, but he first came into contact with the native tribes at Haifa. He had landed there with a detachment of only 600 men, for his transports had been detained by contrary winds. A large Arab force was encamped near him. Its leaders were doubtful whether they would support Abdallah or Ibrahim. They intended to throw in their lot with the more formidable force. When they saw the Egyptian fleet they assumed that the invader was strongly supported. They waited upon him under the pretext of offering their services but really to reconnoitre. Ibrahim read their thoughts.

He fixed his keen eyes upon them. They could not withstand the scrutiny of his gaze ; their countenances changed and they looked down at their feet. "The scoundrels", he said to himself, "I have them now". He had seen through their treachery, for, as he was wont to say, "an honest man will always look you in the face". But he was all smiles, and rivetting his eyes upon theirs, he said : "I accept your services, but until I have tested your fidelity your sons remain with me as hostages". They looked up for an instant as though they would reply, but Ibrahim's eyes remained fixed upon them. They saw that they had played their cards and lost. They accepted the inevitable and they and their neighbours enlisted under the Egyptian banner.¹

If Ibrahim's knowledge of human nature gained the support of these Muslim bands, his broadmindedness won him the friendship of the Christians of the Holy Land. A few days after taking Haifa he was waited upon by some Carmelite friars who were about to construct a monastery on Mount Carmel, which rises just above Haifa. It appears that a quantity of building material had been collected for that purpose.

¹ Yates, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 182.

Abdallah having seen this, and coming to the conclusion that Mount Carmel would be an excellent place for a palace, had seized the whole of the materials on hand for his own purposes.

The monks begged Ibrahim to be allowed to go on with their original plans. He immediately agreed and said to them : " Take back all of your building material that you can find and pull down the palace if it suits your purposes ". Before the friars had departed one of them remarked that Abdallah had been so cruel to them that they had not a dry house in which to put their bread and perishable provisions. " Let us look round and see if we can find a place ", retorted the Muslim commander. They soon found that the only available buildings in Haifa capable of keeping out rain were the Turkish Mosque and the Roman Catholic Church. After inspecting both of them, Ibrahim turned to Captain Prissick, an English officer on his staff, and to an old Maltese monk, and said to them :

" If I take your chapel, you cannot pray to God without it and I shall be called a barbarian. My men can pray in the open air as well as in a mosque. The mosque must, therefore, become a warehouse ". And suiting the action to the word, he took a pickaxe, to make a hole in the wall giving on the sea. " And ", continues Dr. Yates, who tells us that he collected his facts in Haifa, " Ibrahim lent a hand in hauling in the first bag of bread ".¹

It is not surprising to read that this author adds : " These two acts of policy did almost as much as his army in gaining Syria, as the priests have much influence and they did not omit circulating these two favourable traits of Ibrahim among the Christian Syrians. Another fact should also be mentioned. When Ibrahim's forces neared Acre, before commencing the attack he sent word to Abdallah urging

¹ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

"that all women and children be permitted to leave the town".¹

The suggestion was rejected and then the siege began. The place was attacked by sea and land. It had resisted Bonaparte. Abdallah may not have been either wise or politic, liberal-minded or honest, but he was brave and resolute. On 9 December 1831 an attempt was made to overwhelm Acre with a combined bombardment from sea and shore, but without success. We learn from what the Alexandria Russian Consul reported to his chief on 20 December 1831 that not only did the attack fail but that it was impossible to foretell what the future might have in store.²

The complications which arose were not due solely to Abdallah's stout resistance and to the natural strength of Acre, but were also attributable to the attitude of the Sublime Porte. While Ibrahim was bombarding the Syrian stronghold with shot and shell the Sultan began to concentrate upon him and his father a barrage of anathemas and fetwas. A Hatti-Sherif was issued which placed an interdict upon Egypt and declared a blockade against its ports. It was reported that Turkish troops had been ordered to descend on Syria.³ An Imperial fetwa, dated 4 May 1832, decreed the destitution of Muhammad Ali and his outlawry as well as that of Ibrahim.⁴

Weeks passed, and Acre still held out. A feeling of unrest spread to Cairo and Alexandria. Muhammad Ali was not contaminated by it. He remained supremely confident and always insisted that "all will be well when Acre falls". But it did not fall, and the populace became somewhat restless. Stringent orders were issued on 8 March 1832 that no more war news was to be published in Egypt. On

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 183.

² Cattai, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 453.

³ *Il Regno di Mohammed Ali nei documenti Diplomatici Italiani inediti*, per Angelo Sammarco, Roma, Reale Società di Geografia d'Egitto, 1932, vol. IX, p. 205.

⁴ Cattai, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 479.

30 March the Russian Cairo Consular agent reported to his Alexandria superior that on the twenty-sixth four loquacious burghers had had their heads taken off. There were twenty of their fellow citizens still in jail, awaiting, as he put it, *loro buona e cattiva sorte*—their good and bad fate. Labels reading: "This is the fate which awaits those who cannot govern their tongues", had been attached to the bodies of two of these talkative men. On 7 April 1832 two new corpses were exposed. They bore this notice: "This is the punishment that awaits those who speak against the government in secret".¹

Had the suspense lasted much longer a special card might have been prepared for those who talk in their sleep. But on 9 March 1832, after an unsuccessful attempt on that day to carry Acre by storm, Ibrahim decided to leave 5,000 men to blockade that place while with the remainder of his troops he moved against his gathering enemies.² Cairo and Alexandria soon learnt of his victories. He was irresistible. He mowed down the Turkish forces which had been brought into the field against him. He established his supremacy so unmistakably that the pessimism which had held Egypt in its grip gave way to optimism. The loquacious were given full latitude to prate in public or in secret about war news and the timid ceased to worry about what their wives might claim they had muttered in their sleep.

As soon as the menace which confronted his besieging forces had been definitely arrested, Ibrahim returned to Acre. At dawn on 27 May 1832 he directed the assault in person. Wherever the fight was thickest he was to be found bearing the brunt of it. Afraid of nothing, he insisted that his officers should follow his example. He is said to have cut down with his own hand several of them who showed

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

² Sammarco, *op. cit.*, vol. IX, p. 126.

a tendency to fall back to the rear of the storming columns.

The struggle was long and obdurate. The hours passed and Abdallah still remained unvanquished. But just as the sun was setting Ibrahim made a final effort to break down the resistance of the defenders. There was as much dash, as much enthusiasm, as much driving power in that attack as there had been in the assault delivered when dawn was breaking. Abdallah was brave, but could not withstand the irresistible impact. His stronghold fell just as darkness was enveloping his walls and battlements.

The notables of Acre pleaded for mercy. But one brave man always admires another, and Ibrahim recognised in the remnants of the defeated army foemen worthy of his steel. He therefore promised the enemy the protection of life and property. He went so far as to allow the vanquished to keep their arms. He made it clear, however, that all that he accorded to Abdallah himself was that his life would be spared. The defeated Pasha "was received with all the honours due to a Vizir and with all the respect due to misfortune".¹

Abdallah behaved like a hero in the supreme trial. Ibrahim had taken a stronghold which had successfully resisted Bonaparte. But during the recent siege there had been no Sydney Smith cruising on the coast to intercept heavy batteries and to repel assault by water. The absence of that support and the encouragement which it begot had proved fatal, but even if defeat was his lot Abdallah had demonstrated that he knew how to fight. When Ibrahim, in accordance with the terms of the surrender, called for the delivery of the state treasure, Abdallah replied :

"I had walls, men and money with which to defend Acre. My walls have been destroyed ; of my

¹ Cadalvène and Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

" 6,000 men, 5,600 are dead ; and of my treasure
" nothing remains but a few jewels ".¹

Abdallah had thrown himself at Ibrahim's feet before thus expressing his feelings. But the victor would not let him kneel, and said :

" I do not criticise you for having opposed me, for
" we are equals, but you showed undue audacity in
" seeking to resist Muhammad Ali ". " It is the
" will of Allah who has delivered me into your hands ",
was the immediate retort. They then conversed for
some moments. When Ibrahim rose to say " Good
" night " he added : " I hope that you will sleep
" well to-night ". Abdallah answered :

" The same as usual. But don't treat me as if I
" were a woman. My defence proves the contrary.
" The mistake that I made was that I counted too
" much upon the Sultan, and he has no more honour
" than a public woman. If I had known his true
" character, I would have taken other measures, and
" I assure you that I would not now be your prisoner ".²
Abdallah and his family were sent to Egypt, and
appear to have been shown due respect, though they
were held as prisoners.

Acre was pillaged, notwithstanding the assurances
which had been made to its notables, and in the very
teeth of orders given to the troops. It seems that the
men got out of hand for a short while and under cover
of the darkness plundered right and left. Order was
restored the next morning. Ibrahim did his utmost
to atone for this breach of discipline. He gave
instructions that owners might recover their property
wherever found, and he compelled his troops to give
up whatever booty was in their possession.

One of the foreign consuls took advantage of the
turmoil to act as a broker and to amass a considerable
sum by collecting valuable objects for a song, and then,

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. III.

² Sabry, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

by capitalising his capitulatory immunity, selling them at a handsome profit. Cadalvène and Barrault, from whom we have obtained these facts, collected their data on the spot and published their book in 1837. They give the name of this Levantine pariah. We prefer not to cite it, as it is now borne by one of the most distinguished and honourable of the younger men now practising before the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt.¹

From Acre Ibrahim marched to Damascus, that city which still contains the street which Saint Paul called Strait. It is situated in a luxuriant valley and was without adequate fortifications. It was then what would be called a *Weltstadt*. It was abandoned to the invader without the semblance of resistance. It might have proved a Capua to the Egyptian troops, but Ibrahim, halting merely to replenish his stores, pushed on to Homs.

The Pasha of Tripoli there awaited him with 30,000 men forming the vanguard of the Ottoman armies. Any delay would have meant that reinforcements would have swollen the Turk's ranks. The Egyptian lost no time; he surrounded the enemy on 8 July 1832 but waited for him to attack. As soon as the Ottoman General charged, a well-directed and deadly fire of musketry met him. The battle did not last long, but Ibrahim's victory was complete.² The Archives of the Cairo Russian Consulate record that he took 2,500 prisoners, besides many cannon and "luggage".³

Ibrahim's report to his father, dated 11 July, 1832, confirms these figures, but brings the total to 3,000. We learn from this official despatch that "eight pashas, four infantry and three cavalry regi-

¹ Cadalvène and Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 136. Sammarco's *Documenti Italiani inediti*, vol. IX, p. 271, contains an official report testifying to Ibrahim's leniency to the vanquished.

² *History of the Egyptian Revolution*, by A. A. Paton, London, Trubner and Co., 1863, p. 96.

³ Cattani, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 522.

"ments, and 15,000 irregular soldiers were defeated, "whose losses, apart from the prisoners, included "2,000 killed and 2,000 wounded." The prisoners and the wounded were transferred to Acre.¹

Not content with defeating the enemy, Ibrahim devoted his attention to looking after the administration of the conquered territory. On 14 July he chose twenty notables of Damascus and converted them into a provincial council. His proclamation to this body is couched in these terms :

"It is the duty of the shepherd to look after his "flock, and I have accordingly taken steps to assure "the welfare of the inhabitants committed to my "charge, which can only be guaranteed by applying "justice and good will.

"I have in furtherance of this decision created a "council composed of notables and merchants and "given it a mandate to deal with the affairs of "the people. This body will deliberate in public "and decide all ordinary civil matters. It will "submit questions of law to men learned in the "law".²

If Ibrahim thus thought of his responsibility to the defeated, he at no time forgot that he was a soldier and that it was his primary duty to annihilate the opposing force. He devoted himself to this task with unremitting and unbroken success. Town after town fell into his hands. Aleppo succumbed on 15 July 1832. On 29 July he wiped out another Turkish army. This victory was won in the Beylan Pass. The Ottoman general in command then saw the hopelessness of his task and fled precipitately towards Adana, leaving Ibrahim master of all Syria. The Turk was badly frightened, *preso da terrore*, reads an official report addressed to the Foreign Office of the

¹ *Recueil de la Correspondance de Mohamed Ali*, Imprimerie Nationale, 1913, Document No. 461.

² *Ibid.*, Document No. 464.

Government of the Two Sicilies.¹ He left tents, baggage, cannon, munitions, everything behind him, and hurried towards Antioch.

¹ Sammarco, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 97.

CHAPTER XII

KONIA

THIS series of victories disturbed the equanimity of the Powers. Englishmen of the governing class are taught in their cradle to control their nerves and to master their feelings. It has been said that they are not weaned until they have learnt their first lesson in restraining their emotions. It is this discipline which gives them that balance which makes them so placid in emergencies. Downing Street, guided by men reared in such a school, was disturbed by the onward march of Ibrahim's army, but it did not lose its poise. It adopted a policy of watchful expectancy.

Slavs have no such domination over their sentiments. They are volatile, precipitate and headstrong. They make a habit of rushing in where angels fear to tread. It is not surprising to note that the Tsar's advisers became so alarmed when the Turks were defeated in Beylan Pass that they issued instructions to their consular officers¹ to break off relations with Muhammad Ali.² When the Russian Consul-General had his final audience with the Pasha, Muhammad Ali spoke quite frankly of his aspirations :

"I had a legitimate grievance against Abdallah", he said. "I am not opposed to the Turkish dynasty, but the people of Diarbekir, of the Pashalik of Bagdad, of the Southern provinces of Asia Minor and of certain districts of Turkey in Europe are interested in the growth of my power. Several of these groups have made known their wishes, but I

¹ Russia had no diplomatic mission in Egypt.

² Cattai, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 537.

" am not seeking the Sultan's throne. I know every-
" thing that goes on in Constantinople and I am aware
" of the exact extent of what the Sublime Porte can do.

" A successful naval engagement by my fleet would
" overthrow the Sultan, but I shall respect the rights
" of his children, for they are descendants of the
" Prophet. I do not fear the armies of the Sultan.
" My son Ibrahim is now at Adana and what he will
" there accomplish will weigh more in the scales
" than could any diplomatic manœuvring. We are
" living in an age where politics leave a great deal to
" chance and where wires are usually pulled after
" events have taken place.

" It behoves the *Grand Seigneur* to reflect upon the
" eventualities of a contest which he cannot carry on
" with his own forces. He calls me a rebel. He
" forgets that I conquered Egypt with my sword and
" that it is only by the sword that it can be taken from
" me. I am the Sultan's vassal, although I occupy
" Egypt by right of conquest. In conquering Syria
" it is my intention to continue to be his subject and
" the pillar of his throne ".¹

The French are Latins with a condiment added to their basic nature. Just as their *cuisine* subordinates their staple products to the sauces which disguise them, so do they, in the field of diplomacy, give preference to their interests over their emotions, however adroitly they may stress the sentiments which do them honour. When Paris learnt that Acre had fallen and that Ibrahim was sweeping Syria with his victorious battalions, the Quai d'Orsay wrote in substance to its Alexandria Consul-General :

" If the Viceroy delights in recognising all that
" he owes to our arts, to our engineers and to our
" soldiers, we, on our part, congratulate ourselves that
" we have facilitated the birth and development of a
" power worthy of our collaboration and as interested

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 542.

"as we are in the prosperity of the Mediterranean.
"We shall always be ready to give to the Pasha in the
"future the same evidence of our friendship and
"goodwill as he has received in the past from the
"French Government."¹

This message was one of those diplomatic masterpieces which says nothing and may mean anything. Mimaut, the French Consul-General, pointed out in his reply that

"We are now face to face with one of those great
"crises by which the fate of empires are decided. . . .
"An Arab power has been created. It controls the
"Holy Cities ; it is the seat of the Khalifate (*sic*), it
"occupies an inexpugnable position. The armies and
"fleet of Sultan Mahmud will be unable to resist
"Muhammad Ali".²

The more or less threatening attitude of Russia, the incessant inquiries of the French Consul-General and the impeccability of the English aloofness made an impression upon Muhammad Ali. In his war against the Sultan he had applied the maxim of the Quaker, who said : "I shall not hurt thee, or harm thee ; I shall simply make thy head feel a little uneasy". He always insisted that he was the loyal vassal of his liege lord and that he was not making war on the Sublime Porte, but merely seeking to defend himself by rounding out his frontiers.

And, in a measure, he was sincere. He was sincere in the sense that he was not attempting to dethrone Mahmud, he did not covet the Imperial sceptre, he did not desire the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. What he wanted, we think, was an autonomous and powerful Egypt enlarged by the annexation of Syria and certain adjacent territory and the recognition of the hereditary rights of his family to these enlarged self-contained dominions.

¹ *La Mission du Baron de Boislécomte : Egypte et La Syrie en 1833*, par Georges Douin, Société Royale de Géographie d'Egypte, 1927, p. 1.

² Douin, *Mission de Boislécomte*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

There was something almost Scottish about the canniness of Muhammad Ali. He was worldly-wise to an abnormal degree.

He was also the embodiment of ambition and the personification of all that Wolsey condemned. He was, however, so essentially practical, shrewd, sagacious and sensible that he centred his attention upon the attainable and concentrated his vision on what was realisable. He was too discriminating and judicious to be induced into following a will-o'-the wisp. He held his head high but kept his feet on the ground. He always gauged his distance before he leaped. His policy was compressed into the homely admonition : " Look, stop and listen ". He kept in contact with what was going on. His Armenian minister, Boghos Bey, of that distinguished family of upright statesmen which gave Nubar Pasha to the reign of Khedive Ismail, may have been his " guide, philosopher and friend ", but his own eyes were always open and his own ears alert. He caught the significance of the diplomatic rumbling which emanated from the Russian and French Consulates and grasped the potentialities of the ominous British silence.

Ibrahim was hundreds of miles away from these consular weather-vanes. He saw the plains of Anatolia beckoning to him to hurry across them and on to Constantinople. He saw the Egyptian fleet cruising in the Mediterranean and bidding defiance to the Ottoman navy. He saw the possibilities of a compact Arab Empire reposing upon the tradition of the possession of the *Harramein* and backed up by a victorious army. He was a child of a later generation than his father's and the Turkish name was not a fetish which exercised magical powers over his thoughts. He would have bombarded Constantinople without compunction, have driven the Sultan into exile without a moment's hesitation, and have assisted at the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire without a second thought.

He may, perhaps, have been a man of keener discernment than his illustrious father. We do not venture to express an opinion on this point. In any case what diplomats call a *fait accompli* has often been known to work wonders. Presumably the Turkish army and navy would have been unable to prevent Ibrahim from reaching Skutari.¹ His presence at that point would have created such anarchy in Constantinople that Mahmud would probably have been forced to abdicate. It is by no means certain that the Powers could have arrested this momentum. It is even questionable whether they would have sought to do so. We say this since we read in a report submitted to Metternich by his Alexandria Consul-General, dated 18 June 1832, that

“the Sultan is now dominated by Russia, and
“France and England are so jealous of the Tsar that
“they would prefer to see Muhammad Ali on the
“throne of Constantinople because he would rejuvenate
“the Ottoman Empire and make of it a rampart
“against Russia”.²

Ibrahim set forth his point of view in a series of letters to his father. The first of these was written on 28 December 1832. It was dated 5 Chaaban 1248. Both Muhammad Ali and his son, in their correspondence, invariably made use of the Muhammadan Calendar. To avoid confusion we have, in this and other instances, transposed the dates of the Hegira into their Gregorian equivalents. We shall not now quote this letter, but pass on to a subsequent note. On 20 January 1833, Ibrahim advised Muhammad Ali that his intelligence service reported that the road to Constantinople was open and that no armed force would oppose his advance. Passing to higher politics he added :

¹ A report submitted to the Piedmontese Foreign Office, dated Constantinople, 25 August, 1832, stated categorically that nothing stands in the way of Ibrahim's unimpeded march to Constantinople, Sammarco, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 162.

² Sammarco, *op. cit.*, vol. IX., p. 354.

“ It is possible to conclude an honourable peace
“ through the mediation of Rifaat Pasha, but I fear
“ that as long as Sultan Mahmud, that evil genius,
“ remains on the throne no permanent peace or
“ definite arrangement of our conflict is possible. . . .
“ It is imperative that we return to our original
“ intention and dethrone that pernicious man and
“ replace him by the Crown Prince. Such a moment-
“ ous decision will act as a means of shaking up that
“ nation and of awakening it from its stupor ”.

Such language shows that while Ibrahim believed in taking radical measures to enforce his father's claims, he did not advise Muhammad Ali to take over the Sultan's sceptre. He was perfectly willing to allow Constantinople to remain the capital of the Ottoman Empire and to agree that the existing dynasty should continue to rule. But he was the stout champion of immediate and aggressive action. There is a ring of statesmanship in what he added. He said :

“ It may be objected that Europe would not
“ approve of my proposal. My answer is that we
“ should act so promptly that Europe will be unable
“ to forestall our designs. My whole plan is predi-
“ cated upon such immediate action that it will be
“ executed before Europe can intervene. If the
“ Powers, face to face with what we shall have accom-
“ plished, seek to profit by the results thus obtained
“ to bring about a partition of the Ottoman Empire,
“ will that be our fault? Can we prevent their
“ realizing a dream which they have had in view for
“ 84 years? May God afford us his protection!
“ At all events, it is preferable that what is bound to
“ happen some day take place now and facilitate once
“ and for all the question which touches us so
“ deeply ”.¹

Muhammad Ali, on the other hand, hoped against

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Cairo, Turkish Section.

hope that he would be able to adjust matters with the Sultan. He desired, therefore, that Ibrahim should avoid precipitating matters. The march of the Egyptian army had been so rapid that steps had to be taken to consolidate the victories already won. This might not have been necessary if the avalanche of progress had remained unabated, but, as the Pasha willed that his son should not complicate the task of diplomacy, Ibrahim remained on the defensive during the four months immediately following the battle of Beylan (29 July 1832).

During the period when he was marking time, the restless General devoted his attention to administrative problems. He divided Syria into three zones, making Aleppo, Sidon and Damascus the pivotal points of his civil and military government.¹ Peace reigned everywhere because of his enlightened policy, so well exemplified by this proclamation, dated 5 August 1832, and issued when the Egyptian troops entered Jerusalem :

“ The temples and monuments of Jerusalem draw
“ to that city Christians and Jews from distant
“ countries.

“ The numerous pilgrims have a right to complain
“ of the heavy taxes which are exacted of them on the
“ highways.

“ As I have decided to put a stop to this practice,
“ I now order that the Muslim authorities of the
“ Pashalik of Sidon as well as of those of the districts
“ of Jerusalem and Tripoli and of the adjacent
“ provinces of the Mediterranean sea, do away with
“ all taxes of all descriptions collected along the road
“ and in all places.

“ I request the local authorities not to subject to
“ arbitrary taxes Christian priests who perform the
“ ceremonies of their religion in the holy places ”.²

¹ Sammarco, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 231.

² *Ibid.*, vol. X, p. 114.

If such an edict had been promulgated in the calm serenity following months of peace, it could be classed as proof of the liberalism of its author. Issued as it was in the midst of the rough and tumble of war, it becomes all the more significant. It marks its author as being a statesman as well as a soldier, as being a humanitarian as well as a tactician.

Ibrahim lost no opportunity of checking the rapacity of the authorities. He felt that the Egyptian occupation of Syria was destined to be permanent and set to work to reduce the usurious rates of interest demanded by *saraafs*, agents and money changers. He devoted a portion of his day to receiving visits and petitions. On one occasion an old mountaineer was unusually insistent. Ibrahim finally said to him : " I have read nearly two hundred petitions to-day, and " I am entitled to some relaxation, but you may depend " on my examining your prayer ".

The inhabitants of Nazareth took advantage of Ibrahim's good will to complain of the exactions of their local governor. This official was ordered to produce his accounts. An overcharge of 6,000 piastres was established and the delinquent was then and there condemned to twelve months' hard labour in the fortifications of Acre.¹

We are tempted to believe that during the months when Ibrahim was thus devoting his attention to furthering the welfare of the people whom the God of battles had committed to his charge, he and Muhammad Ali hoped that the Egyptian navy would annihilate the Ottoman fleet. We have already emphasized the fact that Muhammad Ali was superlatively canny. We have no proof of the assertion which we are about to make. It is a pure surmise on our part, but we suspect that the Pasha took it for granted that the eyes of the Sublime Porte were centred on his army and that as long as he held

¹ Yates, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 178.

Ibrahim in check the Sultan would negotiate. We suggest that the wily Muhammad Ali planned that while Constantinople thus focussed its attention on his irresistible son, the Egyptian fleet would pounce upon the Ottoman navy, destroy it and thus give him an additional strategic advantage.

Some insistence may be placed on this deduction because Muhammad Ali laid such stress on the influence of sea power that it is inconceivable that he contemplated allowing his navy to remain inactive during such momentous times. The Sammarco papers show that on 20 June 1832, Metternich was advised by his Alexandria Consul-General that :

"the superiority of the fleet of Muhammad Ali over that of the Turks is no longer a question of doubt. All European naval officers are in accord upon this point. Looked at from this angle the issue of this war is bound to be disastrous to Turkey".¹

Repeated messages sent abroad by Consular officers refer to the movements of the two navies.² An official report, dated 10 September 1832, brings out the salient fact that "if the Egyptian navy had emulated the bravery of the army, the Turkish Empire would be at an end".³ Another tells the fateful story that "the two fleets are watching one another but do not dare to attack".⁴ When we turn to the pages of Cadalvène and Barrault, those contemporary observers, whom Jean-Marie Carré calls "conscientious travelers, generally well informed",⁵ we find an explanation of this strange conduct of the Egyptian Admiral. The picture drawn is more or less typical of the Orient of the past.

The naval officer who had received instructions to

¹ Sammarco, *op. cit.*, vol. IX, p. 337.

² *Ibid.*, vol. X, pp. 45, 83, 113, 120.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. X, p. 197.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. X, p. 298.

⁵ *Voyageurs et Ecrivains Français en Egypte*, Le Caire, Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1933.

find the enemy and attack¹ but who did not do so, was Osman Nouredin—Osman Light-of-the-Religion. He was the son of an obscure servant of Muhammad Ali. His precocious intelligence won for him the favour of the Pasha, who had him educated and, in due course, appointed to a clerical position at the Citadel of Cairo ; he later became a schoolmaster. A grave breach of discipline irritated Muhammad Ali and there is a story that Nouredin was condemned to be drowned. He is said to have been put in a sack and was about to be thrown into the Nile when a Persian, attached to the government printing office, bribed the *kawass* charged with the execution of this order, hid Nouredin and eventually interceded for him. Grace was granted him. He was then attached to one of the scholastic missions and sent to England, France and Italy to round off his education.

While in Europe he won universal sympathy. He absorbed with extraordinary facility, at any rate, the veneer of Western Culture. The rapidity with which he acquired languages evoked general admiration. When he returned to Egypt he was looked upon as the paragon of Occidental lore and as the ideal of a Europeanised Oriental. The door of opportunity was open to him. He became the most sought-after man in the country. In an incredibly short space of time Muhammad Ali made him major-general of his land and sea forces, second only to his son, Ibrahim. Then he was appointed Grand-Admiral of the fleet. When the opportunity came for him to assert his mettle,

“ whether it was through disdainful indifference to
 “ the policy of his benefactor, inefficiency, cowardice,
 “ or treachery we know not, he lost the opportunity
 “ to get to grips with the enemy and sought to bottle
 “ up a foe whom he seemed to be unwilling to
 “ capture ”.²

¹ Sammarco, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 64 and *Histoire de la Guerre de Méhémed Ali contre la Porte Ottomane*, Paris, Arthur Bertrand, 1837, p. 220.

² Cadalvène and Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

Bismarck said somewhere that an Oriental who wears his shirt inside his trousers is not to be trusted. Such a statement is far too sweeping, but it is true in the restricted sense that it brings out the fact that exotic plants lack the hardiness of indigenous vegetation. Ibrahim was essentially an Oriental. He had received an Oriental education. He spoke Turkish, Arabic and Persian. He was thoroughly acquainted with the history of the Orient. His culture was exclusively Oriental, though he appears in after life to have acquired some knowledge of French.¹ He thus stood the acid test, whereas Nouredin was just the kind of a man who would be most likely to have an itching palm. No such principle applies to-day. One hundred years have, of course, made a great change in the culture and dress of Egyptians.

Mouriez speaks of the "treason which germinated in the soul of Nouredin",² but like Cadalvène and Barrault he offers no proof of his charge. He insists that the Admiral was essentially a coward. He probably was. Ibrahim had unspeakable contempt for him, and never forgave him for letting the Turkish navy escape.³ Our deduction from all the facts available to us is that the Sublime Porte saw through Muhammad Ali's stratagem, knew as well as he did the significance of an Egyptian victory on the sea, and made it worth Nouredin's while for him to be a coward.

On 25 October 1832, the Tuscan Minister at Constantinople notified his Foreign Office that the Ottoman fleet had anchored in the Dardanelles and that a new Turkish army, under the command of Grand Vizir Reshid Mehmed Pasha, was being formed. This meant that the naval war comedy had either ended or was about to end, and that the Egyptian question had entered a new phase. A subsequent

¹ P. et H., *op. cit.*, p. 38.

² Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 197.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 198.

dispatch describes this Turkish Field-Marshal as "most active, intelligent and brave".

We do not question the accuracy of this language. Had Reshid Mehmed been confronted by an adversary less alert, courageous and competent than Ibrahim, the facts might have confirmed this prognosis. But the conqueror of Abdallah did not allow himself to be intimidated by the circumstance that the Grand Vizir of the Ottoman Empire was in the field against him. He met the advent of the new Richmond by giving orders to his army to march towards Konia, where the roads from Syria and Asia Minor converge and lead to Constantinople, 100 leagues to the East.

It was obvious that a decisive battle would soon take place. The Tsar sent a Russian frigate, the *Standard*, to Constantinople carrying a special ambassador, General Muraviev, with instructions to offer armed intervention to the Sultan. Ibrahim did not await the result of this diplomatic by-play. He sprang forward at the first opportune moment. It came on 21 December 1832. The Ottoman army had an overwhelming numerical superiority. He knew this, and took advantage of a dense fog to cover his movement. Before it lifted the battle had been won. The day ended with Reshid Mehmed a prisoner and the road to Constantinople open.

Ibrahim, even in the hour of victory, did not forget the orientation of his father's policy. The Grand Vizir may have been his prisoner, but the dutiful son recognised in the Sultan's representative the overlordship of the Imperial Potentate. The arms which had been seized earlier in the day were returned. Calling in person to do homage to the defeated adversary, Ibrahim insisted that the Field-Marshal should occupy the place of honour. So obvious was the deference paid to him, so incongruous was it with his unfortunate position, that Reshid Mehmed grew suspicious and suspected foul play. When a

cup of coffee was presented to him, he said that he was thirsty and would prefer a glass of water. When sherbert was suggested he declined it and reiterated a desire for water, which would have been discoloured or cloudy had it contained poison. "Bring sherbet", said Ibrahim to one of his men.

The coloured frozen drink was soon brought and presented to the Grand Vizir. He felt that his doom was sealed, and extended his hand without a tremor. Ibrahim stopped him, took the glass and sipped its contents, a smile half of contempt, half of triumph playing across his lips. The Turk remained equally grave. When half the bowl had been consumed, it was passed to him. He drained it. The two Pashas did not speak a word during the five minutes devoted to this ceremony. When it had ended absolute mutual confidence governed their relations.¹

Ibrahim carried out so punctiliously the simulacrum of effacement before the Grand Vizir that he insisted upon looking upon Reshid Mehmed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army. When, on the day after the battle, orders were given to pursue the defeated foe, they were issued by Ibrahim in the name of his prisoner.² Well might the Prime Minister have said: "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau".

¹ Cadalvène and Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

² *Ibid.*, p. 316.

CHAPTER XIII

KUTAKIA

KONIA has been described as "the ancient cradle of the Ottoman power".¹ Ibrahim knew this, and was alive to the sentimental significance attached to his victory. But he did not stress this detail in the letter which he wrote to Muhammad Ali on 28 December 1832. He rivetted attention upon the political aspects of his triumph. He knew that his father was being harassed by the Consuls-General and he considered the moment opportune to reiterate his point of view. He wrote :

"The Grand Vizir is attached to my army. We
" can advance as far as Constantinople and depose the
" Sultan quickly and without difficulty. But I should
" like to know, as soon as possible, if you really intend
" to carry out this plan, for we must, from this moment,
" take the necessary steps. In my opinion the
" adjustment of our affairs can take place at Con-
" stantinople and at no other place. It is there where
" we should be to dictate what we desire. Let me
" hasten to add that propaganda will not bring us
" there. If, however, you envisage menacing
" Constantinople, it would be useless for us to stop
" at Konia and cut short our forward march.

" Konia is rather far from Constantinople, and
" the ruling powers will not be inclined to make peace
" with us if we do not enter the capital. You will
" recall that they did not make peace with Russia
" until the Tsar's troops had reached Tchekmedji in
" the environs of Constantinople. We should there-

¹ Douin, *La Mission du Baron de Boislécomte*, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

“fore push on at least as far as Brousa, occupy the towns along the coast of the Sea of Marmora and use them as maritime bases for supplying our army. When we get there we can easily spread rumours which will cause the fall of the Sultan. If we fail to bring about his abdication, we shall be able, at all events, to dictate satisfactory terms of peace”.

Ibrahim had thrown his heart into these lines. Notwithstanding his respect for his father he did not hesitate to add :

“If it had not been for your last two orders, which formally instructed me not to advance, I would now be at the gates of Constantinople. I have repeatedly asked myself why were these orders issued? Was it through fear of Europe or for some other motive?”

“I pray you to enlighten me on this latter point before we lose the opportunity now open to us. I await your definite commands”.¹

The Chancelleries of Europe did not remain inactive while Ibrahim was thus pleading his cause. Their campaign had begun before Reshid Mehmed had lost the battle of Konia. The Tsar's special envoy to the Sultan, General Muraviev, had been received in audience at Yildiz Kiosk on 27 December 1832. He had informed Mahmud that the Emperor Nicholas placed his fleet at the disposal of the Sublime Porte for the purpose of bringing Muhammad Ali to reason. It would seem that, for some unaccountable cause, Constantinople did not then know that the Grand Vizir had been defeated. The dates appear to us to be erroneous, but they are official, and we must accept them. At all events, it was not until 28 December 1832, that the Sultan learnt that his army had been annihilated and that no Ottoman force could prevent Ibrahim's descent upon Constantinople.

Muhammadan and fatalist as Mahmud was, he

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Cairo, Turkish Section.

was badly frightened. He expected any moment to hear the roar of the enemy guns attacking Skutari. The French *Chargé d'affaires* reported to his Foreign Office, on 31 December 1832, that the Sultan, overcome by fear and "*se ruant à corps perdu dans l'abîme*",¹ (precipitating himself headlong into the abyss) had sent a messenger post haste to the Russian Embassy and, without consulting his Divan, had accepted the Tsar's offer.

This decision complicated matters. It made "confusion worse confounded". The Turkish Ministers were offended. Their pride was hurt because they had not been consulted or, perhaps, because an opportunity to collect an adequate balm for their feelings in the shape of Russian roubles had been denied them.

The French *Chargé d'affaires* was beside himself with rage. He knew that Admiral Roussin had just been appointed to the Constantinople Embassy. He felt that the Quai d'Orsay might attribute this Russian coup to some oversight on his part, and that as he was about to be superseded, it might adversely affect his career. And he was a patriot, a French patriot, and accordingly something of a chauvinist. Thus he also looked at the matter from a broader standpoint and thought of the important French interests involved. He saw that the personality of Muhammad Ali had faded into the background, that the Egyptian question had been supplanted by a bigger one, and that the problem now was : " Shall Russia be allowed to rule at Constantinople ? "

The French Government at once agreed with the point of view thus so promptly arrived at by Baron de Varenne—the young man temporarily in charge of French interests at the Sublime Porte. The Duc de Broglie, who was then at the Quai d'Orsay, hastened to write to him :

¹ Douin, *Mission de Boislécomte*, p. ix.

"The Ottoman Empire has ceased to exist if the Russian army may thus enter its territory and overrun it on the pretext that it is doing so in order to repel Muhammad Ali, and if the Russian navy may freely navigate the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and anchor opposite the Seraglio. Other Powers, and particularly France and England, cannot view with indifference, and countenance without opposition, such an abdication by the Sultan of his sovereign attributes".¹

When Mahmud was told that France would not agree to allow Russia to have the upper hand at Constantinople, word was sent to Mimaut, the French Consul-General at Alexandria, to inform Muhammad Ali that :

"rather than allow Russian intervention at Constantinople, which would permit the Czar to advance his armies into the heart of Asia Minor and to place his fleet beneath the walls of the Seraglio, other Powers would not hesitate to join forces in order to restrain Muhammad Ali and compel him to discuss terms of peace with the Sublime Porte".²

The French did more than this. De Varennes was a man of outstanding ability. It is extremely difficult for a diplomat to accomplish anything when he is marking time pending the arrival of his successor. Foreign Office officials worship at the shrine of the rising sun. Their backs are always turned towards the West. Everybody in Constantinople knew that in a few days Admiral Roussin would displace de Varennes, and yet the latter had that deftness of touch, that professional skill—and perhaps those *fonds secrets*—which persuaded the Turkish Ministers that they should attempt to convince the Sultan that he should withdraw his acceptance of the Russian offer. The Seraskier, Khosrew, became so insistent in pleading with Mahmud that Turkey should not open her

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

² *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

frontiers to her hereditary enemy, that he threw himself on the ground at the feet of his Imperial Master and emphasized the significance of his act by stressing the fact that he was doing so in the name of the entire Divan.¹

Muraviev had probably heard of all this intriguing and sought to take time by the forelock by hurrying to Alexandria. His object was to let Muhammad Ali know that if Ibrahim advanced or if Alexandria failed to yield to the inevitable, Russia would intervene. Before sailing, Muraviev sent one of his suite, a Colonel Duhamel, to Ibrahim's camp with instructions to convey the same message to the General.² In no sense daunted, de Varennes, the Seraskier and the other Turkish Ministers met this offensive by a counter-offensive. They caused the Sultan to send a special envoy to Muhammad Ali in the person of Khalil Pasha, an ex-Captain Pasha and a most decorative personality. His mission was to convey to the indomitable vassal the pardon of his liege lord and to recognise him as Pasha of Acre and its dependencies.

De Varennes also got busy with his pen and wrote Muhammad Ali a personal note, in which assurances were given that "Khalil Pasha's credentials empower him to adjust all difficulties and to endeavour to wipe out all unpleasant memories".³ The French *chargé* did not forget Ibrahim. In writing to the victor of Konia, de Varennes said :

I express the hope that "recognising that hostilities have now ceased to have any justifying cause, the responsibility for further bloodshed will fall on whomsoever renews hostilities, and as such hostilities may complicate the difficulties in the way of the settlement which is now being discussed, you will deem it opportune to stop your advance and give orders to your subordinates to do likewise".⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

² Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

³ Douin, *Boislicomte*, p. xvi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

Ibrahim's answer reached de Varennes on 26 January 1833. We have not seen the original text, but we know from the report sent to Paris that he replied that he could take no decision until he had received his father's instructions, that he requested the Sublime Porte to permit him to establish winter quarters at Brousa and that Kutakia was his next objective.¹ This reply caused the Sultan to tremble like a leaf. He again resorted to his old practices. He kept his own counsel, and without consulting his Ministers sent a hurried note to the Russian Ambassador asking the Tsar to hold his Crimean and Danubian armies in readiness because he would require their help should Ibrahim advance. De Varennes faced the new situation with his customary vigour. The *Reis Effendi*, who had been won over to Mahmud's cause, met the French diplomat's argument with this dilemma :

"Give us your guarantee that Ibrahim will not advance or agree that we must make an immediate appeal to Russia. We have no time to lose. Ibrahim can reach Constantinople within fifteen days, and it will take the Russians the same time to get to Constantinople".²

Confronted with this emergency and knowing that Admiral Roussin was due to arrive in Constantinople almost any day, de Varennes had the courage to give the guarantee required by the *Reis Effendi*, or, to be more exact, to say that he would write Ibrahim a letter which he felt convinced would accomplish the desired result. He did not lose an instant. A note was at once sent to Ibrahim, dated 30 January 1833, in which the point was brought out that if the Egyptian army did not stop, "the Sublime Porte will find itself in the deplorable necessity of accepting the proffered Russian assistance".

¹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

² *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

De Varennes showed bad psychology in writing along these lines. He was acting under high pressure. Both Ibrahim and Roussin were hurrying to Constantinople. Anybody, even a professional career diplomat, may make a mistake under such a cross fire without meriting excessive censure. But he should have known that Ibrahim did not fear the Tsar and all his armies. The only influence that could have withheld him was his father's command. To inform him that Russian intervention was imminent was to tell him to hurry, to impress upon him that delay might prove fatal and that he should train his guns on the Seraglio before the Russians could reach Constantinople.

Ibrahim was, however, on the move before this letter reached him. This news so alarmed the Sultan that he again established contact with the Russian Embassy. The Tsar's Ambassador, M. de Boutenieff, was entreated not only to send a fleet to the Golden Horn with 5,000 men, but also to prepare an additional expeditionary force of from 25,000 to 30,000.¹ Mahmud's messenger was instructed to remain at the Embassy until orders had been given for a ship to sail at once carrying the urgent summons.

When this plea of "Help me Cassius, or I sink" was being rushed to Russia, Ibrahim was within 50 odd hours' march of the Asiatic shore opposite Constantinople. He there wrote a reply to the letter which de Varennes had written to him on 30 January. He addressed the French *Chargé d'Affaires* as :

"My honourable, enlightened, affectionate and considerate friend, M. de Varennes". After acknowledging receipt of his letter of 30 January 1833, and "its friendly contents", Ibrahim explained that the reason for his departure from Konia and his advance to Brousa was that the former place was not suitable for winter quarters. "We have now reached

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

"Kutakia", he said in conclusion, "and we shall here find acceptable winter quarters. I shall remain here in accordance with the wishes of my father and benefactor until I receive his further orders. I am advising the Sublime Porte of this fact, and I venture to hope that I have fulfilled the wishes of Your Excellency, for their accomplishment would be a source of pleasure to me".¹

This letter brought out the fact that it was perfectly useless to attempt to negotiate with Ibrahim. He was a statesman and an administrator, as well as a soldier, but in relations with the enemy or with neutrals he was a soldier and nothing else. His line of conduct was compressed into one word : obedience. It was the blind, unfaltering, absolute obedience which Schiller had in view when he wrote : *Ich habe blosz ein Amt und keine Meinung*—"I have a duty to perform, not an opinion to express". It behoved de Varennes to get Muhammad Ali to act, otherwise matters would have to take their course.

The French diplomat was not unmindful of this, and had done his utmost to bring pressure to bear upon the Pasha. Unfortunately, the Sublime Porte had not been entirely loyal. The credentials given to Khalil Pasha had not been as comprehensive as they should have been. He and Muhammad Ali were able to elaborate a plan of settlement, but it required the ratification of the Sultan, for the mandate given to Khalil Pasha was far too restricted for the terms covered by it to be acceptable to the Pasha. Mimaut, writing on 13 February 1833, from Alexandria, felt justified, nevertheless, in advising the Quai d'Orsay and the French Embassy at Constantinople that :

"The war is finished. There is a general suspension of hostilities and nobody has the slightest doubt about the acceptance of the terms proposed by Muhammad Ali and transmitted to Constantinople by Khalil Pasha".²

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

² Douin, *Boislécomte*, p. xx.

Before a copy of this dispatch had reached the French Embassy, Admiral Roussin arrived and assumed charge. His investiture took place on 17 February 1833. De Varennes had not been told that the Sultan had again changed his mind and that he had this time taken the precaution of having a special messenger sent to Russia calling for the immediate arrival of the Russian navy and army. The Admiral, who had become an ambassador, and who was probably as proud of his new attire and of its resplendent gold braid as he had been of his first ensign's uniform, felt that his mission had begun most auspiciously. He had not ceased saying : *Oui, c'est très bien, j'en suis enchanté : vraiment ça s'annonce très bien !* and was, perhaps, almost ready to believe that he had accomplished the result himself when, during the evening of 18 February 1833, he received a memorandum from the Sublime Porte reading :

"The *Grand Seigneur* having accepted the help offered by Russia places no restriction in the way of peace other than the retirement of the Egyptian army".¹

The new Ambassador fumed. The next morning he demanded of the *Reis Effendi* an immediate audience. He was received, although all Government offices were closed on account of the Bairam holidays. He threatened to ask for his passports, and raised such a tempest that the Turkish Foreign Minister promised to have immediate instructions sent to the Russian Embassy, to Odessa and Sebastopol countermanding the appeal for help. The *Reis Effendi* went still further and agreed to submit to Roussin the exact text of the conditions under which Turkey was prepared to negotiate with Muhammad Ali.²

The French Ambassador returned to his Embassy well pleased with the result of his first formal official

¹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

interview with the Ottoman Foreign Office. That night a fog enveloped the shores of the Bosphorus. When it rose it revealed that eight Russian men-of-war had anchored during the night almost beneath the windows of the *Palais de France*. "Never", wrote Roussin to his chief, "has a more painful sensation taken possession of my heart and mind. Faced with such conditions the line of conduct open to me was obvious. I gave orders to my dragoman to go to the Sublime Porte and say that this Russian intervention made unnecessary the further presence of a French Ambassador and that, therefore, immediate instructions would be given to countermand the debarkation of my luggage".¹

Roussin was convinced that his ultimatum frightened the Turks, for he reported to Paris that :

"Three hours later emissaries came to me saying that they 'were sent by the Sultan and the Seraskier to solicit the help of France in this emergency and that they formally then and there and unequivocally agreed to renounce Russian aid if I would guarantee that peace would be ratified along the lines proposed by Khalil Pasha'".²

After dilating at some length upon the significance of these terms and upon the magnitude of the concessions made by the Porte, Roussin raised himself to the full height of his ambassadorial dignity and added :

"I finally cast my eyes around me. I saw in the representative of England a sentiment akin to stupor, but nevertheless the will to associate himself with any step which might counteract the Russian intervention. In all the other Legations I found nothing but hesitancy, and in some of them, particularly the Austrian and Prussian, I discovered evidence of obvious unfriendliness towards us".

¹ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

² *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

"But", he continued, still keeping the limelight centred upon himself, "a decision had to be taken. That dictated by the interests of France and the majority of the Powers appeared to me to be obligatory. To preserve the integrity and independence of Turkey, by sending away the Russian fleet, seemed to me to be the essential object to be envisaged, and whatever may have been the secondary drawbacks and the consequences in store for me, I did not hesitate to accept the responsibility which chance had thrust upon me".

And proceeding in this same strain he added :

"This was thus my decision. Assured that the two emissaries really represented the Turkish authorities, I said to them :

"I accept your proposition, and in the name of the Government of the King I guarantee to you the conclusion of peace between the Sublime Porte and the Pasha of Egypt on the basis set forth, provided that immediate orders be given countermanding the help asked of Russia and provided also that the Russian fleet leave the Bosphorus as soon as the wind permits".¹

The French Ambassador followed up this decision by writing three letters, one addressed to Muhammad Ali, one to Ibrahim and one to Mimaut. He could not use the cables, because in those days Constantinople knew no such luxury. The letter to Ibrahim, dated 22 February 1833, requested that he not only refrain from advancing but also that he retire to the line of the new Egyptian frontier, in order to let the people know that the war, from which they had suffered so much, was really ended.² The spirit of this note was all very well in its way, but, as we know, it was a matter of supreme indifference to Ibrahim what the French Ambassador or anybody else might

¹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxv.

have to say. The only thing that made the slightest impression upon him was an expression of the pleasure of Muhammad Ali. And it was in dealing with the Pasha that Roussin's knowledge of human nature went completely astray.

The Admiral had been so pleased with his diplomatic success in forcing the Turks to bend to his will, that he felt that he could do the same with the Egyptians. The letter to Mimaut, the French Consul-General at Alexandria, was sent by hand. Capitaine de Corvette Ollivier, Roussin's aide-de-camp, was instructed to deliver it in person. Unfortunately, he was ordered to remain in Alexandria and, should Muhammad Ali give any sign of hesitating, to circulate the report that "at a word from France the French officers in the Egyptian service would resign, and that the French and British Admirals were being kept posted in regard to what was going on, had received identical orders, had concentrated their forces, and were prepared, at a moment's notice, to make an appearance along the Egyptian coast".¹

It is quite probable that the world would have known nothing of these extraordinary instructions had their author correctly gauged the nature of the understanding which had been reached by Khalil Pasha with Muhammad Ali. Unfortunately, the Admiral had failed to grasp the Pasha's interpretation of that agreement. When Mimaut, acting in perfect good faith, sought to carry out the terms of Roussin's instructions to him, Muhammad Ali naturally failed to fall into line. When Captain Ollivier heard of this hesitation he, like a dutiful aide de camp, obeyed orders and started the rumour which he had been commanded to propagate.

It obviously reached the ears of the Pasha. He no longer hesitated. He assured himself that the story

¹ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

had been started by Captain Ollivier. When this fact had been established he dictated a letter to Mimaut setting forth that "he could not accept proposals "which were a sentence of political death, he would "place the matter in the hands of Allah, and he "preferred a glorious death to ignominy".¹ He then addressed an ultimatum to the Sublime Porte, in which he demanded the whole of Syria and the district of Adana, gave the Sultan five days in which to accept, and advised him that if no acceptance was forthcoming within that time, Ibrahim would receive orders to advance on Constantinople.²

Always extremely cautious and always watching his step, Muhammad Ali sent for Khalil Pasha and explained what had taken place. The Turkish envoy was flabbergasted. He insisted that Constantinople had not been recreant and had not violated the letter or the spirit of the instructions given him. He asked for permission to send a special courier to the Sublime Porte in order to ascertain the true facts. The Pasha agreed, but did not withdraw his ultimatum. He then wrote to Ibrahim along these lines :

"Full power is given you to act for me. You are, "therefore, authorized to sign a treaty of peace in my "name, if they adhere to my proposals. Upon proper "proof that these proposals have been accepted, you "are ordered to withdraw your forces to the territory "ceded to me. If they persist in endeavouring to "confine me to the limits which I deem unsatisfactory, "you will continue your march as you deem best and "in accordance with the plan best adaptable to the "circumstances."³

To complicate matters still further, Paris disapproved of what the French Ambassador had done.⁴ He had exceeded the terms of his mandate. He was

¹ Mauriez, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 226.

² *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

³ Douin, *op. cit.*, p. xxxvi.

⁴ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 230.

not publicly disavowed because the Russian fleet did not retire from the Bosphorus. The Sultan had kept faith and had advised the Tsar's Ambassador on 23 February 1833, that his assistance was no longer required and that the retirement of his forces was therefore necessary.¹ De Boutenieff, the Imperial envoy, had perfect manners. Career diplomats always have ; they specialize in such matters. He did not refuse to withdraw his force. He said he had come as an invited guest and that he would not think of outstaying his welcome. In fact, he promised that the fleet should leave with the first favourable wind. The wind was favourable on 28 February 1833, writes Douin. It was propitious on other days. The Russian Admiral, however, did not think so. He did not leave. The Tsar's Ambassador was profuse in his regrets that the wind was so obstinately unfavourable.

¹ Douin, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii.

CHAPTER XIV

THE TREATY OF KUTAKIA

WHEN Muhammad Ali gave Ibrahim full power to fix the terms of peace, he well knew his son's point of view. It was clearly defined in this letter, dated 3 February 1833 :

"It is evident that the object of the missions of General Muraviev and Khalil Pasha is to fix the terms of peace. Inasmuch as the prosperity of Egypt and its fate depend upon the attitude which you will take, I feel that I owe it to myself and to these sentiments of loyalty and devotion which I entertain for your august person, to submit to you my humble views about the present situation, although I am fully aware of the fact that you, in your great wisdom, need the aid of no one to enlighten you".

Having delivered himself of this dutiful prelude Ibrahim continued :

"Well ! it appears to me that independence should be placed first among the subjects to be discussed and adjusted with the two negotiators. Independence is for us the primary question which supersedes all others. We should then claim the cession of the three districts of Anatolia, Alaia and Cilicia and the island of Cyprus. And we should annex to Egypt, if possible, Tunisia and Tripolitania".

Having set forth his claims he proceeded to sustain his premises by saying :

"These should be our minimum demands, from which we should not abate. Our interests require that we adhere to them. We should, first of all,

"be adamant and immovable in regard to our independence. We must consolidate our position and think of the future. . . .

"We must insist upon taking over Anatolia, Alaia and Cilicia because we need the forests of these provinces. The timber produced by them is vital to our navy. You know that when England recently prohibited the exportation of wood, it was in vain that we applied to Austria. We encountered a refusal which left a painful and ineffaceable impression upon our memory. Do we have to prove that Egypt has imperative need for an adequate supply of wood? We need Cyprus as a naval base for our fleet and in order to keep the Porte from having ready access to our shores.

"May I respectfully call these matters to your exalted attention?"¹

The vision of a statesman dictated that letter. Muhammad Ali, as we have already said, knew exactly what he was doing when he gave his blanket power of attorney to his son. The French Foreign Office was also alive to the true meaning of that mandate. So was London. Roussin may have imagined that he had diagnosed in the British Ambassador at Constantinople "a sentiment akin to stupor" when the news spread that the Russian fleet was in the Bosphorus, but Downing Street never allows itself to become disconcerted. Pope may well have had the diplomatic service of his country in mind when he wrote :

"Those oft are strategems which errors seem,
"Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream".

True to this principle, instructions were issued to the Admiral in charge of the British Mediterranean fleet to get in touch with the British Consul-General at Alexandria and to hold himself in readiness to land

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Cairo, Turkish Division.

a force of bluejackets should their presence be necessary to British interests.¹ And the Quai d'Orsay saw the wisdom of withdrawing from the hands of Admiral Roussin the conduct of diplomatic relations which required not the bluntness of a sailor but the suavity of what the French call a *charmeur*.

Alive to the need of doing something drastic, but unwilling to remove Roussin, through fear that both Russia and the Sublime Porte, and perhaps Muhammad Ali, might misconstrue his act, de Broglie devised the expedient of sending a special delegate to the Near East. The choice of this envoy required careful thought. The French Foreign Minister needed the services of a man of ripe judgment, quick decision and unfailing tact. It was necessary, however, that his choice should fall upon someone who was young enough not to look like an Ambassador but who was wise enough to be able to repair the error of a sailor who had been turned into an Ambassador. His confidence was given to Charles-Joseph-Edmond, Baron de Boislécomte, born in 1796 and initiated into the inner circles of diplomatic mysteries at the Vienna Congress. Talleyrand was the young man's spiritual godfather. De Broglie sent him out to Constantinople and Alexandria under instructions dated 8 April 1833.² They are well worth reading.

We shall not analyse their contents, because Roussin shifted the centre of interest to his Embassy. The Sublime Porte, having told him that the Russian fleet had been ordered to leave and was awaiting a favourable wind, informed him on 23 March 1833 that "it could not renounce Russian intervention" and send away the fleet of that Power until it had "proof that Ibrahim would retire from the territory" not ceded to him".³

¹ Transcript Records of Diplomatic Documents concerning the Affairs of Egypt, year 1833, National Library, Cairo, Document No. 39.

² Douin, *Boislécomte*, p. xxxix.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xlv.

In order to offset this change of front on the part of the Turks, Roussin sought to convince them that Ibrahim could and would blow the Russian fleet to smithereens. "You will need 40,000 men to withstand the Egyptians", he told them, and then added: "it will take the Russians at least 40 to 45 days to get here".¹ This reasoning appealed to the Sultan and his advisers. It rang true. The Sublime Porte, convinced by its brutal force, again reversed its gears. It implored the French Ambassador to say just what concessions should be made to Muhammad Ali. This appeal to Roussin was made on 29 March 1833, and thus before Boislécomte had received his final instructions.

The French Ambassador was satisfied that if he took immediate steps he could settle the fate of the Ottoman Empire before the arrival of the special envoy. He knew that de Varennes was able, discreet and loyal as well as patriotic, indefatigable and resourceful. He therefore persuaded the *Reis Effendi* to put the terms of peace into writing. This was done. They offered Muhammad Ali the whole of Syria. De Varennes was hurried off to Ibrahim's camp on 30 March 1833 with verbal instructions to ascertain the General's minimum demands, if he should say that these terms were unsatisfactory and that his father's orders compelled him to insist upon greater concessions.²

Five days after de Varennes' departure a second Russian naval division sailed into the Golden Horn. This obviously added to the complications of the situation. Roussin thought that he had evolved a means of facing the new emergency when de Varennes came back from Ibrahim's headquarters. His account of his mission was that the Egyptian General was prepared to make certain concessions but that he

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xlix.

² *Ibid.*, p. l.

refused to give up Adana. " Syria ", Roussin reported to his Minister with de Varennes' memorandum before him, " is thus ceded by the Sublime Porte, but Adana " cannot be give up, as that would transfer to the " Pasha the forest wealth of Caramania, the passes of " the Taurus and the highway to Constantinople. " But even if Ibrahim insists that he will not abandon " his claim to Adana, he had begun to withdraw his " forces. I am, therefore, now advising the Sultan " to issue a firman recognizing the validity of the " cession of the territory thus surrendered to " Ibrahim ".¹

It is obvious that the French Ambassador felt that his assistant, the competent and tireless de Varennes, had solved the whole question before the arrival of Boislécomte. He was probably correct in the sense that the Gordian knot had been cut before the latter came into action. But it was not de Varennes' persuasiveness that had moved Ibrahim ; it was instructions issued by Muhammad Ali. These were inspired by a healthy respect not for the convincing logic of a diplomat but for the effective force of the British navy.

We have already said that the Foreign Office had arranged that the British Mediterranean fleet should be placed under the orders of the British Consul-General at Alexandria. The exact date when Colonel Campbell received this mark of his sovereign's confidence is not known. It is certain, however, that on 5 May 1833, the British Consulate-General submitted to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Boghos Yousouroff Bey, a *note verbale* couched, in part, in these terms :—

" The present state of affairs in the Levant has " made it necessary to reinforce the English fleet in " the Mediterranean and to give it instructions to " appear in the harbour of Alexandria, where it will " learn the status of the negotiations pending between

¹ *Ibid.*, p. lv.

“ His Highness the Pasha and the envoy of the
“ Sublime Porte.

“ Should the Admiral find, upon arrival at
“ Alexandria, that a definitive arrangement has taken
“ place and that the presence of the English fleet is
“ no longer necessary, he will follow the orders already
“ given him. Should he ascertain, upon arrival,
“ that negotiations are still pending, he will give
“ Colonel Campbell, who has already received the
“ instructions now known to him, such support as
“ lies within his power.

“ It is hoped that the moral influence of Great
“ Britain and of her allies and knowledge of the fact
“ that the Great Powers will not permit the dismember-
“ ment of the Ottoman Empire, will suffice to induce
“ Muhammad Ali to accept reasonable terms. Should,
“ however, negotiations not be finished, the Admiral
“ is authorized to prevent all communication by sea
“ with Ibrahim’s army until such time as a satisfactory
“ agreement may be effected. And the Admiral will
“ also prevent the departure from Alexandria of
“ Egyptian men-of-war and of all vessels floating the
“ Egyptian flag and carrying troops or munitions of
“ war ”.¹

On 7 May 1833 Boghos Yousouroff replied :

“ My Master, His Highness the Viceroy, has seen
“ the translation of your instructions and has taken
“ cognizance of their purport. These instructions
“ deal with a closed chapter of Egyptian history and
“ it is thus not necessary to discuss them. The
“ Sublime Porte has ceded the Pashalik of Syria and
“ its dependencies. Firmans have been received
“ confirming this cession.”²

It seems impossible to understand why the British Consul-General had this conversation of 5 May with Muhammad Ali’s Foreign Minister. There can be

¹ Transcript Records of Diplomatic Documents concerning the Affairs of Egypt, year 1833, National Library, Cairo, Document No. 39.

² *Ibid.*, Document No. 41.

no doubt in regard to the accuracy of the date cited, for the original text of the *note verbale*, not a printed copy, is before us as we write these lines. We know, however, that Boislécomte reached Alexandria on 29 April 1833, and that cannon were then booming announcing the ratification of the terms of peace.¹ Sabry, whose statements of fact are uniformly accurate, says that Constantinople did not agree officially to these conditions until 4 May. Count von Prokesch-Osten, whom Metternich sent to Alexandria to bring pressure to bear on Muhammad Ali, reached Alexandria on 3 April 1833.²

It is quite probable that Consul-General Campbell had given the Pasha unofficial information about the nature of his instructions and that the arrival of the Austrian envoy brought about the submission of the official memorandum. The roar of guns means nothing to a diplomatic officer. He refused to admit that the war had ended until he had proof in black and white. He knew that British pressure had brought Muhammad Ali into line. He was determined that the Austrians should not be allowed to make political capital out of the peace terms. This explanation of the date tangle is offered for what it may be worth. One fact, anyway, is certain—it is that it was not the persuasive plea of de Varennes which brought Ibrahim into line. It was not until 30 April that Roussin's emissary left Constantinople for the General's headquarters,³ and the boom of cannon goes back to 29 April 1833.

If the diplomats of the Near East manœuvred for the laurels which belong to the peacemaker, the Treaty which their labours produced pleased nobody. The Sultan had suffered the ignominy of defeat by an obstreperous vassal. Muhammad Ali had secured

¹ Douin, *Boislécomte*, p. 1.

² *Mehmed-Ali Vize-Koenig von Aegypten aus meinem Tagebuche*, von Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, Wien, 1877, p. 39.

³ Douin, *Boislécomte*, p. xlix.

neither independence (to which Ibrahim aspired) nor the recognition of his right to transfer his Pashalik to his heirs. He had not even established a controlling interest at Constantinople. Russia felt aggrieved because the Tsar had not been able to consolidate his position at the Sublime Porte. The Western Powers were annoyed at the preponderance in Ottoman affairs acquired by St. Petersburg. Notwithstanding all its imperfections the Treaty of Kutakia was largely a moral victory for Muhammad Ali. Sabry thus sums up its meaning :

“ All the advantages of the peace of Kutakia were
“ due principally to the policy of Ibrahim, who made
“ the fate of Constantinople tremble in the balance
“ and who forced the Sultan to bow his head before
“ his vassal. But the peace was not worthy of the
“ victory. It had no element of stability ”.¹

The praise which this distinguished Egyptian writer showers upon Ibrahim does not meet with the approval of Athanase Politis, the brilliant young Greek diplomat who is now gaining an enviable reputation as an historian. M. Politis takes the position that the General overreached himself and showed bad judgment in giving an international aspect to what might well have remained a purely internal Ottoman question. The hundred odd pages which are presented as an Introduction to his *Le Conflit Turco-Egyptien de 1838-1841* are masterly. They give an unequalled summary of the political history of Egypt from the advent of Muhammad Ali to the end of his reign. We there read :

“ If the conflict between the Sultan and his powerful
“ vassal had been confined to the possession of Syria,
“ it would have had a purely national aspect. It bore
“ upon no major interest of any Power and therefore
“ none would have interfered in a purely local struggle.

“ If, therefore, Muhammad Ali had not then

¹ Sabry, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

“ passed the limits of Syria, it is very probable that no
 “ European intervention would have taken place and
 “ that the Porte would have, sooner or later, conferred
 “ its administration on him ”.¹ And again :

“ We admire Ibrahim’s energy and his spirit of
 “ decision. They are admirable qualities in the
 “ conduct of a war, but we think that the better
 “ political judgment would have been to obviate at all
 “ costs the intervention of the Powers. The advance
 “ upon Constantinople was bound to bring about that
 “ eventuality ”.²

Ibrahim was a lion, Muhammad Ali a fox. Boislécomte also prefers the fox to the lion, for he writes :

“ If Ibrahim had been in his father’s place it is
 “ doubtful whether he would have accomplished the
 “ great work which Muhammad Ali wrought. He
 “ had not the genius to create an Empire, but he had
 “ the qualities which support a throne ”.³ We shall
 not pursue this controverted question any further.

Whatever were Ibrahim’s abilities or shortcomings, he knew as well as anyone that the Treaty of Kutakia was only a truce. Nevertheless, he set to work to govern Syria not as occupied territory but as if it had been permanently annexed to Egypt. The British Vice-Consul stationed at Jaffa reported to his Consul-General, on 16 February 1834, that “ the attitude of
 “ the Government towards the inhabitants is both
 “ friendly and humane ”. The dispatch is written in French. The words used are *doux et humain*.⁴ The French reports from Boislécomte are in the same sense. He stresses the fact that :

“ Ibrahim in entering Syria proclaimed everywhere
 “ the principle of religious liberty and of the equality
 “ of all creeds. He caused public criers to announce

¹ Politis, *op. cit.*, p. xvi.

² *Ibid.*, p. xix.

³ Douin, *Boislécomte*, p. 247.

⁴ Transcript Records, etc., year 1834, Document No. 1.

“in the streets that equal justice would be administered to all alike, regardless of faith, and that an injustice done to a Christian would be as severely punished as an injustice to a Muslim”.¹

Boislécomte also advised the Quai d'Orsay that Ibrahim's policy was to govern the country through the medium of the local authorities. We shall deal later with the measure of success which attended his efforts. We prefer, for the moment, to refer to the fact that the French foreign service officer reported that whatever may be said about the General's cruelty in former wars,

“the last campaign brought out a rare spectacle, rare for an European army and very exceptional for a Muhammadan army: I have in mind the circumstance that he maintained perfect discipline over his troops in their relations with the civil population and ordered that they pay for everything consumed by them on their march”.²

Ibrahim was essentially a farmer. Agriculture appealed to him. He sought to introduce new vegetation into Syria. We have already quoted what Dr. Yates had to say about how he mingled with his men. Boislécomte tells us specifically that he applied in his army the European principle which prohibited officers from arbitrarily punishing their men. Boislécomte was born a Baron and became a Count. He did not entirely approve of Ibrahim's democratic principles, for he observed:

“Ibrahim became so familiar with his men that, always living among them, even playing with them and continually praising the nation from which they sprang, they came to look upon him as a bulwark against their officers and carried matters so far that they were known to refuse to execute orders and to say that they would appeal to Ibrahim”.³

¹ Douin, *Boislécomte*, p. 205.

² *Ibid.*, p. 249.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

No man could conduct troops to victory as often and as irresistibly as Ibrahim did, if he were not a disciplinarian. Boislécomte's statement is disproved by the General's record. The diplomat was a Bourbon of the Bourbons. He had to retire from the French foreign service because he refused to serve under the Second Republic. He even objected to Louis Philippe. He found that monarch too "bourgeois" for his autocratic tastes.¹

The measure of success which attended Ibrahim's leadership as a soldier is exemplified by Cervantes' dictum. His achievements as a civil governor are brought out by an official document entitled : *Notes on the Commercial, Agricultural and Political State of Syria*—15 April 1834, submitted to the British Consulate-General. The document is fairly long. This excerpt may well be quoted :

"The principal Turks in Syria, who under the former Government were specially protected at the expense of the people over whom they had exercised every kind of exaction, have now lost that power and are necessarily inimical to Ibrahim Pasha, who will not permit them to oppress the people of the country and who has deprived them of many improper privileges which they formerly enjoyed.

"The Pasha has directed that a pension be given to such of them as have been deprived of a situation which they formerly held."

These "notes" conclude by this general analysis of the situation :

"There is not, therefore, any fair cause of complaint at present existing against the Government of Syria, but it is certain that there are two classes of people who are not content with Ibrahim Pasha. The one consists of those who had power or place under the former Pasha and who are not numerous and chiefly reside in the large towns. The other consists

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxxvii.

“ of the idle and disorderly, principally in Damascus and Aleppo, but from all I can learn the people of the country generally are satisfied.

“ Projects are in agitation for new roads and for the best means of facilitating communications in Syria, and English miners are now employed by the Pasha to report if there are any mines of metals or of coal in that country ”.¹

Another observer reported to the British Consul-General :

“ The whole of the interest of this country is vested in Ibrahim Pasha’s Government. I have spoken for some hours with him. I find him even more interesting than his father—frank, honest, but resolute, and even more eager to do good to this people. His soldiers are in excellent order. There are about 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry with 12 batteries of field pieces. The people fear them, yet they behave themselves in general very well ”.²

It may not be amiss to complete this general survey of Ibrahim’s government by some details of his personal appearance at that time. Several writers have said that he did not care about his attire and that he was careless about his appearance. This hardly dovetails with what Boislécomte has written. He remarks that Ibrahim’s teeth were remarkably beautiful. For a French diplomat, writing in 1834, to have put this detail into an official report and to have said nothing about Ibrahim’s dress not only emphasizes the beauty of his teeth but tells the reader that there was nothing flamboyant about the way in which he wore his clothes. Boislécomte’s powers of observation are attested by the circumstance that he says that “ Ibrahim’s arms are very short ”.³

In these twentieth-century days, when daughters act as the censors of the books which their mothers

¹ Transcript Records, etc., year 1834, Document No. 26.

² *Ibid.*, Document No. 24.

³ Douin, *Boislécomte*, p. 244.

may be permitted to read and when the word "respect" is deleted from the vocabulary of the young, it may be of interest to learn that Ibrahim was so punctiliously courteous to his father that he never lounged and never thought of smoking when in the Pasha's presence.¹ Boislécomte was convinced that the people of Anatolia unanimously desired to see this respectful son made Sultan of Constantinople. Ibrahim knew of the movement, but it meant absolutely nothing to him. If he sought to capitalise his popularity, it was merely in order that he might better serve his father. One of his favourite expressions was : "the same will which rules at Cairo should rule at Constantinople".²

While Ibrahim was doing his utmost to bring order out of chaos, the Russians were intriguing against him. They began their work before the ink was dry upon the Treaty of Kutakia. As early as 15 July 1833, the British Ambassador at Constantinople felt constrained to address a personal note to Colonel Campbell dealing with the situation created by this breach of faith. The letter is marked "private" and is in Lord Ponsonby's own handwriting. It took him seven pages of notepaper to deliver his message.

Its importance is accentuated not only by the word "private" but by its opening sentence, which reads :
"I am about to make a communication to you in
"the use of which I must particularly request you to
"act with the most extreme caution and prudence,
"bearing always in mind, in the first place, that what
"I tell you may be *erroneous*, and in the second that,
"if it be correct, there is the most pressing necessity
"for such a management of what may be done as shall
"not tend to favouring the game of our adversaries".

Having put the Consul-General's curiosity on tip-toe the Ambassador added :

"What I have to tell you is, that there are grounds

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

² *Ibid.*, p. 292.

“ to fear that the Russians have set or have encouraged
“ the Sultan to meditate the attack upon Mehemet Ali
“ of which I before spoke to you. The power of
“ the Sultan to attack Mehemet is nil, except if he
“ obtains it from Russia, but it may well be the policy
“ of St. Petersburg to excite him to attack now that,
“ under the new Treaty, the Russians have the right
“ to aid the Sultan against all his enemies ”.¹

¹ Transcript Records, etc., year 1833, Document No. 98.

CHAPTER XV

UNKIAR-SKELESSI

SEVERAL weeks before the Treaty of Kutakia was signed Count Orloff was commissioned by his Imperial Master, the Tsar of all the Russias, to hasten to Constantinople. He was sent on a special mission. Its scope is shown by his title, which was : "Ambassador Extraordinary and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces in the Ottoman Empire".¹ He made his solemn entry into the Turkish capital on 6 May 1833. The fact that Mahmud and Muhammad Ali had then adjusted their differences did not interfere with the splendour and solemnity of his arrival. Indeed, it may have added to the glamour of the occasion.

It was not mere pomp and vainglory which inspired this ostentation. There was method in his madness. When Count Orloff ascertained that the Treaty of Peace had been signed, he had to set up a pretext to justify his presence at Constantinople. He therefore hastened to explain that his sojourn on the banks of the Bosphorus was but "an explicit sign of that perfect harmony which reigns between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia".² He then lingered in order to facilitate the evacuation of the Imperial forces. His presence irritated the irascible Roussin, and its meaning was commented upon in dispatches sent to London by the placid Ponsonby. They soon ascertained the true significance of all this Russian subtlety.

¹ *La Question d'Egypte*, par C. de Freycinet, Paris, Calmann-Levy, s.d., p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

They learnt that on 8 July 1833 a Treaty had been signed by Orloff and the *Reis Effendi* which said, in its Article III :

“ In view of his sincere desire to maintain the complete independence of the Sublime Porte, should circumstances again constrain the Sublime Porte to claim the moral assistance and military aid of Russia—although this contingency, may it please God, is in no sense foreseen—His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises to furnish by land and water whatever forces the two contracting parties may deem necessary ”.

A secret clause annexed to this agreement bound Turkey to close the Dardanelles against the ships of all nations, should Russia become involved in a foreign war.

When Roussin heard of this pact he became so incensed that, according to M. de Freycinet, who, it will be remembered, was the Prime Minister of France when England occupied Egypt in 1882, “ he desired to advise the Porte that if it adhered to the Treaty such action would provoke the decided hostility of France. But ”, continues the same author, “ the British Ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, while sharing Roussin’s sentiments, refused to take such a step ”.¹

We shall not pursue this subject any further, because Ibrahim took no part in the discussions which were brought about by this Convention. But it was to this Treaty that reference was made in the confidential letter addressed by Lord Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell and quoted at the end of the preceding chapter. The Russian interference in Syrian affairs brought out in the British Ambassador’s note assumed a most insidious form. It took the shape of inciting both the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim inhabitants of Syria to revolt. The Tsar’s agents obviously

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

did not deal with the Muhammadan intrigue. They left that to the Turks.

We already know that as late as 15 April 1833 the Alexandria British Consulate-General was advised that "there is not any fair cause of complaint at present existing against the Government of Syria". We have also not forgotten that religious equality was the watchword of Ibrahim's administration. It was this liberalism that the Tsar's agents and the Turkish malcontents used as the most facile means of stirring up unrest.

Why Muslim reactionaries should have objected to Ibrahim's liberalism is self evident. It meant the death-knell of obscurantist intolerance. It is by no means clear, however, why a Christian sect should have adopted the same tactics.

Islam, in many respects one of the most liberal of religions, observes segregation as its cardinal principle. It divides the world into sheep and goats. True Believers, the followers of the Prophet, are the sheep; the rest of mankind makes up the goats. There are at least two kinds of goats—those who have a Book—Christians and Jews—and those who are not so blessed, and who thus constitute the residuum of the human race. The Quran, speaking of the latter category, lays down this rule:

"O Prophet! contend against the infidels and the hypocrites and be rigorous with them: Hell shall be their dwelling-place! Wretched the journey thither".¹

This precept is not lacking in clearness. Taken in connection with another which reads:

"Fight then against them till strife be at an end and the religion be all of it God's",² it means that those who have no book must embrace Islam or die. But Muhammad was a Liberal and a Progressive—

¹ Sura ix, "Immunity," 74.

² Sura, xcv, "Immunity," 40.

we mean, of course, a Liberal and a Progressive of the seventh century of the Christian era. So he ordained that his followers should :

"make war upon such of those to whom the Scriptures have been given as believe not in God, or in the last day, and who forbid not that which God and His Apostle have forbidden and who profess not the profession of the truth until they pay tribute out of hand, and they be humbled".¹ The Prophet also said :

"Observe, therefore, engagement with them (the people of the book) through the whole of their treaty, for God loveth those who fear him".²

The lesson which flows from these two last texts is that while Christendom recognised as late as 1555, when the Treaty of Augsburg ended the Thirty Years' War, the absolute right of the State to determine the religion professed by its inhabitants, and merely tempered this rule by allowing the dissatisfied to emigrate,³ Muhammadanism as early as 623 laid down the principle that "those to whom the Scriptures have been given" may adhere to their faith provided "they pay tribute out of hand and they be humbled".

The result of this rule was that Christians and Jews were not molested. Their churches and synagogues were not destroyed. All that they had to do was to pay a special tax and be humble. As the Bible says "Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land", and they capitalised their humility and grew wealthy because they were meek. This is no exaggeration. The "True Believers" would not allow them to bear arms. They were exempted from military service. They were made to stay at home, look after their flocks, attend to their business and permitted to worship at the shrine of their forebears.

¹ Sura, ix., "Immunity," 29.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

³ *Lectures on Modern History*, by John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, first Baron Acton, London, Macmillan, 1920, p. 127.

In the Orient the "sheep" became the military caste and the "goats" the men behind the lines, the war profiteers who acquired great wealth and paid out a bare modicum of their war profits in the shape of special taxes. When Ibrahim established his principle of religious equality and of equality before the law, it carried with it, for the people of the Book, exemption from special taxes. The necessary corollary was eventual amenability to military service.

Christians and Jews did not fear this change. The law always contemplated exemptions, and they were able to pay for such immunity. What cut them to the quick was that equality meant sooner or later the end of their trade monopoly. They willingly accepted exemption from special taxes, but objected to its counterpart. They had been war profiteers for twelve centuries. They became dissatisfied because their vested right ran counter to the tenets of fundamental fair play put into practice by Ibrahim.

Europe's approach to this question was very unfair to Ibrahim. We do not suggest that the Occident meant to be unfair, but we insist that it was unfair in fact. It applauded the principle of equality before the law. Its attitude was defined by Lord Palmerston when he announced :

"Europe has a right to hope that the Christian ' subjects of the Porte which the Sultan has placed for ' the present under the administration of Muhammad ' Ali shall be exempted from that new conscription ' with which the Pasha thinks proper to harass and ' afflict the Muhammadan population whose interests ' and welfare have been committed to his keeping ".

In other words, the British Foreign Minister saw no objection to the principle of conscription, and does not appear to have criticised the proclamation of equality before the law. What he seems to have desired was that the Christians should be allowed "to have their cake and eat it too". This was pre-

cisely what Ibrahim permitted them to do, for Colonel Campbell, the British Consul-General at Alexandria, replied to the strictures contained in Lord Palmerston's remarks that :

" he had recently made a tour in Syria (1835) where
" he had seen pilgrims with a cross tattooed on their
" arms, and he had learnt from them it was a common
" custom, which not only distinguished them from
" Muslims but also freed them from the fear of
" compulsory enrolment ".¹

Many of the Christians of Syria had grown so prosperous under the old system of paying tribute out of hand and of being humbled that it suited their plans to assail Ibrahim. To attack the sacrosanctity of monopoly, the inviolability of vested rights, and the impregnability of caste is to court trouble. The inevitable soon happened. Disaffection became unrest and unrest revolution. But largely because the Orthodox or Schismatic Christians opposed Ibrahim, the Catholic or Maronite Syrians supported him. There are no Irish in Syria, but the same spirit which prompts Ulstermen and Irish Catholics to take opposing views of almost every conceivable question, except an ingrained love for a fight, caused the two Syrian Christian groups to assume antagonistic positions. And the Druses² are always at daggers drawn with the Maronites. Almost automatically, they found their way into the anti-Ibrahim party.

The opposition of the Druses was nearly a fatal consequence of the support given to the new Government by the Maronites. We take it for granted that Ibrahim foresaw this and accepted it as inevitable. What he did not appreciate was the fact that the enmity of the Druses brought into the camp of his adversaries Lady Hester Lucy Stanhope, the niece of

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

² Druses are neither Christians, Muslims or Jews. They believe that Hakim, a Caliph of the Fatimite Egyptian dynasty, was the last and greatest personification of the divinity on earth.

William Pitt, and granddaughter of the first Lord Chatham. She was a very remarkable woman. She had sat at the head of Pitt's table and had assisted in welcoming his guests, gracing the board with her stately beauty and enlivening the company by her quickness and keenness of wit. On her uncle's death she lived in Montagu Square, London, but life in England without the interest caused by associating with the principal politicians of the Tory party proved irksome to her, and, after seeking relief from lassitude in the fastnesses of Wales, and travelling far and wide, the Near East beckoned to her and she settled among the Druses of Mount Lebanon.

In this new abode she wielded an almost absolute authority. Her jurisdiction extended to the surrounding districts. Ibrahim solicited her neutrality, but she was not a woman who thought in terms of neutrality. She believed in the Biblical maxim : "He that is not with me is against me". She became a bitter critic of Egyptian rule. Her attacks carried great weight, not only because her name and character lent influence to what she said, but also because the word "compromise" was deleted from her vocabulary. Absolutely sincere, she was, we fear, as partisan as she was high-minded.

The files of the British Consulate-General contain a petition which was filed against her by two Syrians whose names savour of a Maronite origin, though we advance this deduction with a certain hesitance. The document is so typical of the Levant, and throws such a sidelight on what we may call the "backstair" politics of those days, that we are tempted to quote from it. It is written in English, signed by Gabriel and Francis Homsy, and reads :

"The undersigned, Your Highness's very humble
"petitioners, having lent to Lady Esther Stanhope
"(*sic*) a British subject residing in Syria, in the
"neighbourhood of Saida, the sum of five thousand

" three hundred effective dollars, on condition that
" such sum should be reimbursed within three months
" by bills, as the whole is proved by a document in her
" own handwriting in the possession of petitioners,
" who have now experienced a delay of nine years
" without obtaining from Lady Esther anything but
" vain promises . . . they throw themselves at your
" Highness's feet, begging that, in your justice, you
" will invite the British Mission in this country to
" examine this affair, and when proved to be such as
" above that the necessary steps will be taken to compel
" Lady Esther to the payment of the above sum ".¹

There was nothing petty or mean about either Muhammad Ali or Ibrahim. They were what the French call "*grands seigneurs*". But the petition is just such a document as Syrian moneylenders would delight in bringing forward in the vain hope of currying favour with the powers that be. We do not know what was the eventual outcome of this demand. All that we can affirm is that the *Encyclopædia Britannica* says that "Lady Hester Stanhope possessed great business talents, and when Pitt was out of office she "acted as his private secretary". Parliament granted her a life pension of £1,200. She thus had a competence, and if she "possessed great business talents", she had no need to borrow money.

Dodwell's *The Founder of Modern Egypt* recounts an incident which tells how Turkish agents were able to excite the Muhammadan Syrians to oppose Ibrahim. All religions have their zealots, men who live clean lives, who are sincerely attached to the tenets of their faith, and are unable to see their neighbour's point of view. However liberal Muhammad may have been, there are among his followers adherents of irreproachable character who wear intellectual blinkers. One of these irreconcilables mounted the minaret of

¹ Transcript of Records of Diplomatic Documents concerning the Affairs of Egypt, year 1834, National Library, Cairo, Document No. 79.

Nablus mosque one Friday noon in 1834 and cried aloud :

“ Does the Muslim religion exist no longer ?
“ Is it dead ? Are we not Turks ? Let every man
“ who loves the Prophet take up arms against that
“ man without faith, the Giaour, Ibrahim Pasha !
“ that drunkard who always drinks spirits and wine,
“ who eats pork and every dirt that comes from the
“ sea (alluding to Ibrahim Pasha’s eating turtle and
“ other sea-fish forbidden by the Muhammadan
“ religion) the same as the Christians do, who lives in
“ the convents with the priests and prays with them,
“ and never goes to the mosque ”.¹

We have not found any proof of this statement that Ibrahim ate pork. Many a Muhammadan who now drinks wine will firmly refuse to touch any form of hog meat. Others compromise on ham, but few will add bacon to their list. In the absence of any evidence we are inclined to doubt if he had ever partaken of ham, much less of pork, or, at all events, made a custom of having it on his table. The charge of being a drunkard was made with equal levity. The Orthodox Muhammadan is just as fanatical about the consumption of alcoholic beverages as the rural Methodist or Baptist is—or rather was. Just as the Nonconformist considers—or rather considered—adultery and alcohol as being convertible terms and the sipping of a vintage wine as being on a moral par with gulping down a gallon of whisky, so did this Muslim enthusiast call Ibrahim a drunkard because the General was not a total abstainer.

With Christians opposed, for reasons of their own, to Ibrahim, and Muslims antagonistic to him, the scene was set for a good fight. Able as he was to crush any rising in the main towns, he was too politic not to avert the danger which would arise from the existence of a focus of disorder at Aleppo, a short

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

distance from the Taurus. He arranged with one of the local chiefs to maintain order in that region. He made other alliances with other leaders, and after some little trouble succeeded in establishing the rule of law. But the Sultan was bent on making trouble, and a foreign war, not merely internal unrest, soon occupied his attention.

Mahmud had attempted in May 1834 to take advantage of the Syrian revolt in order to regain his lost territories.¹ His Grand Vizir, Reshid Mehmed Pasha, the Turkish officer whom Ibrahim had captured in the battle of Konia, was then at Sivas near the new frontier. The pretext for his presence there was the chronic disaffection of the Kurds. The Sultan felt that the troubles in Syria afforded an ideal opportunity to throw this army into the territory ceded to Muhammad Ali. Both Ponsonby and Roussin knew that if this were done, Ibrahim would not only annihilate the Ottoman force but would again menace Constantinople. It was, therefore, not because "they loved Cæsar less but Rome more" that they intervened at the Sublime Porte to save for Turkey the city of the Cæsars.

This enmity of Mahmud and the patronizing attitude of the Powers aggravated Muhammad Ali. He took up the matter with Ibrahim in a letter dated 24 August 1834. He reviewed therein the general situation, pointing out the Sultan's abortive attempt to bring on a new war, and ended: "We hope to be able, in convincing Europe of the bad faith and provocative conduct of the Sublime Porte, to rid ourselves of this chain of servitude which we now wear round our neck".²

Muhammad Ali adopted this tone because his entourage had become predominantly hostile to the terms of the Kutakia Treaty. Nobody came out and

¹ Cattai, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 130.

² Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Turkish Section.

criticised the Pasha. Courtiers, in those days, did not find it conducive to longevity to tell an Oriental prince that he had made an egregious blunder. But there are a thousand and one ways of driving home a message without dotting i's and crossing t's. Muhammad Ali's magnanimity was emphasized. The bigness of heart which prompted him to renounce the fruit of victory was stressed. He was told repeatedly that Mahmud should be grateful because Egypt had, of its motion, given up the independence which was within its grasp.¹

If such tactics and Mahmud's stupidity were necessary to cause Muhammad Ali to write this letter of 24 August 1834, no such pressure dictated Ibrahim's reply. It was dated 3 September 1834. It said, in part,

"You write that we should now rid ourselves of this chain of servitude which we wear round our neck, and that it would be proper for us to transfer it to those at Constantinople. May I be permitted to say that when, during the recent war, I suggested to you that we deliberately reject this chain of vassalage, you answered that it sufficed for you to be Muhammad Ali. If you now think that the time has come to break this chain, I am afraid that I cannot agree with you. It will not be easy to break it. It will be difficult to do so, for the Turks have brave soldiers, men who are as brave as ours. And besides, if their fleet gets into action, an attack on our coast will do more harm to you than to me".²

While this language is clear-cut and to the point, its tone is respectful. The excerpt which has been quoted is detached from a fairly long letter. The original Turkish text of the entire reply leaves no doubt in regard to the filial devotion of Ibrahim.

¹ Douin, *La Première Guerre de Syrie*, Le Caire, Société Royale de Géographie d'Egypte, vol. II, p. 289.

² Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Turkish Section.

Nevertheless, he was discussing a political question pregnant with great possibilities, and his love for his father was too great for him to allow the slightest ambiguity to creep into the expression of his opinion. We have not Muhammad Ali's answer. We have, however, another letter from Ibrahim dated 27 September 1834, which permits us to reconstruct the missing evidence. But we shall confine ourselves to quoting from the note which we have before us. It says :

" You write that I have misinterpreted your letter, " that you said that we should cast off the chain of " servitude and that you did not add that we should " attempt to transfer the chain to the neck of the " Turks. I fully understood your meaning. You " did not say that we should attempt to transfer the " chain to the neck of the Turks. I put these words " into your mouth. Let me tell you why I did so.

" The Ottoman Empire claims to be the seat of " the Khalifate, and bases its claim upon the fact that " it possesses the two holy cities of Islam, the " *Harramein*. But we know that it is Egypt which " holds the *Harramein* because it rules the Hedjaz. " If, therefore, we become independent, the argument " of the Sublime Porte will cease to have any weight, " because it will be impossible for the Imam to " proclaim in the Mosques that the Sultan is the " servant of the *Harramein*, because everybody will " know that the Hedjaz and the Holy Places are under " Egyptian domination. This means that the chain " of vassalage will then be on the neck of the Turks ".¹

Further correspondence passed between father and son. Ibrahim continued to maintain that it was now too late to attack the Sultan. His letters reveal that he had become extremely circumspect. The lion in him was replaced by the fox formerly so manifest in Muhammad Ali. He became canny when the Pasha

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Turkish Section.

preferred daring to astuteness. Fearful lest his father might resent his insistence upon the points already made in his letters, he added :

"My only reason for thus reviewing the past is "that we may take no decision without fully appreciating and weighing the consequences which our "acts may entail".¹

Ibrahim was forty-five years of age when the metamorphosis of his character thrust itself to the fore. It is this continuous widening of his mental horizon which is one of his most striking characteristics. He began life as a relentless *Defterdar*, and we have seen that his administration of Syria made equality of taxation its dominant note. He knew nothing of modern military tactics when he won fame in the Hedjaz. He was big enough to see that the world had outgrown the type of warfare which had proved to be successful in dealing with the Wahabis, and he set to work to master every detail of European strategy. He proposed a clear-cut line of conduct in dealing with Turkey. He adhered to the policy which he then advocated so strongly, but he had the moral courage to admit that whether he was right or wrong when at Kutakia, recent developments made it necessary for him to shift his position.

It was not merely the insistence upon his generosity to a defeated foe which his entourage had brought so constantly to the fore, that had converted the cautious Muhammad Ali into a somewhat truculent leader. There are always wheels within wheels in the mechanism of European politics. Lord Palmerston looked upon him as "an occupier of the road to India"², and therefore cordially disliked him. Louis Philippe may have created the expression "Entente Cordiale" to describe the friendship which shortly after this marked the relations between Paris and

¹ Royal Egyptian Archives, Abdine Palace, Turkish Section.

² *Palmerston*, by Philip Guedalla, London, Ernest Benn Limited, s.d., p. 175.

London, but the very fact that the British Foreign Secretary evinced a personal dislike for Muhammad Ali at this time inspired the bourgeois monarch to give his heart to the Pasha. And because the Tsar of Russia and the Emperor of Austria were fast friends, it would seem that the support given by Nicholas to the Sultan caused Metternich to pat Muhammad Ali at the back.

Metternich and Louis Philippe did not strike the same note when they attuned their lyres to the praise of the Pasha. The Austrian used Count Prokesch-Osten as his mouthpiece and made him accentuate the glorious destiny of an Arab Empire. The French sovereign caused Mimaut to expatiate upon the magical influence of independence. He may, perhaps, have been sincere in all this. We know that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was not an essential element in the foreign policy of France. The Bourbons had attacked Algiers, and the Louis Philippe régime had taken kindly to that dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. France had provided officers for the Egyptian army and navy, and the experts who managed the Alexandria dockyards and arsenals were French. Paris looked upon the independence of Egypt as a fact which required nothing but legal recognition to make it incontestable. It therefore devoted its efforts to reconciling the Sultan to this proposition. "To France belongs the duty of uniting the two halves of the Empire" is how Mimaut describes the orientation of his policy.

During those months when Muhammad Ali was thus being conducted into new spheres of intellectual activity, Ibrahim was not only looking after the civil administration of Syria but also preparing for trouble with Turkey. He established his army headquarters at Antioch. When he first selected St. Peter's old episcopal see as his base, that city was surrounded by interesting old battlements. Its citadel was part of

the living rock and its walls a triumph of the engineering skill of a past age. Such archæological treasures meant nothing to him. His troops needed barracks. To import building material would have meant a heavy outlay of cash. He therefore used these antiquated fortifications as his stone quarries.

Matters drifted along month after month without a collision between the Turks and the Egyptians. For a while it looked as if the outposts were not destined to clash. But the inevitable happened on 23 April 1839, when the Ottoman commander, accompanied by his Prussian staff, crossed the frontier and approached an Egyptian brigade. Helmuth von Moltke, who was destined to win immortality at Sedan, was in this contingent. Ibrahim did not fail to grasp the meaning of this challenge, but he let higher politics control his strategy. He knew that if he pressed forward and accepted the défi, it meant the reopening of hostilities. He considered that it behoved his father, not himself, to take this momentous decision. He therefore hurried messengers to advise the Pasha of what had taken place. Without awaiting their return he gave orders to his corps commanders to hold themselves in readiness for immediate action. And then he sent for the notables of the vicinage, told them of what was likely to happen, and that he needed their friendly co-operation.

As soon as Ibrahim's messengers reached Muhammad Ali, the Pasha gave orders that his Minister of War, Ahmed Pasha, should leave at once for the front. This decision caused the French Consul to protest that if the Minister of War were to join Ibrahim, hostilities would be unavoidable. The Pasha did not reply to this outburst. The Frenchman then returned to the charge and said :

"Your Highness will be responsible for the war, "if you allow Ahmed Pasha to join Ibrahim. I "guarantee that the Sultan wants peace and that "France wants peace".

"Not only shall I keep Ahmed Pasha here in Cairo, but I shall at once recall Ibrahim and his army, if you can guarantee me that the Turks will not advance", was the immediate retort. The Consul was elated when he heard this, and at once produced a letter from Roussin, the hotheaded Ambassador, which said that he had obtained the Sultan's word that the Sublime Porte wanted peace. The letter from the sailor diplomatist concluded in these words: "France has spoken. Her counsels have been followed. Give the widest publicity to my dispatch".

Muhammad Ali had a good memory and a quick mind. Roussin was not unknown to him. He did not question the good faith of the Consul or the sincerity of the Ambassador who had served his apprenticeship on the bridge of a ship. He merely turned to the Austrian Consul, who was present, and said: "Do your letters give you similar guarantees of peace and can you, too, give me like assurances?" The answer was in the negative. Muhammad Ali did not hesitate. "Gentlemen", he said, "I know what is going on in Constantinople. Elementary prudence forces my hand. I must give Ahmed Pasha orders to leave at once". These orders were given then and there.¹

¹ *Soliman Pacha*, par Aimé Vingtrinier, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1886, p. 296.

CHAPTER XVI

NEZIB

THE Minister for War hurried to Ibrahim's headquarters. He had a long route before him, and could not travel as fast as a courier. A messenger, therefore, preceded him, who brought Muhammad Ali's orders to his son. We have not seen the text of these instructions, but we are able to surmise their import. We say this because as late as June 1839 plenary authority was given Ibrahim to do whatever he thought proper and either to begin war or to preserve the peace as circumstances should warrant.¹

When these discretionary powers were given to Ibrahim, Muhammad Ali knew that his son would not attack unless forced to do so. A virtual state of war on land and sea had existed between Turkey and Egypt since March 1839 ; at all events, the Greek Consul-General stationed at Cairo so reported to his Government on 26 March.² It was Ibrahim's self-restraint which had prevented the simulacrum of peace giving way to the reality of open hostilities. The attitude of the Turks was so provocative that on 17 June the Greek Foreign Office was advised by its Alexandria representative that :

“ the news received from the zone where the two
“ armies are now camping is to the effect that the
“ Sultan's troops continue to advance and encourage
“ the country people to revolt by furnishing them with
“ arms and making promises to them. One con-
“ tingent of troops, made up of about 800 cavalrymen

¹ *Politis op. cit.*, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

‘commanded by Soliman Marash Pasha, penetrated
‘as far as Aintab. They took possession of that town,
‘but its fortress still remains in the hands of the
‘Egyptians. It is said that the Turkish Commander-
‘in-Chief, Hafez Pasha, was with this force, but
‘he did not go with it as far as Aintab. The Sultan’s
‘troops, taking advantage of the inaction of the
‘Egyptian army—inaction due to the orders sent to
‘Ibrahim Pasha by the Viceroy and dictated by the
‘threats of the European Powers and their exhorta-
‘tions not to be the first to open fire—have advanced
‘considerably without there having been any engage-
‘ment other than between this cavalry detachment
‘and a small corps of Bedwins ”.¹

An earlier dispatch sent by the same Consul-General to his Government throws light on these threats of the European Powers. Michael Tossizza, the Greek who gave this information to Athens, was neither a professional diplomatist nor a sailor, but a merchant who had been established in Alexandria before the days of Greek independence. He won the esteem of Muhammad Ali and held it. When in 1833 Greece opened her first Consular office in Egypt he was put in charge of it. He did not at first send regular reports to his Foreign Office, and it was not until 1838 that he began to deal with political questions.² At no time did he acquire that special style so characteristic of “protocols and peppermints”, but always made his meaning perfectly clear. Writing from the vantage point of a Consular officer who possessed the incalculable asset of the personal friendship of Muhammad Ali, Tossizza reported to his Ministry on 23 July 1838 :

“The English diplomatic agent, Mr. Campbell,
“has officially advised the Viceroy that Great Britain
“entirely disapproves of his claims to independence

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. iii.

‘ and that he must remain just as he is, otherwise the
‘ four great Powers, England, France, Russia and
‘ Austria, acting in unison, will prevent his obtaining
‘ independence, if necessary by hostile action. These
‘ Powers have already concerted and have decided to
‘ increase the British and French fleets in the
‘ Mediterranean and even, if need be, to send Austrian
‘ troops to Syria. His Highness, it appears, will
‘ answer that if he is unable to obtain what he desires
‘ by conciliatory means he will be constrained to
‘ acquire it by other tactics, and that at all events it
‘ would be a great honour for him to be vanquished
‘ by the four Great Powers ”.¹

Another dispatch by Tossizza, dated 6 September 1838, brings Prussia into the combination. This is of interest because we already know that Helmuth von Moltke was then in the Ottoman army which was doing its utmost to provoke Ibrahim. Of course, von Moltke was at that time a relatively unknown man, and Prussia a secondary Power. But the alignment Austria, Russia, Prussia, savoured of the subsequent *Dreikaiserbund*, and accentuated the perils confronting Ibrahim’s army. The Consuls of these three nations told Muhammad Ali that they would not tolerate any change in the relationship between him and the Sublime Porte, and that, if he took any action, they would unite with Turkey to defeat him. He replied : “ I do not want war. I shall not make a “ hostile move ; but I desire independence, and I “ will not renounce this objective ”.²

Nevertheless, these warnings impressed Muhammad Ali. He felt that the best way to avoid disagreeable audiences so pregnant with dangerous possibilities was to leave for the South. There had been persistent rumours that gold in paying quantities had been discovered in the Sudan. He considered that it would

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

be well for him to have first-hand knowledge about this important matter. If Ibrahim should be compelled to march against the Turks this discovery would solve an important problem. And his absence would give the entire Turkish question a chance to settle down to something concrete. But even this temporary eclipse failed to break the solid diplomatic phalanx still opposed to Muhammad Ali when he returned on 15 March 1839.

All these facts, and the lessons which they taught were obviously known to Ibrahim. His father kept him fully posted. It was because he was so well informed and so impressed with the seriousness of the situation that he held back when the Turks nagged at him. They knew that they had the diplomatic support of Europe. It was this knowledge that made the Sublime Porte so persistently annoying in its tactics. The military leaders were goaded on by von Moltke, von Mulbach and the other Prussians, who, with that so typically German dogmatic self-confidence and cocksureness, kept urging Hafez Pasha to harass Ibrahim more and more.

The Turkish commander was perfectly willing to be persuaded by his Prussian staff. He was supremely confident of success, because he had a large army, an elaborate intelligence service, and, in his German aides, the nucleus of a good corps of officers. The fact that Ibrahim had not retaliated when attacked on 23 April encouraged him in his self-complacency. The capture of Aintab added to his ease of mind. The first doubt that beset him was caused by his interrogation of one of his prisoners. When Tel-Basher was taken on 3 June the Turks captured Ferdjan, the Chief of the Hanades Arabs, a magnificent specimen of manhood and as proud as he was statuesque. The Serasker questioned the prisoner, hoping to gain some valuable information from him. The man was obdurate, and replied : ' Why are you questioning

"me? You have my head. My tongue cannot save my head, but may do it harm, for if my tongue speaks my head may fall". "I'll not hurt a hair of your beard if you speak the truth", answered Hafez. "Swear on the Quran", retorted the prisoner, "that I may go forth safe and sound, and I'll tell you what you want".

Ferdjan then burst out laughing and said :

"You want me to tell the truth and tell you what I think of your camp and of Ibrahim's. You want to know what is going to happen. Who can tell what the future has in store for us? But if you insist upon being told the truth, I'll tell you. Ibrahim's camp is a camp of soldiers and your camp is a camp of pilgrims".

"What do you mean?" shouted the Turk. "I mean just what I have said", the Arab threw back at him. "Now listen to me. In Ibrahim's camp I saw stacks of arms and near these arms armed infantrymen; I saw cannon and near them artillerymen; I saw stables and near them cavalrymen. Everybody is at his post and everybody is ready. The same order does not reign in your camp. Here I see Jews, merchants, imams, men who come to lend money, men who come to sell and men who come to pray. That's why I say that your camp looks like a camp of pilgrims. You ask who will win. That I cannot say. God knows, and at the allotted time you will know."¹

Turks have their faults, but they are gentlemen. Hafez was both stunned and worried by this reply, but he kept his word, and released the candid Arab. Before he had recovered from his astonishment a letter was handed to him which Ibrahim had sent by a messenger. It was not brought under a flag of truce, because a state of war had not been officially declared. It bore the date of 8 June 1839 and read :

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 188.

“ The instructions sent by the great Powers to
“ their Consuls-General resident in Alexandria have
“ convinced me that they do not approve of war, and
“ I know that His Highness, my magnanimous master,
“ does not approve of it. Notwithstanding this
“ (1) Soliman Marash Pasha has dispatched a corps
“ to attack our troops at Boulanik ; (2) you have sent
“ a detachment to Payas in order to incite its inhabit-
“ ants against us ; (3) Hagi Omar Oglou has been
“ detailed to Kurd Dagħ for a like purpose ; (4) you
“ have invaded our territory and attacked our Hanades
“ Arabs ; and (5) you have distributed arms among
“ the natives of the province of Aintab, and Soliman
“ Marash Pasha entered the city of that name and is
“ still there. Yesterday Your Excellency led a
“ cavalry expedition into our lines and you had your
“ artillery direct its fire on our outposts at Hanades ”.

After having laid down these predicates, Ibrahim added :

“ I have until now tolerated all this without
“ retaliating because I have sought to persuade myself
“ that these hostilities are frowned upon by our
“ Supreme lord, the Sultan. If Your Excellency
“ attributes my inaction to fear, he is mistaken. My
“ inaction is due to but one cause, and that is my desire
“ to respect the wishes of His Highness, my father
“ and august master. If Your Excellency has instruc-
“ tions to begin hostilities, why do you act in this
“ manner, why do you intrigue ? Come on, but come
“ on openly and let the war be conducted as a war
“ should be. Your Excellency knows what took place
“ a few years ago and that you are dealing with men
“ who know nought of fear. We cannot allow these
“ intrigues to go on indefinitely. May I have the
“ honour of a frank reply ? The bearer, Colonel
“ Mahmud Bey, will, if you desire, bring back your
“ answer to me ”.¹

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 193.

Hafez Pasha received the Colonel and the major who accompanied him with great courtesy. He showered presents on them and told them that he would send a reply the next day. Its dominant note was that "submission is not a question of words but of acts". Starting from this point of view, Hafez Pasha refused to admit that Ibrahim's charges were well founded, and attempted to prove that the Egyptian, not the Imperial, troops were the aggressors. The concluding paragraph of the answer read :

"I take the liberty of writing you this friendly letter as an evidence of my good will. I am handing it to Colonel Azek Bey, who accompanies Ahmed Bey, one of the colonels of the victorious Imperial army. When, with the Grace of God, these lines shall have been delivered to you, the execution of their sense will depend entirely upon your exalted prudence".¹

While the two Generals were engaging in this epistolary duel, a messenger was hurrying to Ibrahim with a letter from his father, dated 9 June 1839. It read :

"I have received your dispatch in which you tell me that the enemy continues to advance and now occupies sixty villages beyond Aintab, that he has armed the natives, that he has incited the rebels to attack Akhard and to rob and assassinate the Governor of that place. You add that it is not prudent to allow the Turks to go on in this way and that you desire me to tell you what you should do.

"The aggressions of the enemy have exceeded all reasonable limits. If we show greater forbearance we shall be unable to stop him, because he is sowing discord right and left. The greater the patience that we have shown in order not to contravene the wishes of the great Powers, the more has our adversary advanced and aggravated matters. We are now forced to act. We must repulse their

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 197.

“attacks by a counter attack. As the enemy is the aggressor the Powers will exonerate us.

“I advise you, therefore, that upon receipt of this dispatch you should attack the troops of our enemy which have penetrated into our territory, and after you have expelled them you should advance upon the main army and give battle to it”.¹

These instructions reached Ibrahim after dusk. He wanted to attack the enemy the next morning at dawn. Soliman Pasha, the Colonel Sève of these pages, Ibrahim's right hand, was of a contrary opinion and held to the view that the presence of Prussian officers in Hafez's army made it quite probable that the enemy's position was strongly fortified. The Frenchman argued that a personal reconnaissance should precede an attack. Ibrahim, always willing to listen to reason, readily assented.

The next morning the two leaders undertook the important task of surveying the Turkish position in person. They approached so near the lines that the horse of one of their group was killed. They found that Nezib, where Hafez was entrenched, was impregnable and could not be taken by assault.² The Karsim, which flows at the foot of the hill where von Moltke and von Mulbach had pitched the Ottoman camp, formed a barrier which made it necessary that the Egyptians should retire and approach their quarry from another angle. Ibrahim and Soliman saw that the advantage thus held by the Turkish force had been due to the technical skill of the Prussian staff. They argued, however, that the Germans would not have the imagination to forestall the move which audacity pointed out to them.

They were right. But they took desperate chances. They backed their judgment of Prussian psychology and of Turkish density. Aimé Vingtrinier, Soliman Pasha's biographer, says that the plan was :

¹ Vingtrinier, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

² *Ibid.*, p. 312.

“Soliman’s idea, a stroke of genius if it succeeded, “the hallucination of a madman if it failed. But “he had absolute confidence in it and communicated “this faith to the entire army from its commander- “in-chief to the humblest private”.¹

The plan thus executed under Ibrahim’s authority, and for which he assumed responsibility, consisted in abandoning the camp then occupied, traversing the village of Mezzar from dawn to dusk, turning Mount Beiazar and then returning towards the enemy, veering towards the south and pointing towards the village of Kardikala. The whole strategy of this movement assumed that when von Moltke first perceived that the Egyptians had left their camp he would take it for granted that their leaders would not expose their flank as they contemplated doing and that he would thus give them a chance to carry out the first part of their plan before its significance had been grasped. It also accepted as a premise that when von Moltke awoke to the reality of the situation and desired to retire to a better point in order to attack the Egyptians before they had reached safe ground, the vanity of the Turkish Commander would prove obdurate and override the belated German logic.

It is said that the Prussian officers were so incensed when Hafez Pasha overruled them that they tendered their resignation. “A soldier does not resign on the eve of a battle”, retorted the Seraskier. This appeal to military ethics carried the day. Von Moltke did not retire. He did his best to cope with the situation. He readjusted his plans. He removed the batteries which were useless because the Egyptians had refused to be mowed down by them. He placed them where they could be of service. He knew that the coming dawn would mean the beginning of a decisive battle, and he feared that its outcome would be unfavourable to the Ottoman forces because

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

Ibrahim was so unorthodox that he refused to do what the canons of warfare made axiomatic and did those very things which elementary principles of strategy condemn. It was galling to the master tactician that an adversary refused to do what he ought to do. He preferred a MacMahon or a Bazaine who followed the rules to an Ibrahim or a Soliman Pasha who were laws unto themselves.

At peep of day on 24 June the Egyptian attack began. The Turks relied very largely on their cavalry. They felt that the contour of the land called for such a plan of battle. They may have been correct. We do not know enough about military strategy to venture an opinion. All that interests us is the fact that the Egyptian infantry resisted the cavalry charge and that the Turkish horsemen took to flight. Their rout brought disaster to the entire Ottoman army. By nine o'clock Ibrahim was the undisputed master of the field.

He entered Hafez's tent. If we can take Vingtrinier's evidence seriously on this point—and we do not—"it was as vast as a palace, decorated like the "drawing-room of an emperor, and most majestic".¹ Such language savours of exaggeration, but in this overdecorated tent there was one of those inlaid mother-of-pearl Turkish stools, which are as inartistic as they are useless and as uncomfortable as they are expensive. Upon it somebody had left Hafez Pasha's decorations and his correspondence.

When Ibrahim entered this temporary abode of luxury, which von Moltke must have considered violative of Article 212, section 14, paragraph 9, lines 3 and 4 of the rules regulating armies in the field, he was bathed in perspiration and covered with dust from head to foot. A smile of contempt played across his lips when he beheld this ostentatious display. He walked at once to the stool. The

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

decorations meant nothing to him. He soared above such empty vanities. The potentialities of those abandoned documents appealed to him. He stopped to examine them and discovered that they contained a Firman appointing Hafez Pasha his father's successor as Pasha of Egypt.¹ He had the other papers carefully scrutinized in order to ascertain whether they contained any information of military value. While these details were being looked after the Egyptian cavalry was sent in pursuit of the fleeing Turks and arrangements made for a general advance on three points, Marach, Malathia and Diarbekir.

We know from the Greek Consul-General's report to Athens that it was from Hafez Pasha's tent that Ibrahim sent his dispatch to Muhammad Ali announcing the defeat of the Turks. The battle had lasted but two hours. The messenger bringing the glad tidings reached Cairo on 3 June. The news was telegraphed thence to Alexandria where the Pasha was then in residence.² Another Consular report has it that the artillery duel had lasted only an hour and a half, and that the Turks suddenly broke and fled after sustaining losses of 5,000 men killed, and from 7,000 to 8,000 prisoners. Nothing is said about the wounded.³

Sultan Mahmud did not live to learn the issue of his great adventure against the most formidable of his vassals. Two days after the battle of Nezib and before the news of the Turkish defeat had reached Constantinople, he breathed his last. "It is evident", writes Viscount Ponsonby in commenting on his death, "that the disease had existed many months. He was not aware himself of his situation, so that he continued to do everything to hasten a catastrophe".

¹ *Egypte au XIX. Siècle*, par Edouard Gouin, Paris, Boizard, s.d. p. 454.

² Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

³ Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

What was this disease ? The doctors who attended the Imperial patient failed to agree. Dr. Milligen, the English physician who was consulted, said that delirium tremens carried off Mahmud. The German expert, Dr. Neuner, who was also in attendance, held that tuberculosis was the cause of death. The Hakim-Bashi, or chief Turkish doctor of the Palace, agreed with the Briton.¹

This controversy recalls the one which some forty odd years ago revolved around the death of Kaiser Frederick III. Unfortunately for Sir Morell Mackenzie there was then no Turk to act as umpire. We have pictured Mahmud as a man of vacillating temperament and a coward. In speaking thus of him and in mentioning Dr. Milligen's diagnosis we may have done him an injustice. We therefore hasten to add that the British Ambassador accredited to him said of him : " It is astonishing how much ' and how generally he is lamented. It is not when ' a man is dead, and no longer the dispenser of ' rewards and punishments, that the voice of flattery ' is raised. It therefore is reasonable to believe that ' a man so lamented was really esteemed when he was ' alive ".²

Another heart was spared the pang of learning of the rout of the Turks. We refer to that of Lady Hester Lucy Stanhope. She passed away when the opposing forces were about to spring at one another. Had she lived, she would probably have played a part in stiffening England's hostility to Muhammad Ali's designs. But the chancelleries of Europe did not require the driving power of a fearless woman to urge them to put pressure to bear upon the Pasha. France posed as his friend. Some historians say that Paris sought to capitalize that friendship. Whether it did or did not, as soon as it was known that the battle

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 306 *et seq.*

² *History of the Egyptian Revolution*, by A. A. Paton, London, Trubner and Co., 1863, p. 135.

of Nezib had annihilated the Turkish military machine the Quai d'Orsay hurried one of its agents, Captain Caillé, to the Egyptian camp.

Ibrahim had not stood still after wiping out Hafez's army. He had found the enemy's plan of campaign. It was divided into nine sections, the seventh of which stated specifically that the capture of Egypt should be the second objective of the Turks.¹ Any compunction that Ibrahim might have had in pushing forward was wiped out by the certainty thus thrust home that the Sultan had intended that this war should be one of extermination.

One of his first steps was to retake possession of Aintab. Its Mufti had been one of the Muslim leaders who had given wide circulation to the calumny that Ibrahim was a *rafdi* or heretic. This man had openly espoused the Turkish cause. When the Imperial army was defeated he sought to play the part of a champion of the Egyptians. Ibrahim's intelligence service was too well organized for such a fraud to be attempted with impunity. "You 'called me a heretic, forgetting that it was I who 'opened the Kaaba to True Believers. A woman 'may now safely undertake a pilgrimage to the Holy 'Cities unaccompanied. Can't you see that it was 'fundamentally unjust to call me a heretic when it 'is I who am the protector of the *Harramein* ? It 'is thou who art a *khanzir* (hog), for it is thou who 'wouldst fain foment trouble and prepare the ruin 'of Islam".² Cadalvène and Barrault, who recount the incident, fail to tell us whether the Mufti was pardoned or punished.

Rapid as may have been Ibrahim's advance, he was soon overtaken by Captain Caillé, the emissary of the French Government. This officer had reached Alexandria before news of the battle of Nezib had

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 281.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 280.

been received, but after everybody knew that a clash had become unavoidable. He had brought with him letters from the French Prime Minister, Marshal Soult, in which it was categorically stated that the five great Powers had decided to interfere in the strife and to stop hostilities if they had already commenced.¹ He obtained a letter from Muhammad Ali addressed to Ibrahim and hurried off to Syria. He overtook the victorious General on 29 June just as the army was bivouacking for the night at Inje-Sou.

Hospitality is ingrained in the soul of an Oriental. Caillé insisted that he had travelled night and day because he desired to be the first foreign representative to congratulate Ibrahim. This assurance added to the warmth of the welcome extended to him. For a time Caillé said nothing to dampen the ardour of the General's enthusiasm. It was not until questions had been asked about the movement of the European fleets that the Frenchman said : " I have a letter for " you from your father ". Ibrahim was delighted to know this and tore open the seal of the note. Deep was his chagrin to read in it an order to stop the forward movement of his troops. " This is impossible ", he exclaimed. " This letter was written before Nezib " had been fought and won. This battle and the " provocations leading up to it rescind these orders. " I assume the responsibility for refusing to execute " these orders ".

Unfortunately we have not been able to find Muhammad Ali's letter. We can judge of its general trend from the reply drafted by Ibrahim, written in the third person and beginning

" Here is what your servant humbly sets forth :

" He has taken cognizance of the orders of his " benefactor, Your Highness, orders contained in the " letter dated 16 June, which has been delivered to " him by M. Caillé, aide-de-camp of His Excellency

¹ Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

"the President of the French Council of Ministers, His Excellency the very magnificent Marshal Soult".

After having expatiated upon the provocative attitude of Hafez Pasha and after having shown that after the battle of Nezib the army had either to go forward or retire, as it could no longer obtain supplies where it was, he added :

"Whoever heard of a victorious army retiring ? Supplies were obtainable if the troops advanced. Matach and Biledjik became the objective of Your Highness's forces because supplies could be obtained there and because retirement was unthinkable. An advance upon Orfa and Marach subsequently became necessary, and for the same reasons. Let the proper authority decide what the army's subsequent moves shall be".¹

Vingtrinier says that when Ibrahim read Muhammad Ali's letter he was very angry and "*ne ménagea ni son père, ni la France, ni l'envoyé*".² Soliman Pasha's biographer does not deal with source material. His facts are culled very largely from Cadalvène and Barrault's *Deux Ans de l'histoire d'Orient*, published in 1840, which has been repeatedly cited here. These contemporary authorities do not say that Ibrahim "abused his father, France and the envoy". All that they affirm is that he used the language which we have already quoted. He was obviously deeply moved. His letter to Muhammad Ali makes this self-evident. His love, his respect, his veneration for his father were, however, so all-engrossing and so deeply rooted in his soul that we are not prepared to admit that even in his hour of anguish he abused his father. We readily grant that he upbraided both France and Captain Caillé. In fact, we are inclined

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, pièces justificatives, No. XVIII, vol. I, p. 385.

² Vingtrinier, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

to believe that he found an outlet for his feelings in denouncing France to his heart's content.

Caillé attempted to reason with Ibrahim and stressed Europe's opposition to the war, the orders of Muhammad Ali and the certainty of intervention by the Great Powers. The General refused to listen to these arguments, and replied :

" You are a student of history, aren't you ? Have you ever heard of a victorious General stopping his forward march ? If you have, I haven't ".

Undaunted, Caillé insisted that the two divisions heading towards Malatia and Konia should be diverted and that they should not cross the Taurus. Ibrahim refused, basing his decision upon the necessity of preventing the Turks from re-forming an army of invasion and upon the need of assuring the food supply of his own troops. But the Frenchman, holding to his ground, finally provoked this retort :

" I am prepared to turn over to you the command of my army and to give you my supply of cash. I am not land hungry. If you will preserve Syria and feed my troops, I shall be satisfied. I am not going to abandon Syria and my men must be fed ".

The interview lasted five hours. If, before it had ended, Ibrahim abused the pertinacious envoy, he can hardly be blamed. Few victorious Generals would have given five hours of their time to an emissary on a disagreeable mission. Not to be outdone, the next morning at dawn, when the troops were breaking camp, Caillé asked for another interview. Ibrahim's tent had already been dismantled. His bodyguard and his saddle horse were awaiting him. He gave the Frenchman a cold reception. There were no chairs or camp stools, but Caillé planted his feet into the dust and talked and talked and talked. Ibrahim finally said to him : " I do not want to invite you to leave, but if you talk for ten years you will be unable to change my mind."

Here he showed bad judgment. He indulged in prophecy. As long as he spoke of the past and dealt with the present he was on safe territory. When he sought to peer into the future, he trespassed upon dangerous ground. Caillé knew this. He had worked out a new campaign during the night. It was to say nothing, little or nothing about the Powers, and to hammer away at the wishes of Muhammad Ali.

These tactics broke through Ibrahim's guard. His love for his father was more than devotion ; it was an obsession, a cult, a religion. He simply could not adhere to a line of conduct which might possibly offend Muhammad Ali. Love, not fear, dictated this attitude. Still standing, and with his favourite stallion pawing the earth a few feet away, his resistance broke down. He agreed not to cross the Taurus and to confine his operations to the occupation of Marach and Orfa, points absolutely essential for the food supply of his army. Then and there he gave orders that a courier be sent to overtake the advance troops and stop their march.¹ In the hour of his greatest triumph an unwillingness to embarrass his father caused him to take a step which he deplored.

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 282.

CHAPTER XVII

THE NEW SULTAN

THE death of Sultan Mahmud gave a new orientation to the Egyptian question. His successor was Abdul Medjid, the twenty-first child of the deceased monarch, a boy not yet seventeen years of age. He had been educated under the auspices of his mother, a Georgian slave named Bezmi-Alem (or ornament of the world), who had been given as a present to his father. He was her only child and she adored him. Her influence dictated the choice of the new Grand Vizir. She gave her approval to Khosrew, who may aptly be described as Muhammad Ali's pet aversion. He made Khalil Pasha the Seraskier of the Turkish army.¹

The Ministry took advantage of the induction into office of the new sovereign to order that hostilities should cease. But Khosrew Pasha was not at all tactful in the letter he wrote to Muhammad Ali to that effect. He should have known that he and the Pasha were implacable enemies and that his presence at the Sublime Porte would make it extremely difficult to re-establish peace. It is too much to ask of a politician to expect him to efface his personality on the altar of patriotism. Khosrew did not give a thought to such a consideration. On the contrary, he hastened to send a note to Egypt conceived, in part, in these terms :

"As indicated in the letter which I addressed to
"Your Highness a few days ago, the very powerful
"and very magnificent Sultan, Abdul-Medjid Khan,

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 148.

“our August Master, having ascended the throne
 “as a result of the vacancy created by Divine Decree,
 “His Majesty, moved by an inspiration of that
 “righteousness and wisdom with which he is blessed,
 “deigned to say at the very moment of his accession :

“ ‘Certain acts of Muhammad Ali Pasha, Governor
 “ ‘of Egypt, having ill-disposed my father of glorious
 “ ‘memory, various incidents and events have since
 “ ‘taken place, nevertheless out of the plenitude of my
 “ ‘desire to promote the general weal and prosperity
 “ ‘of the peoples committed to my charge by Provi-
 “ ‘dence, and also in order to avoid the shedding of
 “ ‘any more Muslim blood, I am prepared to forget
 “ ‘the past and to forgive this governor on condition
 “ ‘that he will tender me his absolute submission. I
 “ ‘shall send him a decoration similar to those of my
 “ ‘other Vizirs and I shall confer upon him the
 “ ‘government of Egypt and vest in his son the right
 “ ‘of succession.’

“His Majesty, at the same time, appointed me,
 “unworthy though I am, his Grand Vizir ”.¹

Muhammad Ali subscribed to the last clause of this letter. All the others he treated with contempt. Had Khosrew Pasha deliberately attempted to crowd a series of mistakes into a few lines, he could hardly have expected to have invented more or graver blunders than he had compressed into this short space. He did not speak of independence but admitted the principle of heredity. As lately as the eve of the recent hostilities, 15 May 1839, Muhammad Ali had said to Cochelet, the French Consul-General, that he no longer exacted independence and would willingly compromise if the hereditary rights of his family were recognized.² Had the Grand Vizir not been an incorrigible blunderer, he might have been able to win the Pasha's good will by the proposition which

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 132.

² Politis, *op. cit.*, p. lix.

he had submitted. As it was, Muhammad Ali replied on 15 July 1839 :

“ I have had the honour to receive the letter in
“ which Your Highness apprises me that the very
“ magnificent, the very powerful, the very formidable
“ Sultan Abdul Medjid has ascended the Imperial
“ throne made vacant as a result of Divine predestina-
“ tion, that His Majesty grants me forgiveness and a
“ decoration similar to that accorded to other Vizirs,
“ that he recognizes the hereditary right of my children
“ to the Pashalik of Egypt, that Hafez Pasha has
“ received orders to stop his march and that Akkif
“ Effendi has been sent to me to explain how essential
“ it is that Muslim union be preserved inviolate.

“ Let me assure you that my first care has been
“ to express the hope that our very magnificent and
“ very powerful master, benefactor and emperor may
“ attain the realisation of his desires and extend far
“ and wide the shadow of his protection . . . but
“ as Your Highness's letter speaks only of Egypt and
“ as Akkif Effendi says that his mandate goes no
“ further than that, and does not apply to the grant
“ in perpetuity of the other provinces, your proposals
“ are unacceptable and your envoy prefers to leave
“ rather than uselessly prolong his sojourn, as he
“ deems it most opportune to tell Your Highness
“ verbally some things that may be pertinent ”.¹

This was Muhammad Ali's official reply to Khosrew. He also sent a personal letter to the Grand Vizir, in which he said “ You had better change your sentiments
“ or resign ”.² And knowing that the Sultana Validé, or Sultana-Mother, was then the real sovereign of Turkey, he wrote her a note in which he urged her to have Khosrew dismissed. The Prime Minister may not have known how to draft a letter, but he belonged to that category of officials which Thomas

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 173.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 175.

Jefferson, the author of the American Declaration of Independence, had in mind when he said : " Few die and none resign ". Turks are often dullards, but never cowards. Khosrew, therefore, held to his guns and did a little intriguing of his own.

He looked up Admiral Roussin, the sailor-diplomat who was still French Ambassador at Constantinople, and asked him if he would mind transmitting to Egypt, in the French diplomatic pouch, four letters addressed to four Turkish naval officers attached to the Ottoman fleet then at Alexandria. Sailors are always prepared to oblige sailors, and Roussin, forgetting that although a diplomatic pouch often carries anything from lipsticks to kitchen utensils, not to speak of confidential correspondence, it is always essential that the parcels be unsealed, accepted, in this instance, sealed letters. He also overlooked the fact that there might well have been special reasons why Khosrew desired to communicate in secret with these four men.

The fleet to which these officers were attached had been sent to Alexandria with orders to bombard that port. When the Captain-Pasha in charge of the expedition learnt that Sultan Mahmud had passed away, his suspicions became aroused by certain commands which modified his original instructions. " He assembled his officers ", writes Dodwell, " told them he was convinced that Khosrew meant to give the fleet up to the Russians, and that it would be better to join Muhammad Ali, with which they all agreed ".¹ The Captain-Pasha and his officers remained in Alexandria not to bombard that port but to give the weight of their guns to Muhammad Ali. It was in order to get the men who had betrayed Turkey to betray their Admiral that the Grand Vizir wrote these letters. The four sealed envelopes reached Alexandria on 24 July 1839. The French

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

Consul, in opening the diplomatic pouch, found the letters but no word of explanation. He had an audience that morning at the palace. He arrived ahead of time, and while waiting his turn casually mentioned to Artin Bey, of the Viceregal household, that he had the four letters with him and would deliver them as soon as he left the Palace.

Artin Bey was an Armenian, wideawake and faithful. He left the Consul in the anteroom and told the Pasha about the letters. Shortly after M. Cochelet had been admitted, Muhammad Ali said, with his most ingratiating smile : " Where are " those letters from Constantinople ? You will let " me see them, won't you ? " The request was made so casually and innocently that the Frenchman hastened to produce the four envelopes, and said : " These men are not in the inner port just now, and " I would greatly appreciate it if Your Highness would " facilitate me in having these letters brought out to " them ". The Pasha, never ceasing to beam complacently, replied : " If it means anything to you, " why certainly. I'll deliver them in person, if " necessary ". He then took the envelopes, and saying " But they're sealed ", to M. Cochelet's astonishment and dismay, broke all four seals.

The Consul quickly recovered his equanimity and protested most energetically. " But ", said Muhammad Ali, " do not be annoyed. I'll deliver " the letters just as safely as you could have done. " Let my secretary give you a receipt for them ". And so saying he had them read and saw that they were an appeal by Khosrew to the four naval officers to desert the Captain-Pasha and to attack Muhammad Ali. The French diplomat was powerless. He fumed, but could do nothing. He could not even report the incident to the Quai d'Orsay ; for if he did it would mean that Roussin, the Ambassador, would be reprimanded for having allowed a sealed

letter to go into the pouch addressed to some one not connected with the foreign service, and perhaps the Consul himself would be scolded for his part in the affair.¹

Muhammad Ali enjoyed the incident. He wrote to Khosrew telling him that his ruse had not succeeded. In the course of his comments the Pasha said : " All four letters addressed by Your Highness have been faithfully delivered in person to the officers to whom they were addressed ".²

The Pasha chuckled at the utter helplessness of the French Consul. He knew that Cochelet's hands were tied, and he delighted at having stolen a march on Khosrew. Not content with having told the Grand Vizir that this attempt to take advantage of the inviolability of a diplomatic pouch had proved abortive, Muhammad Ali sent a circular to all the Vizirs of the Empire, requesting their aid in removing Khosrew, whose conduct, he said, had played havoc with the interests of Islam and who had been the cause of the evils that had for years afflicted the Ottoman Empire.

The man who was thus assailed thought primarily of his own interests. He saw that Muhammad Ali was bent upon driving him out of office. He determined to keep his portfolio and to let the State pay the price. He made up his mind, therefore, to comply with all the demands that the Pasha had enumerated. They no longer envisaged independence ; they were centred upon obtaining hereditary government for Egypt, Syria and all the territory dominated by the Egyptian forces. When the Grand Vizir had congratulated himself on having evolved a formula which enabled him to retain his high office, the Internuncio, that is to say the Austrian Ambassador accredited to Constantinople, received instructions from Metternich which completely changed the situation.

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 180.

The death of Mahmud, the defeat of the Turkish army at Nezib, and the demands of Muhammad Ali filled the chancelleries of Europe with the darkest forebodings. The diplomats who were in power in London, Paris, St. Petersburg and Vienna were badly frightened. They did not know what might happen. Palmerston, Soult and Metternich feared that the Tsar might take advantage of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi in order to invade Turkey and occupy the shores of the Bosphorus. Dread of Russian complications temporarily effaced Muhammad Ali's personality from their minds.

"Circumstances", to quote Cadalvène and Barrault, "called for a prompt decision. M. de Metternich, thanks to the priority of his information, took the initiative and with a rare good chance worthy of his fame, his sense of responsibility caused him to exercise the greatest prudence in assuming the part of spokesman for Europe".¹

Metternich vetoed the idea of making any concession to Muhammad Ali. The Austrian Prime Minister was the champion of reaction, and was thus bitterly opposed to the Pasha who impersonated the cause of Liberalism. Dislike of Russia caused Palmerston to march to the music of obscurantism. His ambassador at Constantinople, Ponsonby—and here we quote from Dodwell—"suffered from a highly virulent form of Russophobia and smelt Russian intrigue in everything that transpired. He was particularly convinced that the Pasha was sold to Russia and had inoculated Palmerston with his ideas".² Soult had fought brilliantly at Austerlitz, but it has been said of him that "he had character only in front of the enemy". A brave soldier, he was a political mountebank. He dealt as unfairly with Muhammad Ali as he had with Napoleon. He

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 182.

² Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

had played fast and loose with his Emperor, off the field of battle, and he adopted the same tactics in his relations with the Viceroy, except that they had been at no time companions in arms.

Had Patrick Campbell been allowed to remain at Alexandria, where he had been the British representative since 1833, Ponsonby's "virulent form of "Russophobia" might have had as an antidote Campbell's intimate knowledge of the Egyptian question and his sincere regard for Muhammad Ali. Had Palmerston not given way to Metternich, Khosrew would probably have adhered to his intention and have ceded to Muhammad Ali the hereditary privilege demanded by the Pasha. Campbell "had "dared to suggest that the Turkish Empire might "be restored to progress and prosperity if Khosrew "were removed from office and Muhammad Ali "invited to co-operate in its reform".¹ When the Egyptian imbroglio was at its height this fearless diplomatic officer was unceremoniously displaced.

This procedure does not harmonize with British precedents. When diplomatic issues are pending London seldom removes the man on the spot. The whole aspect of the map of the Eastern Mediterranean might not be what it is to-day if Campbell had been retained at Alexandria and permitted to drive his arguments home. We are not in a position to prove what we are about to say, but we suspect that "the spirit" of Lady Hester Lucy Stanhope may have played a part in bringing about this recall. Palmerston was a man of impulses and of the temperament to yield to the epistolary bombardment of the granddaughter of a peer.

It was Campbell's duty to follow up the Homsy petition previously cited claiming money from Pitt's niece. Egypt was and is a capitulatory country. This means that the law of that land is personal and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

not territorial, and that Lady Hester was subject to the jurisdiction of the British Consulate-General at Alexandria. We must assume that Campbell investigated the Homsy claim, and we fear that his action may have offended the high-spirited champion of the Druses and the political opponent of Ibrahim. Give a woman a grievance, real or imaginary, and she will nurse it. We may be mistaken, but we are convinced that there is a connection between the Homsy petition claiming \$5,200 of Lady Hester Lucy Stanhope, Campbell's dismissal and Palmerston's support of Metternich's programme. At all events, we know that in September 1839 the British Consul-General "was curtly informed that Palmerston intended to "advise his recall—a measure which the Minister "had been contemplating for a year".¹

Kismet was bent upon complicating the Egyptian question and putting difficulties in the path of Muhammad Ali. Campbell's successor, Colonel Hodges, reached Alexandria in December 1839. Had he been in a position to bring to the discharge of his duties that objectivity, that broadness of vision, that keenness of perception characteristic of British foreign officers, the inherent justice of the Pasha's primary claims would, perhaps, have made such an impression on him that he might have defended the cause of Liberalism against the cohorts of Reaction. As it was we have Dodwell's assurance that the new British Consul-General

"proved to be hot-tempered, blustering and quarrel-
"some. He began by quarrelling with the packet
"agent at Alexandria for charging him postage in
"accordance with instructions from the Postmaster-
"General. He went on to confide in a most intem-
"perate Vice-Consul, who carried tales well calculated
"to inflame both the Consul-General and the Foreign
"Minister. His own conduct won him the cordial

¹ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

“dislike of the whole consular body, and before the
 “Consulate-General was reopened in 1841, he was
 “very wisely sent off to cool his temper in the less
 “trying climate of Hamburg. His services in the
 “crisis of 1840 seem to have been more than amply
 “recognised by permission to accept the insignia of a
 “Turkish General of division”.¹

The agreement between the Powers which caused Khosrew such intense relief bears date 28 July 1839, and reads :

“The five undersigned Ambassadors,² in conformity with instructions received yesterday from their respective courts, congratulate themselves that they are able to announce to the Sublime Porte that the agreement of the five Powers in respect of the Oriental question is certain and they request the Sublime Porte to take no definitive decision about the matter without their concurrence”.³

Emphatic as was this statement and clear-cut as was the assurance which it gave, Khosrew had such a wholesome respect for Muhammad Ali that when he wrote in reply to the Pasha's letter of 15 July definitely rejecting the proposals submitted by the Sublime Porte, he said, in part :

“The answer of Your Highness contains certain reproaches and points out that in the letter of which Akkif Effendi was the bearer the hereditary principle was restricted to Egypt. If it was not more explicit, it was because this was the first time that question was discussed. I took up the matter with the Ministry, and after laying all the facts before His Majesty, I was about to dispatch a messenger to you charged with negotiating with Your Highness when the Ambassadors of the five Great Powers submitted the collective note copy of which is

¹ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

² The Prussian Ambassador added his signature to that of the representatives of England, France, Russia and Austria.

³ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 188.

“ hereto annexed. This note shows that the Powers
“ are elaborating a definitive plan of settlement.
“ Even if I cannot and do not admit the principle of
“ the right of these Powers to interfere in the relations
“ between a liege lord and a vassal, inasmuch as the
“ Powers are discussing the matter it appeared to me
“ that it would be wiser to take no further action ”.¹

Muhammad Ali at once realised the significance of this intervention. Always resourceful, he determined to make a personal appeal to the Sultan. His letter, dated 2 August 1839, is an excellent piece of draftsmanship, but the issue had outgrown mere questions of verbiage. Abdul Medjid was nothing but a boy. Even if he had been a man, his influence would have been nil. Higher politics had taken possession of the field and they brushed aside such a puppet as the Ottoman figurehead.

In his reply to the Consuls-General, who gave their support to Khosrew, Muhammad Ali said :

“ I cherish the belief that the Powers will act
“ equitably with me. If they do, I shall have no
“ difficulty in accepting their decision. I really have
“ but two words to say. What I require is :
“ (1) that my hereditary rights apply to Syria, and
“ (2) that Khosrew be dismissed ”.²

The Pasha felt confident that Europe would give him what he wanted. The French press encouraged him. Paris did not take kindly to the agreement carried through on 28 July 1839. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had put Turkey under the tutelage of Russia. This new pact placed the Ottoman Empire under the overlordship of Europe. French public opinion considered that the Quai d'Orsay had been short-sighted. Debidour, who had written a carefully considered diplomatic history of Europe, points out why England, Russia and Prussia agreed

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 205.

² Politis, *op. cit.*, p. lxxi.

to Metternich's proposals, "but", says he, "we ask ourselves why did France, without hesitation, ally herself with her enemies to dictate to her friends?"

The answer may be that it was because Soult was then in power and because he was an opportunist. But whatever may have been the Marshal's motives for signing the joint agreement, a divergence of views soon arose between him and Palmerston. He was prepared to permit the principle of heredity to be applied to Syria. The English Foreign Minister wished to restore that province to Turkey. The Tsar took note of this divergence. He saw in it an admirable opportunity for estranging the young Queen of England from the mature King of France. He sent to London, therefore, a specialist in Near East affairs, a trained diplomat, Baron Brunnow, with instructions to win Palmerston's favour.

Metternich was alive to the potentialities of the hour. He dreaded the establishment of sympathetic relations between Liberal England and Tsarist Russia. He felt that if Brunnow cemented Anglo-Russian friendship, the cause of Conservatism would suffer. He therefore looked at the clock and decided to put it back. He did this by proposing to tear up the accord of 28 July 1839, and replace it by another pact. He submitted the new draft to the Powers on 20 November 1839. It read :

"Egypt and Turkey are advised :

"(1) that the Powers are not opposed to direct agreement between the Sublime Porte and Muhammad Ali and

"(2) that collective measures will be taken against Ibrahim should he attempt to advance".¹

Shortly after Metternich had launched this bomb the Soult Ministry got into trouble. Muhammad Ali had given France many commercial privileges and had many French partizans. His popularity had been

¹ Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 300.

increased and spread by Adolphe Thiers, who regarded him as a second Napoleon and who saw in the Egyptian question an opportunity for Paris to regain her lost prestige in Western European affairs.¹ He hammered away at the Soult Cabinet and finally overthrew it on 13 January 1840, when the Government of the day proposed a bill that provided for the dower of the Duc de Nemours, the Prince whose name, it will be recalled, had been put forward for the then inexistent Greek throne.

Before Louis Philippe gave Thiers his commission he went over the entire Egyptian question with his new Prime Minister. They believed that they had foreseen all possible complications that might arise. They were one in desiring the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, but, at the same time, they acknowledged a benevolent interest in Muhammad Ali. They considered that Alexandria was the logical place for the establishment of a French sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. They knew of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement and it irritated them. They determined to prevent Russia and England from crushing the Pasha.²

All this bickering and dickering, all this diplomatic manœuvring stiffened Muhammad Ali's attitude. He saw that Europe was no longer acting in unison. He became convinced that if he remained adamant, the Powers would not unite and put the thumbscrew on him. But he overlooked the fact that Palmerston was prepared to have him kept within the bonds of vassalage even if England had to do it alone. "Paris might gesticulate its sympathy for Muhammad Ali and the 'Napoleon of Peace' protest his adoration of the *nouvel Alexandre in Egypt*", writes Guedalla, and then quotes Palmerston as having asked :

"But would they hazard a naval war for such an

¹ *Thiers and the French Monarchy*, by John M. S. Allison, London, Constable and Company, Ltd., s.d., p. 267.

² *Ibid.*, p. 279.

"object? Where are they to find ships to equal
"or to contend with the British navy alone, leaving
"out the Russian navy, which in such a case would
"join us? What would become of Algiers if they
"were at war with a Power superior to France at
"sea? Would they risk a continental war? And
"for what? Could they help Muhammad Ali by
"marching to the Rhine? And would they not be
"driven back as fast as they went? . . . The
"French may talk big, but x x x x".¹

While the French press in those days, to repeat Palmerston's language, may have "talked big", the Quai d'Orsay was most circumspect. Its strategy is best set forth in its dispatch to Cochelet :

"You must not even suggest to the Viceroy
"too formally a direct arrangement with the Porte,
"for such a counsel would arouse, in England, an
"antagonism that it would be well to avoid. It is
"enough if we bring Muhammad Ali to understand
"how much it will be of advantage to him, if he
"facilitates the efforts of those who are working to
"make the attitude of the Porte more favourable to
"him".

It looked for a time as if this policy would bear fruit, for in June Khosrew Pasha was forced to resign. But Palmerston was not the type of man to be defeated by such tactics. He saw that it meant that the tide had turned in favour of France. He met the move by obtaining the signature of Russia, Austria and Prussia to a treaty known as the Pact of London and dated 15 July 1840, by which Muhammad Ali was to receive the Pashalik of Egypt on an hereditary tenure and Northern Syria for life. If he delayed acceptance beyond ten days he was to receive Egypt alone ; if he refused the four Powers would blockade him ; if he advanced on Constantinople the Powers would co-operate at the Sultan's request in its defence.

¹ Guedalla, *Palmerston*, p. 224.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CURTAIN FALLS

THIS pact outraged Thiers' sense of dignity. A little man with a big head, he was of humble origin and socially ambitious. In other words, he was always pushing himself forward and was, at the same time, very sensitive. But he was above all things a patriot. He was just the kind of statesman to be deeply offended at Palmerston's coup. He saw in it an utter disregard of France and an attempt to brush her aside as if she were a negligible quantity. It meant to him that Europe had determined to isolate his country. He also interpreted it as an effort on Palmerston's part to bring about an estrangement between him and his sovereign.

Palmerston did not confine his efforts to this piece of diplomatic finesse. Delicate manipulation was not his speciality. He may be described as a champion of hammer-and-tongs methods. He is, perhaps, more aptly portrayed by the American expression, "he carried a chip on his shoulder". At all events, he was a fighter. His family title was an Irish peerage. Their main connection with that island may have been "limited to a graceful consent to adorn its "nobility and live upon its revenue",¹ but he had that ingrained love for a shindy characteristic of Irishmen. As soon as he became convinced that Thiers was pursuing what he called a selfish policy he issued instructions to Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, to stir up a revolt against Muhammad

¹ Guedalla, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Ali. This means that because France and England had become engaged in a diplomatic duel, Ibrahim's good work in Syria was to be brushed aside and the torch of insurrection lighted in a land which was on the high road to prosperity.

A British fleet was dispatched to the Syrian coast to incite the Syrians to revolt, to supply them with arms and to enrich their leaders. Dodwell, the English historian whose name we have frequently cited, brings out this fact in this laconic statement :

"On September 11 (1840) a force of British "marines and Turkish troops were landed on the "Syrian coast near Beyrout. For months a general "unrest and Ottoman emissaries had been stirring "up the Syrians to revolt".¹

This date is somewhat misleading. It seems to imply that practically two months elapsed between the Pact of London (15 July) and this aggressive action (11 September). This creates the impression that, while French intrigue and Thiers' bumptiousness may have forced Palmerston's hand, even if he had an Irish title and an Irish temperament, he held himself under control for fifty-eight days. We read however, in the published archives of the Alexandria Greek Consulate that some days before 16 July several British men-of-war arrived off the coast of Syria.² Their presence there obviously did not mean that their intentions were necessarily hostile. Another dispatch, dated 26 July, contains this statement :

"The Government (of Muhammad Ali) continues 'to receive information about the success of the 'suppression of the Syrian revolt. Private correspondence, nevertheless, brings out the fact that 'there are certain localities where, encouraged by the 'appearance of British men of war, the rebels have 'not yet surrendered.'"³

Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

² Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

On 16 September, the Greek Consul-General advised Athens in this sense :

“ During the past ten days we have been informed
“ of the close blockade of Syria which has not been
“ preceded by a proclamation. The Government
“ have here received news by land to the effect that
“ the English have commenced other hostilities.
“ They landed, in the environs of Beirut, after the
“ arrival of the Ottoman fleet, about 3,000 Albanians
“ and bombarded the camp and an empty shop located
“ near the shore. The landing took place at a spot
“ where other troops may, if need be, be disembarked.
“ The English and the Turks are using all means to
“ attain their objective. They have promised Soliman
“ Pasha the hereditary governorship of Cyprus and
“ Mahmud Bey the governorship of Beirut, the
“ Pashalik of Tripoli and other similar things. Ibrahim
“ Pasha is at Beirut, having left, at the head of his
“ troops, his son, aged twelve, under the guardianship
“ of four of his most famous generals ”.

A postscript to this report is couched in these words :

“ We have just learnt most positively that no troops
“ were landed in Syria and that all that took place was
“ the bombardment ”.¹

Consul-General Tossizza appears to have allowed an entire month to pass without sending any further dispatches to his Foreign Office. He awoke from his lethargy on 16 October 1840 and advised his government that :—

“ Herewith you will find copies of three documents
“ dealing with the blockade of the coasts of Egypt and
“ Syria. I should add that the note containing the
“ declaration of the blockade was sent by small boats
“ attached to the blockading squadron. The date of
“ this notice is shown on the envelopes addressed to
“ the Government and to the Consulates. But the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

"Viceroy was not at Alexandria when these notices were received. The local authorities did not deliver them and they did not reach the Consulates until 10 October".¹

Muhammad Ali was practically a century ahead of his epoch. President Wilson—or was it Lloyd George or Lord Northcliffe?—devised in 1918 the seductive formula that the Allies were fighting not Germany but militarism, not the German people but the Hohenzollerns. This was theft of the Pasha's thunder. When British troops bombarded Syria, when British guns armed Syrian insurrectionists and when British money stimulated the patriotism of Syrian leaders he said "I am not at war with England but with Lord Palmerston". Germans affirm that President Wilson—or was it Lloyd George or Lord Northcliffe?—was not serious when the slogan "Peace with Germany but war with the Kaiser" resounded from walls, battlements and chimney tops. Muhammad Ali was obviously in good faith, for "he not only suffered the British mails to pass, but took special measures to protect (British) travellers using the Suez route".²

While his father was thus proving that he was tolerant and generous, Ibrahim was being hard pressed. Dodwell says that

"his army was scattered, weak, lacking stores and supplies. In October the Druses rose. On 10 October at Bait-Hannis, Commodore Napier met and defeated Ibrahim in person at the head of a small body of troops and captured his standard. On 4 November Acre, which had resisted Ibrahim for six months, surrendered after a single day's bombardment. The Egyptian power in Syria had collapsed".³

This is an accurate picture of the situation. What

¹ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

² Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

³ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

with Turks scheming against him because his rule spelt progress, Orthodox Christians fighting him because his Government menaced their traditional vested right to make money as war profiteers, Muslims opposing him because he believed in religious liberty and in equality before the law, Druses warring against him because the Catholic Maronites had originally supported him, England fanning and subsidizing this discontent and encouraging anarchy by blockading the Syrian coasts and bombarding one of its strategic points, Ibrahim would have been a fool if he had uselessly sacrificed the blood of his troops.

Ibrahim was not a coward—like Robert E. Lee, of Virginia, he had a record of achievement to defend him against this accusation. Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox when he became convinced that, while he could still fight, he could not arrest the doom of fate. He refused to become the leader of a band of guerillas. He bowed to the inevitable with a fortitude that does him honour. Ibrahim was, in this respect, a Muslim Lee.

England was at war with France, although London and Paris were at peace. Palmerston was mistaken, but he was satisfied, in his own mind, that Thiers was a conceited, double-dealing second-class journalist converted into a politician and masquerading as a statesman. He had made up his mind to thrash the little fellow, and the weight of his ire fell upon Egypt's work in Syria.

Ibrahim was a fatalist. He saw that Allah had registered an irreversible verdict. But he did not abandon his charge. He stood by his guns until the father whom he loved with a love that only a strong man could feel, recalled him on 29 November 1840.

Thiers, at whom Palmerston was striking when hitting Ibrahim, was navigating troubled Parliamentary seas while the Irish peer was loosening his muscles. Louis Philippe was perfectly willing to

push French interests in Egypt, but he was determined not to become involved in war. "He allowed Thiers "to continue his warlike preparations, but", to quote Allison's words, "in private, he remarked to Saint-Aulaire, who came to him after a long conference with the President: 'There you are well instructed, my dear ambassador. Your official theme is excellent, but for your private instructions, let me tell you that I will not allow myself to be carried too far by my little minister. At least he wants war, and I do not want it, and when he will not allow me any other recourse, then I shall break with him rather than break with you'".¹

With his King working against him, French ministries traditionally unstable and Palmerston making it clear that he had either to fight, resign or be overthrown, it is obvious that Thiers was in a critical position. He did not desire war. His was a policy of bluff. But if he was seeking to deceive everybody and deceiving nobody, Palmerston was in deadly earnest. The French Parliament and King became convinced of this. At the end of October 1840, when Ibrahim was reaping the harvest which Thiers had sown, the Paris Cabinet, whose blundering and blustering caused Egypt the loss of Syria, went out of office.

If the bombast of a Frenchman drove Ibrahim into war, the idiosyncrasies of an Englishman played havoc with the elaboration of the terms of peace. The British navy which blockaded the coast of Syria was under the orders of Admiral Stopford. His second in command was Commodore (afterwards Sir Charles) Napier, who distinguished himself by leading the storming column at Sidon on 26 September 1840. On 15 November Napier was directed to appear off Alexandria with a strong fleet. "He was", says the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "a man of undoubted energy

¹ Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

"and courage, but of no less eccentricity and vanity". It required neither energy nor courage to attack Alexandria. Muhammad Ali was too sensible a man to give battle to the British navy. The assignment given to Napier, on the other hand, required an officer who was neither eccentric nor vain.

His virtues were not called for in Alexandria harbour, and his faults were just what were needed to add to the complications of the Egyptian question. His defects impaired his usefulness to such an extent that, again to quote the same standard authority, "he caused great offence to many of his brother officers by his behaviour to his superior, Admiral Stopford, in the Syrian war and was embroiled all his life in quarrels with the Admiralty".¹

Napier reached Alexandria on 21 November 1840. We do not understand why he took so long to get there. He at once let the Egyptian Government know that Alexandria was not invulnerable and could easily suffer the fate of Acre. He went so far as to add that if Muhammad Ali thought of founding a dynasty, he may be lucky if he does not again become a simple Pasha.²

Sailors are not supposed to be skilled in the niceties of diplomatic language and this crudeness meant nothing. It served, however, as an opening wedge. Before he had finished the correspondence, Napier assumed the prerogative of negotiating with Muhammad Ali. On 27 November, though invested with no diplomatic authority, but led on either by his eccentricity or by his vanity, possibly by both, he signed a convention with the Pasha, who agreed to evacuate Syria and to restore the Ottoman fleet on condition that he be recognised as hereditary governor of Egypt.³ It was in virtue of this understanding that Ibrahim was recalled.

¹ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 13th Edition, vol. XIX, p. 169, s.v. "Napier, Sir Charles."

² Sabry, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

³ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

Muhammad Ali never doubted for an instant that Napier was fully empowered by the British Foreign Office to conduct these negotiations. He did not ask the Commodore to produce credentials. He assumed that Napier's uniform was a guarantee of good faith. He looked upon the word of an Englishman as being the best of passports. It is possible that Napier may have said that he was acting upon his own initiative and without instructions from London. Such a statement, if made, would have meant to Muhammad Ali that the Commodore was falling back upon a diplomatic subterfuge. The Pasha could not have conceived of a British naval officer, in command of a blockading squadron, discussing terms of peace without a mandate from England. And because Napier was "eccentric and vain", his idiosyncrasy made it impossible for him to realise the gravity of his error.

Muhammad Ali was also in good faith ; his good faith was engendered by that respect for an Englishman's uniform which tradition had converted into the best of credentials. And whatever doubts he may have had in regard to Napier's mandate were dissipated by the fact that it was the British Consul-General, Mr. Larking, who acted as the intermediary between him and the Commodore.

We make this latter statement upon the authority of the Greek Consular archives.¹ It emphasizes the incongruity of the entire situation. If we can accept as accurate the official report submitted to Athens, a British fleet bombarded the Syrian coast without a preliminary proclamation of any sort.² The Pasha blamed Palmerston and not Great Britain for this hostile demonstration, and refused to admit that he was at war with Queen Victoria's Government. He therefore allowed Her Britannic Majesty's Consul to

¹ Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

² Palmerston obviously considered that the notice given by the Powers on 15 July, 1840, sufficed.

remain at Alexandria. This representative of the Foreign Office—he did not represent solely the Board of Trade, because he had diplomatic attributes—collaborated with the British Commodore blockading Alexandria in carrying out unauthorized negotiations looking towards the re-establishment of a peace that had never, technically speaking, been officially disturbed.

The same Greek Consular dispatch which affirms that Consul-General Larking acted as the liaison officer between Napier and Muhammad Ali adds that the Commodore's proposals were to the effect that if the Pasha accepted the offer submitted by the Powers on 15 July, Napier felt convinced that it was still open and that by taking advantage of it the horrors of war would end.

Consul-General Tossizza advised Athens on 26 October 1840 that the officer commanding the British squadron had on that day informed the Consular corps that the blockade of Alexandria was officially suspended until 20 November.¹ On 10 December word reached Alexandria that the Sublime Porte had, on 2 December, notified the various Consulates that the blockade of the Syrian ports was raised.² These steps appear to have convinced not only Muhammad Ali but also the Greek Consul-General that peace was in sight and that Napier was the moving spirit behind this tendency. But, on 16 December, matters underwent a sudden change. It appears that Alexandria—and by Alexandria we mean Muhammad Ali and the Consular corps—then learnt for the first time that Admiral Stopford “annulled the Napier agreement . . . and wrote the Pasha, under date “of 6 December, advising him to accept the proposals “which will be made to him officially by the four “allied Powers in accordance with the terms of the

¹ Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, p. 123.

"letter addressed by Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty on 14 November".¹

The concluding lines of this report bring out the difficulties created by this unexpected turn of affairs. Tossizza allowed over three weeks to pass without referring either to Napier or Stopford, but on 18 January 1841 he informed his Foreign Office that :

"On the thirteenth a vessel arrived from Marmaras or Marmarizza bringing Napier and carrying official letters from Stopford to Muhammad Ali which confirmed that he would be given the hereditary government of Egypt, but without England's guarantee. Napier's mission had certainly no object other than to prepare the Viceroy to submit to the Sultan and to execute that which had been arranged. Muhammad Ali answered at once that he accepted everything and one of his steamers left immediately for Syria with letters giving instructions for the evacuation of Syria".²

We learn from this same source that Ibrahim reached Cairo a few days before 6 March 1841 and also that the reading of the official *Hatti* definitely settling the war took place on 10 June.³ The Greek Consul-General in reporting this latter fact remarked :

"We can affirm with certainty that the curtain has now definitely fallen upon the long scene of Turco-Egyptian affairs".⁴ But this happy ending to a complicated plot did not come about quite as quickly as these official documents would seem to indicate. Dodwell tells us, for example, that the diplomatic world of Constantinople was flabbergasted when it heard that Muhammad Ali had issued orders to Ibrahim, on 29 November 1840, to evacuate Syria. The Ambassadors knew nothing of what Napier had

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 130.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

done and thus were unable to understand why the Pasha had taken so radical and apparently so inexplicable a decision. "Old Napier", wrote Hodges, dropping for the nonce his consular dignity, "has kicked up a devil of a row among the *corps diplomatique* here".¹

It appears that there had been method in the madness of the Commodore whom the *Encyclopædia Britannica* calls "eccentric and vain". He had learnt that Palmerston and the English Cabinet had, on 10 October 1840, receded from the radical position taken on 15 July 1840 and referred to at the end of the preceding chapter. In deference to French feeling, and perhaps to facilitate Louis Philippe in overthrowing Thiers, they had agreed to recommend Muhammad Ali for the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt provided he speedily withdrew his troops from the other Turkish provinces and gave up the Ottoman fleet.²

It is part of the training of a seaman to study currents, tides, and drifts, to watch the barometer and to know from what quarter the wind blows. Commodore Napier applied these principles to his experiment in higher politics. He thus saw that Palmerston and the English Cabinet were steering towards conciliation with Muhammad Ali, and he decided to direct his course in the same direction. But professional diplomats live in a rarified atmosphere. They would have to look down to keep track of currents, tides and drifts, and that would be beneath their dignity. To study a barometer would be to consult something commonplace, and thus to descend from their pedestals. To observe the direction of the wind would be to use ordinary common sense, and that would be abhorrent to them. So it came about that while Napier knew what Palmerston and the

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

² Foreign Office instructions to Ponsonby, 15 October, 1840 (F.O. 78.390) quoted in Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

English Cabinet wanted and sought to obtain results in an unorthodox way, Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, preferred regularity to results, the protocol to peace. It is for this reason that we read in *The Founder of Modern Egypt* :

"When Napier's agreement reached London, it was promptly approved. Ponsonby's prejudices still invented obstacles in the way of a full settlement. He induced the Porte to issue a Firman—the *Hatti Sherif* of 13 February 1841—containing a number of unwelcome restrictions. This, on Napier's advice, Muhammad Ali rejected. Both Palmerston and Metternich urged the modification of the grant. This was done by a Firman of 1 June. It recognised a hereditary right by seniority in the direct male descendants of the Pasha. It fixed the tribute at 80,000 purses of piastres. It limited the Pasha's army to 18,000 men save in time of war or by express permission. It forbade the building of new ships".¹

Muhammad Ali's brain and Ibrahim's sword thus won for Egypt what many historians consider virtual independence. A considerable measure of autonomy was assured. The hereditary principle was admitted. But the wider frontiers which at one time appeared to be obtainable were not granted. Europe vetoed what Turkey would have been forced to concede.

With peace thus re-established Ibrahim, like Cincinnatus, went back to his plough. Tossizza reported this fact to his Government on 6 October 1842.² In previous dispatches he had advised Athens that "the situation is calm. Almost all the principal military and political personages are now devoting themselves to looking after their farms".³ Quiet continued to reign, and the ship of State maintained

¹ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

² Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

an even keel until suddenly, on 27 July 1844, the Greek Consul-General felt the need of sending this report to his Foreign Office :

"The mail steamer having been unable to depart on account of a strange phenomenon which has happened to the Viceroy, I must add to what I have already written that His Highness left here (Alexandria) this morning having said that he was going to Mecca. None of his intimates or employees were on the pier because he had given instructions that he wanted to see and hear nobody. His Highness brought his chemist and a few servants with him. When embarking he saluted nobody, but as the boat moved away he saluted. The French Consul wrote yesterday to the Foreign Office to learn what was going on. The Minister sent the letter to the Viceroy with a request that he be instructed in regard to what answer to give. His Highness said : 'Draft any sort of reply that suits you. Things are in a bad way.' Most people attribute this to some sort of madness. The country is very much disturbed".¹

The next report, dated six days later, shows how unnecessary it is to become excited when alarming reports are published in the daily press. We say this because after having sent this most sensational dispatch to his Ministry, Tossizza wrote that Muhammad Ali had gone to Cairo, cancelled his Mecca trip and that "reliable information has reached us that His Highness now enjoys perfect health, that his malady has ceased and he is quite affable and perfectly calm."²

If the Greek Consul-General was thus somewhat precipitate in informing Athens that Muhammad Ali had had a nervous breakdown, he was so careful not to make a like mistake a second time that his archives

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

fail to show that he advised his Foreign Office that Ibrahim had fallen ill. We know, however, from Vingtrinier's *Soliman Pacha* that in September 1845 what is described as a *grave maladie d'entrailles* forced the General to take a cure at San Guitano, near Pisa. These waters did him no good, and he repaired to Vernet in the Pyrenees.¹ Better results appear to have been achieved, for he and Soliman subsequently visited Paris and London and enjoyed themselves. He returned to Alexandria on 8 August 1846 in the best of health.²

Months passed, and the Greek Consul-General on 15 February 1848, reported to his Government that, "the Viceroy continuing to be dangerously ill, the "medical board has decided that he should go to "Europe for his health".³ This time Tossizza carefully refrains from indulging in diagnosis or prognosis. A laconic message sent from Alexandria, on 13 September 1848, that is to say seven months later, carries this sense of prudence so far that it merely says :

"Ibrahim Pasha arrived here last Saturday, the tenth instant, by the same two-decked boat on which he had left. The next day he departed for Cairo to take over the reins of government, having been put in his father's place by the supreme orders of the Sultan. Absolute tranquillity obtains in Egypt, everything going on as formerly, with all the "regularity and the security desirable".⁴ On 26 September 1848 Tossizza reported that on 22 September a formal firman had been read nominating Ibrahim Viceroy of Egypt. Nothing was said in regard to the reason for supplanting Muhammad Ali. The report, nevertheless, added : "Ibrahim's

¹ Vingtrinier, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

² Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

health is far from perfect".¹ A dispatch sent on 30 September confirmed the announcement of the investiture of Ibrahim, said nothing about why his father was displaced, and brought out the fact that the health of the new Viceroy improved one day and grew worse the next, for he is "suffering from a grave chronic malady".²

On 24 October 1848 news was sent to Athens that Ibrahim's condition was most serious.³ On 7 November he was reported somewhat better but not out of danger.⁴ He passed away on 10 November 1848, at 1 a.m. He was then 59 years of age. Abbas Pasha, son of Toussun and grandson of Muhammad Ali, succeeded him.⁵

It is with surprise that we read in Dicey's *The Story of the Khedivate*:

"Ibrahim was well qualified to carry on the policy of Muhammad Ali. But before his death Ibrahim had become subject to fits of insanity. He was the victim of insomnia, unable, as he is reported to have said himself, to sleep at night, because in his dreams he was haunted by the ghosts of the men he had done to death".⁶

We have been unable to find any evidence that Ibrahim was insane. The Russian archives state specifically that he died of an affliction of the chest.⁷ Mental disorders are not mentioned. We know that when Muhammad Ali was advanced in years his mind failed. Ibrahim took over the sceptre. It is most unlikely that the Sublime Porte would have chosen one mentally afflicted man to replace another. We are inclined to think that Dicey confused the father

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

² *Ibid.*, p. 174.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *The Story of the Khedivate*, by Edward Dicey, London, Rivington's, 1902, p. 15.

⁷ Through the courtesy of René Cattani Bey we are able to quote from an unpublished report, dated 10 November, 1848.

with the son. Ibrahim had no reason to fear the ghosts of the dead. He had always done his duty as he had seen it. Moreover, the so-called guilty conscience of hardened criminals seldom interferes with their sleep. Records show that murderers of the worst type usually sleep soundly not only during their sojourn in the condemned cells, but also on the very eve of their execution.

On 7 August 1849, the Greek Consulate-General advised Athens of the death, on 2 August 1849, at 11.30 a.m., of the "genial and indefatigable Muhammad Ali".¹ Twenty years older than his illustrious son, he was 79 when he breathed his last.

These deaths have all the elements of an anti-climax. Muhammad Ali has left his mark upon the history of the world. He had a long life and an eventful reign. Old age took its toll of him and his mental faculties gave way under the strain. He was the father of eighty-three children, but only five sons and two daughters appear to have survived him.² The great hopes of the middle years of his reign were not entirely realised. The most devoted and respectful of sons, Ibrahim was more than a warrior; he was a great soldier who had the vision of a statesman. Impetuous in youth, maturity converted him into a man who had the moral courage to be a conservative but who remained a liberal in all matters bearing upon religious liberty. Had he been vouchsafed a long reign, there is every reason to believe that he would have launched his country on the high road to prosperity. As it was, he preceded his father to the grave and was ill when he took over the sceptre. To-day his name is practically unknown. He was so devotedly attached to his father that he would willingly have called himself Ibrahim the Effaced.

¹ Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

² P. et H., *op. cit.*, p. 36.

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